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©European Communities, 2003ABSTRACT 
 
This paper presents results of an on-going joint European Commission / OECD 
project, aimed at monitoring the direct influence of tax and benefit instruments on 
household incomes. Indicators of financial work incentives are needed for identifying 
any undesired influences of taxes and social transfers on people’s work decisions. At 
the same time, a central part of recent tax and benefit reform strategies has been to 
reduce reliance on welfare by “making work pay”, that is, to make work an 
economically attractive option relative to welfare. It is therefore desirable to monitor 
the effects of such policies as well as the potential for further reform. 
Marginal effective tax rates (METRs) are calculated in order to show what part of a 
change in earnings is “taxed away” by the combined operation of taxes, social 
security contributions (SSCs), and any withdrawal of earnings related social benefits. 
Three different types of METRs are calculated in order to measure so-called low-
wage, unemployment and inactivity traps, that is situations where incentives to work 
are low. 
 
The results allow the identification of countries and family types that face little 
financial incentive to increase work effort or to take up a job. Recent reforms to 
“make work pay” and to reduce the tax burden on labour, especially for low wage 
earners, have contributed to lower marginal (effective) tax rates. This has diminished 
the risk of potential low-wage and unemployment traps at certain income levels. Yet, 
despite such efforts there are still fundamental trade-offs in the ability of low income 
support programmes to be effective in relieving poverty and to have well-targeted 
benefits while maintaining the necessary work incentives. We have seen that the risk 
of negative effects on work incentives remains particularly high in some member 
states. The search for a suitable solution to the “challenging triangle” of welfare, - that 
is, designing a satisfactory income-support scheme for low-income families, whilst 
minimising disincentives to work and avoiding excessive budgetary cost - remains the 
key issue in the agenda for the reform of tax-benefit systems in many European 
countries. Continued monitoring of the mechanics of tax-benefit systems can serve as 
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  I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper presents the results of an ongoing joint European Commission / OECD 
project
1 aimed at monitoring the direct influence of tax and benefit instruments on 
household incomes. The project uses and extends OECD tax-benefit models to 
compute a range of work incentive indicators such as marginal effective tax rates on 
earned income. Given widespread concern about possible adverse effects of taxes and 
benefits on unemployment levels, it has become increasingly important to regularly 
assess both the financial incentives to work and the degree of protection from 
unemployment related poverty risks. Indicators of financial work incentives are 
needed to identify any undesired influences of taxes and social transfers on people’s 
work decisions. At the same time, a central part of many recent tax and welfare 
reform strategies has been to reduce reliance on welfare by “making work pay”, that 
is, to make work an economically attractive option relative to welfare. It is therefore 
desirable to monitor the effects of such policies as well as the potential for further 
reform. 
It is important in this context to distinguish between “incentives” and “incentive 
effects”. While measuring financial work incentives is an integral part of any tax-
benefit policy evaluation exercise, employment levels, unemployment rates and total 
hours worked are of course not determined exclusively by the size of benefits and the 
taxes needed to finance them. First, a lack of suitable jobs can give rise to involuntary 
unemployment which will persist to the extent that the legal and institutional 
framework prevents wage adjustment mechanisms from aligning supply and demand. 
Secondly, numerous non-financial considerations will play a role in the decision of 
whether and how many hours to work. In addition, any change in labour supply as a 
result of tax-benefit policy differs across population groups so that small changes in 
total labour supply may mask important changes for certain groups of individuals. 
Given these factors and the different roles they are likely to play across countries, it is 
perhaps not surprising that empirical results of the effects of taxes and benefits on 
total unemployment differ considerably across studies.
2 
The evidence is somewhat clearer when one restricts the analysis to one side of the 
labour market. Microeconometric studies of the sensitivity of labour supply with 
respect to changes in net income (and, thus, taxes and benefits) generally find small 
elasticities for men, and frequently also for the population as a whole. Estimates of 
elasticities are, however, much larger for certain groups of people such as secondary 
earners (mainly married women) or single parents.
3 It is clear, therefore, that looking 
at how tax-benefit policy might influence the opportunity set of a single “average 
person” will not generally suffice. Instead, it is desirable to analyse how taxes and 
                                                 
1 Within the European Commission services, the project is financed jointly by DGs ECFIN, EMPL and 
TAXUD and co-ordinated by EUROSTAT. 
2 Influential studies include Daveri, F. and G. Tabellini, (2000) and Nickell, S., (1997). 
3 An overview of earlier studies is provided by Pencavel, J., (1986). See also Atkinson, A.B. and G.V. 
Mogensen, (eds.), (1993); Smith, N., S. Dex, J.D. Vlasblom and T. Callan (2003). An overview of 
several studies is provided by Blundell, R. and T. MaCurdy, (1999). - 6 - 
benefits affect people living in different household circumstances and with a range of 
different earnings levels. 
To obtain a fuller picture of the financial consequences of work and unemployment 
this paper will therefore compare the effects of taxes and benefits on household 
incomes for different family types and earnings levels. By comparing net incomes at 
different wage levels and working hours, one can use these results to show the net 
impact of individual labour supply decisions on disposable income. While this in itself 
does not tell us how changes in tax-benefit policy will actually influence labour 
supply or unemployment levels, it contributes to a thorough understanding of the 
mechanics of tax-benefit systems. This understanding of how different tax-benefit 
instruments interact with each other as well as with people’s individual labour market 
situation is an essential pre-requisite for identifying tax-benefit reform priorities. Such 
priorities may include increasing the financial reward for work by reducing in-work 
taxes and/or out-of-work benefits. They may also include reducing risks of financial 
poverty as a result of job loss by ensuring adequacy of out-of-work benefits or 
extending their coverage. 
Given the numerous elements of tax-benefit systems and the often complex 
interactions between them, summary indicators should be comprehensive in scope. 
They should take into account all relevant tax-and transfer instruments in order to 
allow comparisons across countries with very different tax-benefit typologies. So-
called effective tax rates satisfy this requirement by showing relative tax burdens 
resulting from the combined operation of taxes, social security contributions (SSCs) 
and benefit payments. 
Marginal effective tax rates (METRs) show what part of a change in earnings is 
“taxed away” by the combined operation of taxes, SSCs and any withdrawal of 
earnings related social benefits. They are thus important policy indicators for 
determining how financially desirable it is for an employee to increase working hours 
or for an unemployed person to take up employment in the first place. Their 
magnitude may affect structural unemployment, labour market attachment and 
working hours, especially for those persons at the low end of the productivity scale 
whose labour market opportunities may not be sufficient to induce work given the low 
wages they attract. The results reported in this paper take a first step towards a more 
detailed look at the effects of taxes and benefits on labour market behaviour, 
especially of the poor. We discuss relevant concepts and limitations of these models 
and present results for the year 2001. Similar results for later years will become 
available during the course of the current project as models are updated each year. 
Three different types of METRs are evaluated in this paper (and are explained in more 
detail below). The first one looks at the effects of a small earnings increase and can 
thus be used to assess the financial consequences of increased working hours. This 
indicator is relevant for analysing, for instance, “low-wage trap” issues where low-
paid workers may be locked into benefit receipt: they find their benefits strongly 
reduced if they attempt to supplement their income with additional earnings. 
In addition to computing METRs for a small earnings increase, one may wish to 
assess what part of potential in-work earnings are “taxed away” for a person making a 
transition into work. The second type of METR can be related to the so-called 
“unemployment trap” where unemployed persons with low earnings potential and/or 
receiving relatively generous unemployment benefits face a situation where taking up - 7 - 
employment may lead to small (or no) increase in disposable income as a result of the 
combined effects of benefit withdrawal and higher tax burdens on in-work earnings. 
A third, and similar, type of METR can be computed for out-of-work individuals not 
eligible to unemployment benefits (they might instead receive minimum income 
benefits, if applicable). The resulting marginal effective tax rate can be interpreted as 
describing the work incentive situation for “inactive” people who are not part of the 
labour force. However, the same METR will also be relevant for evaluating work 
incentives for unemployed people who are actively seeking work but who do not (or 
no longer) qualify for receipt of unemployment benefits. 
The paper is divided into five sections. In Section II the main methodological aspects 
of the calculation are presented, including a more detailed explanation of the different 
types of METRs as well as a brief discussion of the method’s main limitations. 
Section III then provides a detailed set of results showing the three different types of 
METRs. Section IV highlights some of the limitations and caveats to be borne in 
mind when interpreting results. Finally, Section V draws together a summary of the 
main results of the analysis and some implications for further policy reform in this 
area. 
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BOX 1    –    “Unemployment trap”, “inactivity trap” and “low-wage trap”
4 
The shape of the budget constraint facing low-income workers does not depend on taxation 
alone. Indeed, due to the presence of income-tested benefits such as in-work benefits and housing 
benefits as well as discontinuities in SSC schedules, low-paid workers face non-linear budget 
constraints with one or more “kink” points. As a result, marginal effective tax rates vary in a 
complex way that reflects the intricacies of tax and SSC rules as well as provisions of the transfer 
system. For example, even though statutory tax rates are low for levels of taxable income, 
METRs faced by low-income individuals can be very high because of the withdrawal of various 
benefits as well as certain provisions built into SSC systems. 
Targeting a particular benefit or tax advantage (allowance, deduction or tax credit) toward low 
income is usually done by phasing–out (more or less gradually) the scheme at higher levels of 
income. This of course reduces its budgetary costs. Yet, at the same time, it increases METRs 
because in the phase-out range, any additional unit of earnings causes a reduction in the 
benefit/tax advantage, reducing the net gain resulting from increased earnings.
5 Depending on 
an individual’s labour market situation, the progressivity of tax systems combined with benefit 
phase-outs can affect financial work incentives in several ways. 
The term “unemployment trap” is frequently used to refer to a situation where benefits paid to 
the unemployed and their families are high relative to potential net earnings such that work 
“does not pay”. While the judgement whether work “pays” is an individual decision that will 
depend on many factors, tax-benefit systems will play an important role. Unemployment benefit 
systems provide income security during unemployment and contribute to a more equitable 
income distribution. By providing income support to liquidity constrained persons during 
unemployment, they also contribute to a more efficient match between workers and jobs. Yet, at 
the same time, out-of-work benefits can discourage job search and put upward pressure on wage 
levels. In theoretical models of imperfect labour markets, unemployment benefits are deemed to 
increase the equilibrium unemployment rate. The mechanisms depend on the type of model. In the 
search model, for instance, higher unemployment benefits increase the reservation wage so that 
unemployed individuals receive fewer job offers with wage levels above the reservation wage. As 
a result, the outflow from unemployment is reduced. Under certain conditions, standard search 
theory models predict that an increase in the amount and duration of unemployment benefits 
leads to longer unemployment spells.
6 A second type of model explains changes in unemployment 
                                                 
4 The discussion in this box draws on Carone G, and A. Salomaki (2001). That paper also presents an 
overview of the theoretical aspects of the impact of tax-benefit systems on labour supply and demand. 
5 A benefit payment is equivalent to a negative tax. As such, the income effect on work effort or 
working hours is negative as long as leisure is a normal good. To the extent that social transfers 
fall with earnings a negative substitution effect will add to the negative income effect, leading to 
an unambiguous decrease of work effort or working hours.    
6 When unemployment benefits are paid for a limited period (or benefits decline over time), the 
reservation wage will tend to fall with the duration of the unemployment spell. After the expiration 
period, there will be a sharp fall in the reservation wage and search intensity will rise, thereby 
significantly increasing the probability of leaving unemployment (the so called exit rate or hazard 
rate). See Atkinson and Micklewright (1991), Bover et al. (1996) and Layard et al. (1991). It is 
important to note the limitations of these models. As Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) point out, 
the representation of unemployment benefits in most standard search models is rather unrealistic. 
For instance, results of these models can change drastically if one takes into account that benefits 
depend on contribution histories, that they may not be payable at all if unemployment is judged to 
be voluntary and that refusals of job offers can cause benefit withdrawal. - 9 - 
levels through a link with the bargaining power of trade unions and, in particular, an influence of 
unemployment benefits on negotiated wage levels.
7 Essentially, unions face a trade-off between 
wage increases and employment levels. More generous unemployment benefits make 
unemployment “less painful” and can therefore change the balance of this trade-off by 
increasing a union’s target wage. 
The “inactivity trap” is a situation similar to the unemployment trap except that it applies to 
people not receiving any unemployment benefits, including those not considered part of the 
labour force or “inactive” as far as paid employment is concerned. For these individuals, a 
situation where employment is judged not to “pay” may be brought about by minimum income or 
other income related benefits which would be lost upon taking up paid work.
8 However, the tax 
system may also have an important deterrent effect, which can be particularly relevant for 
partners or spouses of working individuals: if their incomes are taxed jointly than any potential 
earnings of the currently “inactive” partner may be taxed at relatively high rates and may thus 
reduce the net gain from work. Together, benefits and taxes can effectively create a wage floor 
below which a transition into employment does not bring any financial gain in the short term. 
The “low-wage trap” (or “poverty trap”) is related not to a transition into work but to the 
financial consequences of increasing working hours (or work effort) for those already in (low-
paid) work. As before, the “trap” refers to a situation where an increase in gross in-work 
earnings fails to translate into a net income increase that is felt by the individual to be a 
sufficient return for the additional effort (e.g., OECD, 1997). Again, both taxes and benefits can 
result in large parts of any additional gross earnings being effectively “taxed away”. The 
influence of taxes will be more relevant for earners of higher wages (and low-wage earners with 
high-wage spouses in joint tax systems). However, due to the withdrawal of income tested 
benefits and the operation of SSC earnings thresholds above which contributions are sometimes 
payable on earnings as a whole, the part of an additional working hour that is taxed away at low 
earnings is often much higher than at middle and high income levels. Indeed, typical in-work 
benefit schemes, while reducing the likelihood of “unemployment” or “inactivity traps”, 
generally increase marginal tax rates at relatively low earnings levels as in-work benefit 
amounts are phased out. In turn, this may increase the probability of “low-wage traps”. In terms 
of their potential effect on labour-supply, these instruments therefore trade off higher 
participation against lower working hours. Given this trade-off it is therefore essential to monitor 
both the financial incentives of taking up employment as well as the incentives to change working 
hours for those already in work.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 7 Union wage bargaining models have for instance been formalised by Blanchard and Wolfers (1999), 
and Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991). 
8 While minimum income or social assistance benefits will generally be lower than unemployment 
benefits, they can, depending on the family structure, be of a similar magnitude or even exceed 
unemployment benefits. In the case of earnings related unemployment benefits this is particularly 
likely for people with low previous wages (in several countries, low unemployment benefits may 
also be “topped up” by social assistance payments). In addition, social assistance benefits will 
generally be available for longer periods than unemployment benefits and may be subject to less 
stringent job search requirements. - 10 - 
   
  II. METHODOLOGY
9 
 
An indicator that can be used to measure the extent to which taxes and benefits reduce 
the financial gain from work is the METR (Marginal effective tax rate). These 
measures tell us what part of any additional earnings is taxed away through the 
combined effects of all relevant tax-benefit instruments. Depending on the size of the 
“additional earnings”, the METR can be related to all three types of “trap” discussed 
in Box 1. For unemployed people the additional earnings would simply be the total 
earnings they could attract when moving into work. The resulting METR quantifies to 
what extent the tax-benefit system contributes to an unemployment/inactivity trap in 
cases where the out-of-work person does/does not receive unemployment benefits (we 
will denote these measures METRut and METRit respectively).
10 For those in work, the 
“additional earnings” would be a small earnings increase and the part of that earnings 
change that is “taxed away” would relate to the individual’s decision of whether to 
increase or reduce work effort or working hours (this type of METR will be denoted 
METRlw). Formally, we have 
  METR = 1 – (∆ynet) / (∆ygross)      ( 1 a )  
Where ∆ygross are the “additional earnings” referred to above and ∆ynet is the change in 
net income obtained after taxes and benefits so that the change in gross earnings 
between labour market states A and B is 
  ∆ygross = ygrossB – ygrossA       (1b) 
and the net earnings change is 
  ∆ynet = ynetB – ynetA = (ygrossB – tB + bB) – (ygrossA – tA + bA)   (1c) 
where t denotes total taxes and b denotes total benefits.
11 It is clear therefore that, 
formally, all types of METR are the same with the only difference being the 
                                                 
9 A more detailed description of the methodology, the main assumptions and limitations of the tax-
benefit model can be found in the OECD (2002a, b). Detailed country information on tax-benefit 
systems is available through www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives. 
10 METRut and METRit can be seen as a “participation tax rate”, i.e., the amount of additional taxes plus 
lost benefits relative to gross earnings when moving into work. Elsewhere (e.g., OECD, 2002a), 
this has been referred to as an “Average Effective Tax Rate” or AETR. However, in public finance 
literature an average tax rate usually refers to the ratio of tax revenues divided by tax base without 
any relation to a transition between different labour market states. 
11 Another measure frequently used to characterise the income consequences of labour market 
transitions is the net replacement rate (NRR) usually defined as the ratio of net income while out of 
work divided by net income while in work (2001 NRRs across countries are reported in section III, 
Table 8. For European evidence based on household micro-data see also Immervoll, H. and C. 
O’Donoghue (2003). If labour market state B represents “in work” and A represents “out of work” 
then NRR = ynetA / ynetB  or, after combining with (1a) and rearranging, NRR = 1 – ∆ygross (1 – 
METRut) / ynetB for a person entitled to unemployment benefits and NRR = 1 – ∆ygross (1 – METRit) / - 11 - 
interpretation of states A and B (unemployment and employment in the case of 
METRut; inactivity and employment in the case of METRit; and, e.g., employment with 
30 and 31 hours of work per week in the case of METRlw).
12 
We use the OECD tax/benefit model to calculate gross and net incomes for a set of 
different “hypothetical” family types (described in more detail below). For each of 
these family types, we vary gross in-work earnings for the main earner in order to 
compute the above METR measures for different earnings levels. To provide a 
conceptually consistent way of scaling results in relation to observed earnings levels 
across countries we use a range of 0-200% of Average Production Worker (APW) 
earnings as shown in Table 1.
13 By computing taxes and benefits for each of these 
earnings levels, we can draw so-called “budget constraints” showing resulting net 
income at each point along the (gross) earnings scale. 
 
Table 1- Average Production Worker (APW)  Wage level and Minimum wage - 2001 
APW   APW  PPP rate APW 
(national Currency)  in € (PPP) € as % of APW 
Belgium  1,211,488  30,032 0.9791 30,673 13548 45%  Belgium
Denmark  293,000  39,318 1.2443 31,597 Denmark
Germany  63,338  32,384 1.048 30,901 Germany
Greece  3,734,865  10,961 0.7969 13,754 6576 60%  Greece
Spain  2,614,877  15,716 0.8295 18,946 5196 33%  Spain
France  140,186  21,371 1.007 21,223 13254 62%  France
Ireland  18,714  23,762 1.086 21,880 11724 49%  Ireland
Italy  40,469,979  20,901 0.8802 23,746 Italy
Luxembourg  1,222,407  30,303 1.097 27,623 15294 50%  Luxembourg
Netherlands  64,953  29,474 1.003 29,386 14004 48%  Netherlands
Austria  322,005  23,401 1.012 23,124 Austria
Portugal  1,600,047  7,981 0.7435 10,734 4680 59%  Portugal
Finland  160,802  27,045 1.083 24,972 Finland
Sweden  231,134  24,974 1.1582
8
21,561 Sweden
UK  18,950  30,473 0.7025 26,975 13608 51%  UK
Source: EUROSTAT, OECD. 
Note:Purchasing power parities (PPP) and relative price level indices for the ESA95 aggregates. Final consumption expenditure (SNA approach)
(PPP are provisional values) 
MINIMUM WAGE  
 When computing budget constraints, a decision needs to be made about what is 
assumed to drive the change in earnings. First, one can assume that hourly wages are 
constant while working hours change. This is necessary for calculating METRs for 
part-time workers. It is also more appropriate for very low wages since, as a result of 
(statutory or factual) minimum wages, full-time workers will normally not have 
earnings below a certain minimum. From Table 1 we can see that, in the majority of 
Member States with a statutory minimum wage, the minimum wage level is in the 
range of 50-60% of APW with the highest levels found in France and Greece (60 and 
62% APW) and the lowest in Spain (at 33% APW). A second possibility is to assume 
                                                                                                                                            
ynetB for a person not entitled to unemployment benefits. For a transition into work the term ∆ygross 
(1 – METR) is the part of in-work earnings that are not “taxed away” (and is thus equal to ∆ynet). 
12 The formulation of METRs above considers discrete gross income changes ∆ygross. It is of course the 
case that each “discrete METR” is an average of  METRs resulting from infinitesimal gross 
income changes within the ∆ygross interval.  
13 Methodological details on the computation of Average Production Worker earnings amounts are 
provided in OECD (2002b). - 12 - 
that hourly wages are changing, while working hours remain constant. This is for 
instance necessary for evaluating net incomes and METRs of low-wage full-time 
workers. We provide results under both assumptions.
14 
II. 1    Model scope, income concepts and unit of analysis 
The budget constraint shows current net income defined as current gross earnings plus 
total cash benefits minus total taxes. Total taxes include 
•   National and local income tax
15, and 
•   Own SSC paid by employees and benefit recipients excluding voluntary 
contributions made to either private or public insurance institutions, 
while cash benefits include 
•   family benefits (including employment-conditional “in-work” benefits where 
they are family related), 
•   minimum income (or social assistance) benefits generally excluding any 
strictly housing related parts, 
•   housing benefits generally including any strictly housing related parts of 
minimum income programs, and 
•   unemployment benefits. 
Disability benefits, private-, occupational- or state old-age pension payments as well 
as any income from capital are not considered. Benefit incomes are often taxed or 
subject to SSC and this is taken into account when computing net incomes for benefit 
recipients.
16 
We are measuring current incomes and therefore do not take into account any longer-
term effects of today’s labour market status on future earnings, pension entitlements, 
(re-)qualification for unemployment insurance benefits etc. To the extent that 
individuals are aware of these future income implications and take them into account 
                                                 
14 For most countries the two approaches (fixed hours and fixed hourly wages) yield the exact same 
result. But for some countries, notably, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom, results differ due to tax-benefit rules such as the entitlement to partial 
unemployment benefits for part-time workers returning to work, or minimum/maximum working 
hours requirements built into tax concessions or benefits (such as employment-conditional 
benefits). 
15 Only standard tax relief is included when calculating tax payments. These are tax concessions 
unrelated to  actual expenditures incurred by the taxpayer and are automatically available to 
taxpayers who satisfy relevant eligibility rules. Typical standard reliefs include the basic relief 
available to all taxpayers, wage earners or benefit recipients, irrespective of family status; relief 
available to taxpayers depending on their marital status; relief granted to families with children; 
and the relief for work-related expenses. See OECD (2002b) for further details. 
16 A detailed descriptions of countries’ tax-benefit rules can be found in OECD (2002a, b). 
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when considering their labour market status, it would clearly be desirable to allow for 
them. Unfortunately, this is beyond the scope of our static modelling framework. 
However, current incomes will be the more immediate concern particularly for low-
income households who frequently face liquidity constraints and who are the main 
focus of the present analysis. 
Social security contributions paid by employers are substantial in many countries. In 
addition, the extent to which pensions, healthcare or unemployment benefits are 
financed by contributions or taxes differs enormously across countries (see OECD, 
2002b). It is therefore useful to consider how employers’ SSC might affect our results. 
A first consideration is whether the insurance value or any future benefits bought by 
SSC should be taken into account in the calculations. As explained above, while 
taking into account future income streams may be desirable our static framework 
considers current incomes only. A second, and separate, issue concerns the incidence 
of SSC (see OECD, 1990, chapter 6). To the extent to which employers’ SSC reduce 
employees’ net wages they might usefully be considered a tax on employees. 
Similarly, any part of employees’ SSC that are incident on the employer may not be 
considered as reducing employees’ take-home pay. However, any “forward” or 
“backward” shifting of SSC will take place via adjustments to contractual wages. If 
APW values are measured in an equilibrium situation where these adjustments have 
taken place then any wage adjustments will already be reflected in the average wage 
figures used in our calculations. Given our concern with current cash incomes (and, in 
particular, take-home pay in the case of employed persons) it is therefore appropriate 
to fully deduct employees’ SSC while not deducting any parts of employers’ SSC that 
may be incident on employees since these will already be reflected in lower APW 
values.
17,18 
                                                 
17 For instance, to the extent that employers’ SSC are incident on employees through lower wages, 
lower employers’ SSC will, other things being equal, result in higher contractual wages. What does 
this mean in terms of financial work incentives as measured using our net income concept? If 
employers’ SSC are raised from zero to X and a fraction of 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 of X is shifted to employees 
then average wages w will decrease by sX. Once this adjustment process is complete, the NRR for 
a single person earning the average wage might be B/((1-t)(w-sX)), where B is the net 
unemployment benefit and t is the individual’s average tax rate while in work. This is of course the 
same NRR we would obtain if, instead of raising X through employers’ SSC, employees would 
pay contributions of X in the case where a fraction of 1-s would be shifted to employers. It is clear, 
therefore, that in the framework of our modelling exercise, the above net income concept results in 
conceptually consistent NRR (and, of course, METR) measures regardless of whether SSC are 
paid by employees or employers. 
18 In order to provide a more comprehensive view of the impact of the tax system, results of additional 
computations taking also into account the impact of employers’ SSC are provided in annex B and 
compared to the results in the main text. When employers’ SSC are considered, METRs need to be 
interpreted as marginal effective tax rates on labour costs. To compute these, employers’ SSC will 
of course enter both the numerator and the denominator of equation (1a). Given that employers’ 
SSC vary substantially between countries (see Table B1 in annex B: they are relatively high in 
Belgium, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Sweden, but very small in Denmark) this can of course 
change any METR ranking of countries. Yet, in some cases the patterns are not very different, 
especially at low wage levels (see Table B2-B5 in annex B). In any case, and as argued above, for 
considering the impact of labour market changes on people’s current net income, the METR 
definition needs to exclude employers’ SSC. - 14 - 
A final definitional issue to be considered when computing net incomes and measures 
such as METRs and NRRs is whom to compute them for. In multi-person households 
income situations will depend on the earnings, taxes and benefits of a number of 
people. For instance, one spouse’s earnings may reduce the other spouse’s 
unemployment benefits. Similarly, one household member’s income tax liability will 
usually depend on other household member’s characteristics even for tax systems that 
are not explicitly “joint”. In order to capture all relevant interactions we compute all 
income measures at the household level. It is important to note that, for the purpose of 
evaluating financial work incentives, this implies the assumption that work decisions 
are taken at the household level. 
II. 2  Family types 
The stylised family types considered throughout the analysis are: 
1.  Single adult persons, without children (earnings of adult 0-200% APW). 
2.  Single adult parents, with two children (earnings of adult 0-200% APW). 
3.  One-earner adult couples (earnings of first spouse 0-200% APW; 2
nd spouse 
inactive). 
4.  As in 3 but with two children. 
5.  Two-earner adult couple (earnings of first spouse fixed at 67% APW; 2
nd 
spouse earning 0-200% APW). 
6.  As in 5 but with two children. 
Adult employees are assumed to have an uninterrupted employment record of 22 
years to ensure people qualify for unemployment benefits. Given this assumption, the 
assumed age for all adults is 40 years. In the case of families with children, the 
assumed ages are 4 and 6 meaning that their parents will not be entitled to maternity 
benefits. Similarly, child-care benefits are not considered in the present analysis (but 
will be in a later stage of the current project). All accommodation is assumed to be 
rented with rent constant at 20% of APW. Since the focus of this analysis is on labour 
market transitions we assume that people whose earnings are changing have just made 
a transition from unemployment into employment. As a result, people shown with 
limited working hours will often still be entitled to unemployment benefits since, in 
many countries, a transition from unemployment into part-time work is encouraged 
through the possibility of part-time unemployment benefits. 
The combination of these six household typologies with the wide range of earnings 
and the three types of labour market status (employed, unemployed, inactive) implies 
that tax and benefit rules applied to a considerable part of countries’ actual 
populations are covered in the calculations. Table 2 provides a summary picture of the 
relevance of the chosen household types in EU Member States and Candidate 
Countries. - 15 - 
Table 2 -  Distribution of households (%) by type of households*
(1999)
BE 100 29.7 6.7 26.4 33.3 2.2 1.8
DK 100 37.3 5.2 31.3 21.3 2.9 2.2
DE 100 35.4 3.9 31.4 22.1 5.2 2.1
GR 100 16.0 2.1 28.8 28.1 16.7 8.5
ES 100 10.1 2.0 21.9 32.4 19.0 14.7
FR : : : : : : :
IE 100 20.8 5.2 20.7 31.9 10.7 10.7
IT 100 22.0 2.4 27.1 29.8 12.3 6.3
LU 100 24.8 3.1 25.4 31.2 9.3 6.2
NL 100 33.7 4.8 31.2 26.1 2.8 1.4
AT 100 30.2 3.7 27.8 22.0 9.9 6.5
PT : : : : : : :
FI 100 38.3 4.8 29.6 23.6 2.6 1.2
SE 100 38.2 5.7 28.1 24.4 2.0 1.5
UK 100 31.4 6.5 30.3 21.0 7.3 3.5
CY 100 12.1 1.6 24.1 41.4 10.4 10.5
CZ 100 24.5 4.2 30.2 35.6 2.8 2.7
HU 100 24.0 8.0 22.0 26.0 5.0 15.0
PL 100 14.0 6.0 22.0 36.0 9.0 13.0
SK 100 16.0 5.0 19.0 52.0 3.0 5.0






















While no set of hypothetical households can fully capture the heterogeneity of 
existing population, the purpose here is to choose households that allow us to assess 
the main features of tax-benefit systems. Yet, given the numerous dimensions that 
characterise real households (and will influence tax-benefit calculations) it is 
important not to try to extrapolate results to household types not covered here (or to 
the population as a whole, which would only be possible using a tax-benefit model in 
conjunction with representative household micro-data).
19 
                                                 
19 For a microdata based method to assess effective tax rates in the EU, based on EUROMOD, an EU-
wide tax-benefit microsimulation model, see H. Immervoll (2002). - 16 - 
 
  III.  RESULTS 
The change in net income from equation (1a) can be described as the sum of the 
change in gross earnings plus the contributions of each tax-benefit instrument to the 
total METR so that: 
 
               METR = (∆IT + ∆SSC - ∆HB - ∆FB - ∆SA) / ∆Ygross                                   (2a) 
 
where IT, SSC, HB, FB and SA denote income tax, own social security contributions, 
housing benefits, family benefits and minimum income/social assistance benefits. The 
impact of each component on the METR can be expressed as follows (taking social 
assistance as an example): 

















                                            (2b) 
  
The contribution to the METR of a particular tax-benefit instrument is determined by 
its percentage change following a change in gross income as well as its size relative to 
gross income. In the case of tax, the second term on the right-hand side is the average 
tax rate while the first and third term combined are the elasticity of the tax liability 
with respect to the tax base, which is one of the measures of tax progressivity 
commonly used in literature (e.g., Jacobsson, 1976). 
III.1  Marginal effective tax rate relating to the “low-wage trap” 
Definition: The marginal effective tax rate for an employed person (METRlw) is an 
indicator of the so-called low-wage trap (or poverty trap). It is aimed to measure the 
financial incentives to improve a household’s income situation by increasing earnings, 
and it is defined as the rate at which taxes are increased and benefits reduced as a 
person increases his or her earnings by a small amount. 
To identify the possible earnings range over which different tax-benefit components 
can have an impact on METRs we first consider the earnings levels at which different 
transfers are completely phased out (Table3).  
The general impression is that in almost all countries, METRs on individual and 
household incomes in excess of 67% APW are entirely determined by income tax and 
SSC while benefit withdrawals tend to only play a role below 67% APW. There are 
few exceptions to this general pattern. 
As regards social assistance (upper panel of Table 3), relevant exceptions are 
Denmark, France, Portugal and Sweden, where transfers are still in place for single 
earner couples with children up to 75-80% of the APW wage level. Housing benefit 
entitlements (Table3, lower panel) extend up to earnings levels of almost 110% APW 
for some Swedish household types and to around 80-90% APW for families with 
children in Denmark, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Finland and the United 
Kingdom. In Belgium, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy and Portugal there is no housing 
benefit system at all, at least not at national level.  - 17 - 
 
 
Notes:    Single2c= Lone parents with two children 
  1earnerc=  one-earner  couple 
    1earnerc2c= one-earner couple, with two children 
    2earnerc67= two-earner couple, second spouse earns 67% APW,  
    2earnerc67c2= two-earner couple, two children, second spouse earns 67% APW. 
 
In most countries universal (non-means-tested) child benefits are paid for each 
dependent child, so this component usually does not have any impact on METRs. A 
few exceptions are worth noting, however. In Italy child allowances are related to 
income and hours of work so that part-time workers receive less than full-time 
workers and high-income full-time workers receive less than low-income full-time 
workers. A second notable feature is that family benefits can also be received by one-
earner couples without children. A particular relevance on the determination of the 
METRs is apparent through family-related in-work benefits which are phased-out for 
higher incomes. In 2001, such in-work benefits existed in the UK (Working Families’ 
Tax Credit, WFTC) and Ireland (Family Income Supplement, FIS).
20 In both cases the 
                                                 
20 The UK Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC, recently replaced by Child Credit and Employment 
Credit) is an in-work benefit for parents working at least 16 hours per week. The WFTC is aimed 
at improving work incentives by increasing in-work incomes of low-wage workers relative to the 
net income available to recipients of unemployment benefits (see Blundell et al., 2000). In Ireland, 
Table 3  Level of household's earnings (as % of APW) at which transfers are completely phased out 
Year: 2001
Social Assistance transfers
SA  Single Single2C  1earnerC 1earnerC2C 2earnerC67 2earnerC2C67 
BE  27 34  34 34
DK  46 54  80 81 83 84 
DE  51 59  56 58
GR 
ES  21 31  27 36
FR  47 66  68 79 79 
IE  43 17  57 50
IT 
LU  43 51  64 72
NL  37 41  48 46
AT  43 50  54 64
PT  45 89  89 133 81 109 
FI  34 19  47 65
SE  49 25  66 72
UK  16 38  25 40
Housing Benefits transfers
HB  Single Single2C  1earnerC 1earnerC2C 2earnerC67 2earnerC2C67 
BE 
DK  49 78  80 93 83 93 
DE  51 63  56 81 84 
GR 
ES 
FR  48 90  58 90 91 
IE 
IT 
LU  43 51  64 72
NL  54 72  72 72 72 72 
AT  43 50  54 64
PT 
FI  56 86  74 91 74 91 
SE  49 107  66 82 107 
UK  56 96  68 85 69 83 - 18 - 
withdrawal of in-work benefits is one of the main driving forces of METRlw. In the 
case of the WFTC, benefit amounts were reduced by 55 pence for each £1 extra 
income giving rise to relatively high METRlw. For recipients of these benefits, the 
phase-out range ends at around 100% APW (somewhat lower in the case of Ireland 
and somewhat above in the case of the WFTC) so that METRlw of higher earnings 
levels are no longer affected by the benefits withdrawals (and are therefore lower). 
Looking at the earnings ranges over which benefits have an influence on METRlw we 
can conclude that they will only be relevant for lower earnings levels (often close to 
the earnings of a full-time worker earning the statutory minimum wage where it 
exists) and will rarely be relevant beyond APW earnings levels. In the discussion that 
follows we will therefore focus mainly on households at the lower end of the income 
scale. Indeed, for a two-earner couple where one spouse earns at least 67% APW (one 
of the family types for which results are shown below) the financial effects of the 
second spouse’s working hours decision will, in most countries, be determined almost 
exclusively by taxes and SSC. Most income-related benefits are already phased out at 
67% APW and will therefore not affect the second spouse’s METRlw (of course, the 
decision of whether to participate at all will be affected by out-of-work benefits – this 
will be shown in the discussion of METRut and METRit in sections III.2 and III.3 
below). 
III.1.1    Budget constraints 
To summarise the large volume of model output we show a summary of METRlw 
results for selected earnings levels as a first step (Table 4). Comparing results across 
countries one can see a substantial divergence of METRs even at similar relative 
earnings levels. Yet, it is very important to remember that, given the often complex 
shapes of budget constraints, single point estimates of METRs, for particular earnings 
levels are not very informative and may give a misleading picture of the overall 
situation if presented in isolation (Immervoll et al., 2001). In the second step we 
therefore derive a fuller representation by plotting both net incomes and METRlw over 
the 0-200% APW range of gross earnings income for all six family types discussed 
above (Figures 1-6). The “additional earnings” (∆ygross) used for computing METRlw is 
1% of APW. For people earning less than 50% APW we assume part-time work (at 
APW hourly wage level).   
                                                                                                                                            
one employment-conditional benefit is the Family Income Supplement (FIS) which pays 60% of 
the difference between the net family income and an earning limit (dependent on family size). A 
claimant must be working at least 19 hours per week (two-earner couples can combine their joint 
working hours for this purpose). Several other EU countries have introduced employment-
conditional benefits since 2001. In the United States, an employment conditional refundable tax 
credit (Earned Income Tax Credit) has been in place for more than two decades and has been made 
successively more generous since the early 1990s. - 19 - 
Table 4  -  Low-wage trap indicator (2001)
Marginal effective tax rate at different wage levels, as wage increases by 1% of the APW wage level
Single Single parent, 2 children 1 earner couple 
% of APW 33% 50% 67% 100% 150% 33% 50% 67% 100% 150% 33% 50% 67% 100% 150%
BE -20 72 54 55 56 -20 72 54 55 56 -16 62 45 51 56
DK 109 45 56 50 64 105 105 67 50 64 104 116 110 45 64
DE 100 70 51 58 59 100 100 48 55 52 100 100 39 48 45
GR 16 16 16 29 41 16 16 16 19 41 16 16 16 29 41
ES 6 23 33 29 33 6 6 6 29 29 6 6 26 29 33
FR 89 18 41 34 37 84 84 46 21 40 91 91 30 28 30
IE 100 20 24 26 48 0 60 62 26 48 100 100 4 26 26
IT 10 26 32 39 39 10 10 120 39 39 10 26 32 39 39
LU 109 28 31 42 53 110 120 14 14 49 110 110 14 29 36
NL 100 120 45 45 42 100 89 41 45 42 100 93 45 45 42
AT 100 18 37 43 50 100 18 37 43 50 100 100 37 43 50
PT 55 11 23 25 35 55 55 55 11 35 55 55 55 23 25
FI 54 83 41 47 52 46 74 88 47 52 100 83 95 47 52
SE 100 37 37 35 52 25 45 57 55 52 100 100 37 35 52
UK 73 76 32 32 32 88 89 89 69 32 73 76 70 32 32
CZ 46 46 26 30 30 100 17 41 36 30 100 26 41 28 30
HU 21 39 40 40 51 13 12 34 40 51 21 39 40 40 51
PL 25 34 34 34 34 100 34 34 34 34 100 25 34 34 34
SK 38 46 27 23 30 100 100 46 23 30 100 100 100 23 30
NO 72 36 36 36 49 63 63 63 36 49 72 36 36 36 49
SZ 100 23 23 29 33 100 100 20 27 30 100 100 22 25 28
US 43 29 29 29 42 27 48 46 51 29 35 46 29 29 29
JP 93 17 17 22 28 93 93 17 19 22 93 93 17 19 22
1 earner couple with  2 children 2 earners couple* 2 earners couple with 2 children*
% of APW 33% 50% 67% 100% 150% 33% 50% 67% 100% 150% 33% 50% 67% 100% 150%
BE -20 62 45 51 56 -20 72 56 56 56 -20 72 56 56 56
DK 100 100 116 45 64 45 45 56 50 64 45 45 56 50 64
DE 100 100 60 46 45 55 54 51 54 45 50 52 51 54 42
GR 16 16 16 19 41 16 16 16 29 41 16 16 16 19 41
ES 106 6 6 23 29 6 23 33 29 33 6 6 26 29 33
FR 84 84 88 21 25 25 25 35 34 30 18 18 29 28 30
IE 100 60 62 26 26 20 20 24 26 48 20 20 24 26 48
IT 10 10 32 120 39 51 26 32 39 39 120 26 32 39 39
LU 110 110 110 14 36 14 27 31 34 42 14 14 14 34 42
NL 100 93 45 45 42 25 45 45 45 42 25 45 45 45 42
AT 100 100 37 43 50 18 18 37 43 50 18 18 37 43 50
PT 55 56 55 67 25 15 15 23 23 25 82 11 11 23 25
FI 100 100 85 47 52 27 37 41 47 52 27 37 41 47 52
SE 100 100 100 35 52 25 37 37 35 52 45 37 37 35 52
UK 88 89 89 69 32 22 32 32 32 32 10 32 32 32 32
CZ 100 100 26 38 30 26 26 26 30 30 27 31 26 26 30
HU 13 12 34 40 51 20 39 40 40 50 20 39 40 40 50
PL 100 100 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
SK 100 100 100 23 30 13 23 23 23 30 13 23 23 23 30
NO 100 77 36 36 49 36 36 36 36 49 36 36 36 36 49
SZ 100 100 90 24 28 24 27 27 33 36 22 25 27 31 35
US 80 48 64 51 29 29 29 29 29 29 4 24 29 29 29
JP 93 93 93 19 22 14 17 17 22 22 10 13 17 19 22
Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using  OECD Tax -Benefit models.
* The wage level of the first earner is fixed at 67% of the APW, while the wage level of the second earner is indicated in each column 
 
In order to show the effect of minimum income/social assistance benefits on METRlw, 
the underlying assumption here is that the person whose earnings are being varied is 
not entitled to unemployment benefits when he or she works zero hours. In these 
charts, METRlw (thick solid black line, plotted against the right-hand axis) is depicted 
along with net incomes (for the household as a whole: thick upwards sloping kinked 
line) and gross earnings (thin upwards sloping straight line).
21 The net income plot 
represents the “budget constraint”: it shows the opportunity set in terms of feasible 
combinations of net income and gross earnings (with earnings being determined by 
hourly wages and working hours). The vertical distance between gross and net income 
is the amount of net taxes. Net taxes are positive if net income is below gross income 
and negative if it is above. Dividing net taxes by gross income gives the effective tax 
burden. The point where the two lines cross represents situations where the effective 
tax burden is zero. We call this the break-even point. All persons with net incomes 
                                                 
21 For presentational convenience we have limited the METR range shown to [-120%; +120%]. - 20 - 
above gross incomes receive a net transfer. For a given country and family type, 
higher break-even points mean larger numbers of net benefit recipients.
22 
The slope of the net income plot represents the marginal effective tax rate METRlw. 
METRlw = 0 where the slope of the net income line is parallel to the gross income line 
since in this case, any change in gross income results in the same change in net 
income. The flatter the net income plot the larger the part of any “additional earnings” 
that is “taxed away”. Where the net income line is horizontal, an increase in gross 
income is taxed away entirely (METRlw = 100%). Of course, METRlw can exceed 
100% in which case the net income line will be downwards sloping (e.g., in Hungary 
where the entire amount of minimum income benefit is withdrawn once earnings of a 
single person exceed about 16% APW). Negative METRlw occur in cases where the 
increase in net income exceeds the amount of “additional earnings”. This can, for 
instance, be an (intended) result of in-work benefits where workers receive a 
relatively large benefit when they increase earnings beyond a certain threshold (UK 
families with children). Another reason may be that certain types of SSC are no longer 
compulsory once earnings exceed a certain level (such as in the Netherlands where 
high-wage earners are supposed to fund their own private health insurance).
23 
Looking at the METRlw plot it is apparent that there are numerous spikes and steps 
reflecting kinks in the budget constraint. It is important to note that a large spike in 
itself will not necessarily translate into a large work (dis-)incentive. The budget 
constraint (or what we have termed the “opportunity set” above) is based on the 
assumption that people can “choose” any earnings levels (or at least any of the 200 
points used to draw each of the graphs in figures 1-6). Clearly, this is unrealistic if we 
interpret the budget constraint in terms of changing working hours. However, workers 
may also be able to influence their earnings through increasing the quality of their 
work (or “effort”). Nevertheless, the “additional earnings” that a typical worker would 
consider when deciding whether additional work “pays” may frequently be larger than 
the 1% APW interval we have chosen for computing METRlw. It is useful to note 
therefore that, following equation (1), alternative METRlw measures can easily be 
recomputed for other earnings changes using the same numerical model output 
presented here.
24 To understand the mechanics of existing tax-benefit systems and to 
capture all interactions between different tax-benefit instruments that might 
potentially influence people’s choices it is, in the first instance, nevertheless desirable 
to look at the effects of small changes in earnings (such as 1% of APW)  on net 
incomes. 
Spikes are most obvious at low earnings levels where several different tax and benefit 
instruments often interact in complex ways. At very low gross earnings levels 
marginal rates are usually close to 100% reflecting the withdrawal of minimum 
income/social assistance benefits. Where different benefits are withdrawn 
                                                 
22 Note that the distribution of gross incomes differs across countries. As a result, the break even point 
is not sufficient to make inferences about the number of benefit recipients across countries. 
23 Contributions to private insurance schemes are not taken into account in our model calculations. 
24 Doing this for multiples of the 1% APW interval as considered here is facilitated by the detailed 
numerical breakdowns of budget constraints (table A5 in annex A). This table is also available in 
electronic  spreadsheet format ( http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economicpapers_en.htm). - 21 - 
independently (e.g., social assistance and housing benefits in Luxembourg), METRlw 
can remain above 100% over an extended earnings range resulting in decreasing net 
incomes as working hours increase. 
At the other extreme, METRlw at low earnings levels are much lower (and driven by 
the marginal income tax and SSC rates) in countries where extensive minimum 
income safety nets do not exist (Greece, Italy). Of course this comes at the expense of 
high risks of poverty for those with low or zero earnings.
25 Indeed, an essential use of 
the “budget constraint” graphs is the evaluation of the adequacy of minimum 
income/social assistance schemes and their role in reducing poverty risks
26. The 
minimum income level guaranteed by such schemes is represented by the point at 
which the net income line intersects the left-hand axis. 
At the upper end of the earnings spectrum, changes in METRlw usually result from a 
combination of increasing marginal income tax rates and SSC provisions which 
frequently cause drops of METRlw due to upper contribution thresholds above which 
marginal SSC rates drop to zero (e.g., Austria, Luxembourg). A notable feature of the 
German income tax is that statutory marginal rates rise continuously rather than in 
steps. 
 
III.1.2   Decomposition by tax-benefit instrument 
The influence of each tax-benefit instrument can be seen more clearly from Table A1 
in annex A where we show a decomposition of METRlw results in terms of individual 
tax-benefit components. This decomposition (see equation (2a)) identifies the relative 
contribution of different tax and benefit instruments to high METRlw which is essential 
when thinking about the influence of individual policy measures. 
Without commenting on the results in great detail, it is instructive to look at the 
influence of the Family Benefit component in Ireland and the United Kingdom as this 
provides an example of the adverse impact on METRlw of benefit instruments aimed at 
increasing labour force participation. While Irish METRlw are close to zero for 
families without children up to 60-70% of APW they are far higher (about 60%) over 
the same income range for households with children, due to the functioning of the 
aforementioned Family Income Supplement (counted in the Family Benefit category 
in Table A1). In the United Kingdom we find a similar picture due to the gradual 
reduction of the Working Family Tax Credit. Yet, the marginal deduction rate is lower 
than in Ireland. At the same time, these programmes increase the incomes of low-
wage employees and thus provide both income support for the “working poor” and an 
incentive to seek employment. These latter effects will be reflected in the METRut and 
METRit measures discussed in sections III.2 and III.3 below. 
                                                 
25 Several countries are, however, successful at combining means-tested minimum income safety nets 
with retaining a degree of work incentives for benefit recipients by exempting a part of in-work 
earnings from means-testing. 
26 Immervoll et al. (2001) use this method to analyse and compare the effects of the tax-benefit system 
on low-income households in the Benelux countries. - 22 - 
 
 
BOX 2 – Major differences across household types in Member States 
 
As calculated METRlw may be quite sensitive to the household characteristics, it is useful to 
pinpoint possible striking divergences among different households types across countries. 
Comparing results across family types in Figure 1-6 it is apparent that in Denmark the 
METRlw for single persons (with or without children) is only half as much as the high rate 
(close or even higher than 100%- a clear poverty trap) faced by couples (with or without 
children) with earnings over the range of 50-80% of the APW wage level. 
In France, the METRlw for single workers over the range 50-65% of APW earnings is only 
27% while it is close to 90% for a couple with children (up to 75% of APW earnings) because 
of the withdrawal of relatively more generous housing benefits. 
In Ireland, the presence of children makes the METRlw for single parents and one-earner 
couples with children close to 60% over an income range of 40-90 % of APW earnings, while 
it is only 20% for single people without children. Low-income one-earner households, without 
children, face METRlw as high as 100% over the income range up to the 55 % of APW 
earnings. 
In  Luxembourg, the METRlw is higher than 100% until a gross wage of 43% of APW 
earnings for all the 6 family types considered in the analysis. After that level of earnings, it 
drops to about 30% for single workers and to 13% for single parents (after 50% of APW 
earnings). Yet, for a one-earner couple with children it remains higher than 100% until 
earnings reach 60% of APW earnings, a clear case of poverty trap.  
In Austria, the pattern of the METRlw across family types and income levels is very similar to 
the one in Luxembourg. Indeed, the METRlw is 100% for all family types until 40% of APW 
earnings. Then it drops substantially (to 18%) only for singles and lone parents. For one-
earner couples the rates remain at 100% until an income level of 50% of APW earnings is 
reached, while for one-earner couples with children the METRlw remains at 100% up to an 
income level of 60% of APW earnings.  
In Finland, risk of poverty trap is a concern for one-earner couples with two children, who 
face a METRlw of 100% over a wide range of income (up to 65% of APW earnings), due to the 
withdrawal of housing benefit and social assistance. On the other hand, METRlw for single 
workers and for single parents are generally lower (but for single parents are high at between 
40-80% of APW). 
A similar situation is found in Sweden, where the METRlw are at 100% for couples (with and 
without children, because in Sweden, as in Finland, child benefits are not means-tested) until 
their gross earnings are close to 65-70% of the APW wage level. In both countries, these 
results are generated by the combined effect of high tax rates and withdrawal rates of social 
assistance and housing benefits as earned income increases.  
For the United Kingdom, the phase–out of in-work benefits gives rise to high METRlw for 
single parents and households with children up to high levels of earnings (a rate close to 
around 90%).    - 23 - 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NET (2001) GROSS (2001) METR (2001)
 
















































































































































































































































































































NET (2001) GROSS (2001) METR (2001)











































































NET (2001) GROSS (2001) METR (2001)



































































































































































































































NET (2001) GROSS (2001) METR (2001)











































































NET (2001) GROSS (2001) METR (2001)












































































NET (2001) GROSS (2001) METR (2001)
 
Source: Joint EC-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models - 25 - 
Figure 2 -  METRlw for single parent with 2 children 
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Source: Joint EC-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models - 26 - 
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Source: Joint EC-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models - 27 - 
Figure 3 – METRlw for one–earner couple without children 
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Source: Joint EC-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models - 28 - 
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Source: Joint EC-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models - 29 - 
Figure 4 – METRlw for one–earner couple with 2 children 
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Source: Joint EC-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models - 30 - 
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Source: Joint EC-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models - 31 - 
Figure 5 – METRlw for two earner couple without children 
 
Belgium: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Denmark: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Germany: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Greece: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Spain: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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France: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Ireland: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Italy: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Luxembourg: Two-earner couple without children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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Netherlands: Two-earner couple without children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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Source: Joint EC-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models - 32 - 
 
 
Austria: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Portugal: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Finland: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Sweden: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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United Kingdom: Two-earner couple without children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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Czech Republic: Two-earner couple without children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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Hungary: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Poland: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Slovak Republic: Two-earner couple without children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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United States: Two-earner couple without children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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Source: Joint EC-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models - 33 - 
Figure 6 -  METRlw for two-earner couple with 2 children 
 
Belgium: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Denmark: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Germany: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
















































































NET (2001) GROSS (2001) METR (2001)
Greece: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Spain: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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France: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Ireland: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Italy: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Luxembourg: Two-earner couple with 2 children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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Netherlands: Two-earner couple with 2 children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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Source: Joint EC-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models - 34 - 
 
Austria: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Portugal: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Finland: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Sweden: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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United Kingdom: Two-earner couple with 2 children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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Czech Republic: Two-earner couple with 2 children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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Hungary: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Poland: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Slovak Republic: Two-earner couple with 2 children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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United States: Two-earner couple with 2 children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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Source: Joint EC-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models. - 35 - 
III.2  Marginal effective tax rate relating to the “unemployment trap” 
The above analysis has focussed on measuring to what extent any incremental change 
in gross earnings feeds through to net income levels for people already in 
employment. The unemployment and inactivity traps, on the other hand, are related to 
the net income effects of transitions between employment and non-employment and, 
in particular, how the relative gain from employment is affected by tax and transfer 
policies. While the formal representation of the relevant marginal tax rate indicators is 
equivalent to the METRlw discussed in the previous section, their interpretation for 
policy purposes is different. Indeed, and as we have argued above, policies aimed at 
making work pay often face a trade-off between providing incentives at the 
“extensive” and “intensive” margin of labour supply: policies that improve the 
incentive situation in terms of participation may create financial disincentives for 
those already in work. 
Definition: The marginal effective tax rate for an unemployed person (METRut) is an 
indicator of the so-called unemployment trap. It aims to measure the short-term 
financial incentives to move from unemployment (where unemployment benefits are 
received) into paid employment and is defined as the rate at which taxes increase and 
benefits (mainly unemployment benefits) decrease as a person takes up a given job. 
The METRut thus measures what part of in-work earnings is effectively “taxed away” 
when moving into work. When measuring the financial consequences of moving into 
work a critical question is, of course, what hourly wage the job pays and how many 
hours the person works. In our calculations we assume a transition into a full-time job. 
For computing unemployment benefits in the unemployed situation the characteristics 
of the previous job are also relevant. We assume that the previous job was also full-
time with earnings in the previous job amounting to 67% APW (Table 6) and 100% 
APW (Table 7). In countries with earnings-related unemployment benefits this will 
obviously have an impact on the level of out-of-work income (ynetA and ygrossA in 
equations 1a and 1b).
27 For low income families, any topping up of incomes with 
means-tested benefits (such as social assistance where available) is taken into account 
in both the in-work and out-of-work situation (i.e., it is assumed that people in fact 
apply for the benefits they are entitled to and that they do not have assets or other 
characteristics that disqualify them from benefit receipt). 
Since re-entry wages for unemployed persons may be different from wages received 
in the previous job, we consider a range of different scenarios in Tables 6 and 7.
28 In 
annex A (Figures A1-A6) we also present METRut (and METRit) results for a 
continuous range of re-entry wage levels from 50% to 200% of APW. Similar to 
                                                 
27 The benefit level is generally related to previous earnings but may also be influenced by other factors 
such as employment record, age and family situation, and is usually subject to floor and ceilings. 
Depending on the level of in-work earnings any non-earnings related elements of benefit payments 
(such as floor or ceilings) can give rise to very high or very low out-of-work incomes relative to in-
work incomes. 
28 The literature on the “cost” of job loss refers to the interaction of several mechanisms, such as the 
erosion of human capital skills or considerations of social stigma, that lead to deteriorating wage 
prospects following a period of unemployment (See Kletzer (1998)).  On the other hand, 
prospective wages may have improved due to training measures, for example. - 36 - 
section III.1 we have decomposed the METRut measures in terms of the tax-benefit 
instruments that drive them (Table A2–A3 in the annex). 
All simulations look at the level of unemployment benefits during the second month 
of unemployment (i.e., after expiration of any waiting periods) and, as explained in 
section II, assume an uninterrupted work history of 22 years. In interpreting the 
figures on the risk of unemployment trap one should consider that for those entitled, 
the duration of the unemployment benefit is often limited and is also conditional upon 
other eligibility criteria (Table 5). In particular, job search requirements and their 
enforcement can differ considerably across countries and this will need to be borne in 
mind especially when comparing computed METRut measures across countries. 
Furthermore, in some countries, unemployment benefits are reduced during the period 
of unemployment.
29 Thus, in these cases the METRut faced by an unemployed person 
would decline over time. Clearly, the computed unemployment benefits will therefore 
often represent an “upper bound” while unemployment benefits (and thus METRut) 
may be lower for those with shorter work histories or longer unemployment spells. To 
obtain a measure of the importance of the modelling assumptions as well as the 
relevant range of possible values, the section on “inactivity traps” below (see section 
III.3) considers a situation where people are not entitled to unemployment benefits at 
all (or where unemployment benefits have expired).  
                                                 
29 For instance, the payment rate in Belgium decreases over time from 60% to 43% for a single person. 
For couples with children, when need is proven, the payment rate can continue at 60% for a 
prolonged period. In the Czech Republic, France, the Slovak Republic and Spain payment rates 
decrease over time for all family situations. In France the decrease of UI benefits is graduated and 
depends on the duration of contribution and the age of the claimants. The maximum duration of 
benefit payments is  either fixed or depends on the employment record ( Austria, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary,  the Netherlands, Poland, Spain) or age (Austria, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece,  Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden). See EC-MISSOC 2002 and OECD 
(2002a) for details.  - 37 - 
 
1) The duration of unemployment insurance may vary according to the duration of the employment record 
(contribution period), the age and the family situation of the beneficiary. 
2) Expressed in terms of months that the unemployed person must have been employed and contributing to the 
insurance scheme (the first figure) within the investigated period of time (the latter figure) 
 
Looking at the third column in Table 6 (see also panel 3 in table A2.1 in the annex) 
we can see that for an unemployed person (single without children) previously 
employed at a low wage level of 67% of APW and taking up a new job at the same 
wage level as before unemployment, the METRut is close to 90% in Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden. In 
other words, the short-term net financial reward for taking up a job is only 10% of 
gross earnings. In most of these countries, this high METRut is due to the loss of 
relatively generous unemployment benefits. In Belgium, part of the high METR is 
also due to a relatively large increase in taxes when taking up a job (21% of gross 
earnings). Obviously, undertaking a job paying a wage lower (higher) than the wage 
before unemployment implies higher (lower) METRut. Take the case of returning to 
work with a re-entry wage equivalent to 50% of APW earnings
30 (Table 6, first 
column in each panel). A single person with a pre-unemployment wage of 67% of 
APW earnings may see his/her disposable income fall to a level lower than in the case 
where he/she remains unemployed. This unemployment trap is revealed by a METRut 
                                                 
30 According to Table 1, half of the average production worker wage level is close to the statutory minimum wage 
in several Member States. 
Table 5 -  Unemployment benefit systems in the EU 
(2002)
  Waiting Entitlement 
Country  Unemployment Unemploym. period conditions 
insurance (1)  assistance days (UI), months (2) 
Belgium  No limit  None 0 14 / 18 
Denmark 48  None 0 12 / 36 
Germany  6 - 32  Unlimited 0 12 / 36 
Greece  5 - 15  None 6 6 / 14 
Spain  4 - 24  6-18 0 12 / 72 
France  4 - 60  Unlimited 7 4 / 8 
Ireland  15  Unlimited 3 9 / 12 
Italy  6 - 9  None 0 12 / 24 
Luxembourg  12-24 None 0 6 / 12 
Netherlands  6 - 60  24 0 6 / 9 
Austria  5 - 16  Unlimited 0 12 / 24 
Portugal  12 - 30  6-15 0 18 / 24 
Finland 23  Unlimited 7 10 / 24 
Sweden  14 5 5 6 / 12 
UK 6  None 3 None 
Sources:EC-MISSOC 2002; OECD(2002a) 
Benefit duration, months- 38 - 
even higher than 100% in as many as nine Member States (Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Portugal, and Sweden). Of course this is only true 
for as long as the person remains entitled to unemployment benefits. If benefits are 
withdrawn completely as a result of the unemployed person’s refusal to accept the 
lower paid job then the alternative to low-paid work is no income at all or social 
assistance benefits, and therefore the METRut may in fact be in fact much lower. 
It is interesting to note (panel 1 and 2 in Tables A2.2, A2.3 and A2.4 in the annex) 
that for very low-income (up to 50% of APW) single parent and one-earner 
households, the income support provided by social assistance programmes in some 
member states (Denmark, France, Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden) while in work 
makes METRs lower than they would otherwise have been. Indeed, transfers from 
social assistance schemes reduce the negative impact on net incomes from the 
complete withdrawal of the unemployment benefits transfers when moving into work. 
While social assistance may in some countries also be received as a top-up to low 
unemployment benefits, employment-conditional benefits (or tax credits) are, of 
course, only available while in work (in Tables A1-A3 in the annex tax credits are 
shown as part of income tax component -IT - while family-related in-work benefits 
and tax credits are included in component FB). These in-work benefit schemes are 
designed to significantly raise in-work income for low-wage families above out-of-
work income levels. As discussed in section III.1, the resulting reduction in METRut is 
the intended positive effect on participation incentives which needs to be traded off 
against an increase of METRlw as a result of phasing out in-work benefits at higher   
income levels.  
The METRut faced by a single unemployed person with a pre-unemployment wage of 
100% APW is broadly similar for low re-entry wages (Table 7). Yet, when taking up a 
new job at the same wage level as before, unemployment METRut are generally lower 
than those faced by low-wage workers (compare columns 2-3 in Table 6 and Table 7). 
It is also interesting to note the differences across family types. The risk of an 
unemployment trap is usually higher for a one-earner couple with two children than 
for a single person.  
To conclude this section it is worth recalling that an alternative but related indicator of 
the unemployment trap is the net replacement rate (NRR). The NRR is the ratio of net 
income when out of work divided by net income when in work.  This indicator is 
conceptually and numerically different from the METRut  (see footnote 11) which 
indicates the part of gross earnings that is “taxed away” when taking up a job. To 
complement the information provided by the METRut measures, we have computed a 
range of NRRs for the hypothetical family types at low and average wage levels 
(Table 8). These NRRs are computed for a transition from full-time jobs paying 
wages between 50% and 150% of APW to unemployment (as before, with the 
unemployment benefit being computed for the second month of unemployment; all 
other definitions are also similar to the ones used for computing the METR measures).  
 - 39 - 
Table 6  -   Unemployment trap (2001)
Marginal effective tax rate for an unemployed person
(previous work= 67% of the APW wage level) returning to work at a wage equivalent to:
% of APW 50% 67% 100% 150% 50% 67% 100% 150% 50% 67% 100% 150%
BE 100 89 78 71 91 82 74 68 92 80 70 65
DK 107 91 78 73 104 97 83 76 73 83 77 71
DE 100 88 77 70 100 93 79 70 100 88 74 65
GR 101 79 60 50 107 84 61 51 101 79 60 50
ES 100 81 65 53 100 82 62 51 100 77 61 50
FR 103 87 70 59 89 92 76 60 87 89 68 55
IE 87 73 59 54 50 54 60 53 100 87 68 54
IT 69 60 53 49 74 53 54 52 67 57 53 49
LU 107 88 71 63 104 89 64 57 102 107 79 63
NL 93 85 72 60 92 87 75 62 96 91 77 63
AT 88 75 64 57 99 84 69 61 100 86 71 62
PT 111 88 67 55 77 72 63 52 77 72 65 51
FI 90 81 69 63 94 88 79 70 97 91 78 69
SE 105 87 70 62 103 91 80 69 100 98 78 67
UK 78 70 58 49 45 56 65 57 84 82 66 55
CZ 80 67 54 46 94 80 67 57 92 79 64 53
HU 84 75 64 61 89 71 61 59 84 75 64 61
PL 92 77 63 53 86 84 68 57 94 78 63 54
SK 88 77 59 49 100 91 72 59 100 100 80 62
NO 89 75 62 57 96 87 79 67 101 83 67 59
SZ 115 92 71 58 100 92 69 56 100 95 71 57
US 85 71 57 51 59 63 58 49 83 75 60 50
JP 94 74 56 45 103 95 70 55 84 71 54 43
% of APW 50% 67% 100% 150% 50% 67% 100% 150% 50% 67% 100% 150%
BE 87 76 68 64 99 89 78 70 99 89 78 70
DK 76 87 82 75 107 91 78 73 107 91 78 73
DE 100 85 75 65 99 86 75 67 114 98 83 72
GR 107 84 61 51 101 79 60 50 107 84 61 51
ES 100 82 61 50 100 81 65 53 103 83 65 54
FR 78 84 76 59 104 88 70 58 104 87 68 55
IE 95 87 72 57 54 48 42 37 72 61 51 43
IT 78 54 53 53 75 64 56 51 80 70 62 55
LU 101 104 83 64 102 83 66 57 115 89 68 58
NL 94 90 78 63 89 78 67 57 89 78 67 57
AT 100 97 78 67 80 69 60 54 86 74 63 56
PT 55 55 57 56 114 91 68 54 111 86 65 52
FI 100 99 89 76 82 71 63 58 91 78 67 61
SE 100 100 84 71 105 87 70 62 105 87 70 62
UK 66 72 74 62 43 41 38 36 54 49 43 39
CZ 100 96 77 63 76 63 51 44 77 65 55 46
HU 89 71 61 59 84 73 62 60 84 73 62 60
PL 100 91 80 65 77 66 55 48 77 66 55 51
SK 100 100 96 72 85 69 54 45 85 69 58 48
NO 99 92 73 63 89 75 62 57 94 78 64 59
SZ 100 100 75 59 108 88 68 56 109 88 68 56
US 59 62 60 50 85 71 57 48 83 69 56 47
JP 84 86 71 56 95 75 56 45 91 71 56 44
Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using  OECD Tax -Benefit models.
Single parent, 2 children 1 earner couple  Single
* The wage level of the first earner is fixed at 67% of the APW, while the wage level of the second earner is indicated in each column 
2 earners couple with 2 
children* 1 earner couple with  2 children 2 earners couple *
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Table 7  -  Unemployment trap (2001)
Marginal effective tax rate for an unemployed person 
(previous work= 100% of the APW wage level) returning to work at a wage equivalent to:
% of APW 50% 67% 100% 150% 50% 67% 100% 150% 50% 67% 100% 150%
BE 100 89 78 71 91 82 74 68 92 80 70 65
DK 107 91 78 73 104 97 83 76 73 83 77 71
DE 101 88 77 70 115 104 87 75 100 88 74 65
GR 112 88 66 54 126 98 71 57 120 94 70 56
ES 129 103 79 63 138 110 81 64 135 103 78 62
FR 120 100 79 65 101 100 82 63 100 99 74 60
IE 87 73 59 54 50 54 60 53 100 87 68 54
IT 92 77 65 56 100 73 67 61 93 76 67 58
LU 144 115 89 75 154 126 89 73 118 119 87 69
NL 110 98 80 65 104 97 81 66 102 96 81 65
AT 96 81 68 60 106 89 73 63 100 86 71 62
PT 141 110 81 65 107 94 78 62 107 94 79 61
FI 99 88 73 66 104 95 84 73 99 92 79 69
SE 133 109 85 72 123 106 90 76 114 109 85 72
UK 78 70 58 49 45 56 65 57 84 82 66 55
CZ 97 80 62 52 94 80 67 57 95 81 66 54
HU 84 75 64 61 89 71 61 59 84 75 64 61
PL 92 77 63 53 86 84 68 57 94 78 63 54
SK 111 95 71 57 101 92 72 59 100 100 80 62
NO 117 95 76 67 113 99 88 73 117 95 76 65
SZ 143 113 84 67 145 126 92 71 124 113 83 65
US 108 88 69 59 68 70 63 52 100 88 69 56
JP 116 91 67 52 92 88 65 52 106 88 65 50
% of APW 50% 67% 100% 150% 50% 67% 100% 150% 50% 67% 100% 150%
BE 87 76 68 64 99 89 78 70 99 89 78 70
DK 76 87 82 75 107 91 78 73 107 91 78 73
DE 115 95 82 70 118 101 85 74 138 116 95 80
GR 126 98 71 57 112 88 66 54 126 98 71 57
ES 139 111 80 63 129 103 79 63 140 111 84 66
FR 89 92 81 62 120 100 78 63 122 100 76 61
IE 95 87 72 57 54 48 42 37 72 61 51 43
IT 104 73 66 62 92 77 65 56 95 81 69 60
LU 113 112 89 68 139 111 85 69 155 119 88 71
NL 102 96 82 66 115 97 80 65 114 97 80 65
AT 100 97 78 67 101 85 70 61 107 89 73 63
PT 67 64 63 60 144 113 83 64 141 108 80 61
FI 100 99 89 76 98 83 71 64 106 89 75 66
SE 104 103 86 73 133 109 85 72 133 109 85 72
UK 66 72 74 62 43 41 38 36 54 49 43 39
CZ 100 96 77 63 100 81 63 52 97 80 65 53
HU 89 71 61 59 84 73 62 60 84 73 62 60
PL 100 91 80 65 77 66 55 48 77 66 55 51
SK 100 100 96 72 118 94 71 56 118 94 75 59
NO 109 99 78 66 117 95 76 67 122 99 78 68
SZ 134 125 92 70 134 107 81 65 150 118 89 69
US 68 68 64 53 108 88 69 56 108 87 68 55
JP 84 86 71 56 117 92 67 52 113 87 67 52
Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using  OECD Tax -Benefit models.
* The wage level of the first earner is fixed at 67% of the APW, while the wage level of the second earner is indicated in each column 
1 earner couple  Single parent, 2 children Single
1 earner couple with  2 children 2 earners couple*
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Table 8 – Net Replacement Rates for unemployed persons (2001)
Single Single parent, 2 children 1 earner couple 
% of APW 50% 67% 100% 150% 50% 67% 100% 150% 50% 67% 100% 150%
BE 82 83 63 46 84 79 63 48 81 73 55 41
DK 92 85 60 45 94 96 76 61 71 86 63 47
DE 100 81 61 62 100 92 82 78 100 85 63 51
GR 101 76 58 58 108 81 66 65 101 76 63 63
ES 77 78 74 52 84 81 79 66 75 76 75 53
FR 94 83 71 70 86 92 78 70 82 87 67 69
IE 87 69 50 38 70 65 59 45 113 87 64 45
IT 47 50 52 39 55 54 60 49 48 50 56 43
LU 78 85 85 87 90 90 89 92 110 108 84 85
NL 91 80 71 61 93 87 77 66 96 89 73 63
AT 85 68 55 55 100 84 70 64 100 82 60 56
PT 1 1 2 8 6 7 8 8 38 37 57 68 08 17 3 7 6 7 9
FI 83 74 61 48 92 89 82 67 97 88 69 54
SE 97 82 78 56 90 92 89 69 100 98 78 56
UK 76 64 45 31 66 65 62 46 84 78 56 39
CZ 63 57 51 50 95 80 63 58 92 75 57 52
HU 64 65 47 35 76 73 58 46 64 65 47 35
PL 89 68 47 32 85 80 56 38 92 70 48 33
SK 79 72 64 47 100 92 72 56 100 100 75 52
NO 94 66 66 53 92 89 86 68 93 78 67 53
SZ 100 90 80 81 100 92 91 91 100 94 80 80
US 68 63 58 42 60 64 56 40 69 70 60 41
JP 74 70 60 60 88 83 60 60 83 67 59 58
1 earner couple with  2 children 2 earners couple 2 earners couple with 2 children
% of APW 50% 67% 100% 150% 50% 67% 100% 150% 50% 67% 100% 150%
BE 80 74 58 45 95 91 78 63 96 92 80 67
DK 71 84 75 58 96 93 77 64 96 93 78 66
DE 1 0 0 8 4 7 8 7 09 39 08 58 09 89 9 9 6 9 1
GR 108 81 66 65 101 88 75 72 103 91 80 76
ES 84 81 78 66 90 89 85 68 94 90 89 78
FR 79 85 78 69 96 92 82 79 96 92 83 79
IE 97 90 72 53 79 71 59 47 88 80 68 55
IT 58 57 62 52 79 77 71 59 83 81 76 62
LU 118 116 89 89 91 90 89 88 95 94 92 91
NL 95 89 77 65 85 85 83 74 86 86 84 75
AT 1 0 0 9 7 7 6 6 68 28 07 67 28 88 6 8 1 7 6
PT 75 69 66 78 107 95 88 88 105 92 87 87
FI 1 0 0 9 9 8 5 6 58 48 17 56 69 08 6 8 0 7 0
SE 100 100 82 61 91 91 87 71 92 92 88 72
UK 78 76 71 53 71 63 53 42 79 72 60 49
CZ 1 0 0 9 6 7 5 5 98 07 77 26 78 48 0 7 5 7 0
HU 76 73 57 46 83 81 68 57 87 85 73 63
PL 1 0 0 9 0 7 3 5 18 67 66 24 88 77 7 6 3 5 0
SK 100 100 96 69 84 81 78 64 86 84 83 69
NO 1 0 0 9 1 7 4 5 98 68 38 06 99 08 7 8 3 7 2
SZ 100 100 91 91 93 92 86 84 94 93 92 91
US 66 65 59 42 84 81 75 59 85 83 78 63
JP 89 87 68 59 90 86 77 73 88 84 78 73
Net replacement rates are calculated on the first month of unemployment.
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III. 3  Marginal effective tax rates relating to the “inactivity trap” 
 
To conclude, we examine the financial disincentives to move from a labour market 
condition of inactivity or long-term unemployment (that is, individuals looking for a 
job but not or no longer entitled to unemployment benefits).
31 This means that we are 
considering as a starting point for the calculation of the METRit a hypothetical 
individual living in a household where the only source of net out-of-work income is 
provided through benefits other than unemployment benefits or through the earnings 
of a spouse. This is a relevant situation for low-income families where one or both of 
the spouses have never worked or are otherwise excluded from receiving 
unemployment benefits. 
Definition: The marginal effective tax rate for an “inactive” person (METRit) is an 
indicator of the so-called inactivity trap. It aims to measure the short-term financial 
incentives to move from inactivity, unpaid work or unemployment where no 
unemployment benefits are received, into paid employment and is defined as the rate 
at which taxes increase and benefits (mainly minimum income or social assistance 
benefits) decrease as a person takes up a given job. 
Except for the receipt of unemployment benefits, all other modelling assumptions are 
the same as in section III.2 above. Table 9 reports estimates of METRit faced by 
“inactive” persons deciding to take up employment. As in the previous section we 
have calculated METRit f o r  a  m o v e  t o  w o r k  a t  d i fferent gross wage levels. 
Decomposition of the METRit in terms of underlying tax-benefit instruments is 
reported in Table A4 in annex A. As with the METRut results in the previous section, 
figures A1-A6 in the annex A show METRit over a broad range of re-entry wages (50-
200% of APW). 
We start by looking at the results for taking up employment with very low earnings of 
33% of the APW wage level corresponding, in most cases, to a low wage part-time 
job. Table 9 clearly show that all one-earner household types considered in our 
analysis face a high risk of an inactivity trap in at least eight member states. In fact, 
METRs are close to or higher than 90-100% in the following countries: Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, Ireland (but not for single parents with children), 
Netherlands, Austria, Finland, and Sweden. In the short-term there is no, or only very 
little, gain for recipients of means-tested benefits who take up employment. This is 
mainly due to the withdrawal of transfers from social assistance schemes, but in some 
countries (Denmark, Germany, France, Austria, Sweden, United Kingdom) the 
withdrawal of housing benefit also contributes to high METRit. 
 
 
                                                 
31 After the exhaustion of unemployment insurance, jobless persons often continue to receive 
unemployment assistance (e.g., Austria, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden). In most countries, benefits of last resort (minimum income, social assistance) 
exist for those not entitled to any unemployment benefits. Exceptions are Greece and Italy where 
no such schemes exist on a national level. 
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Table 9 - Inactivity trap indicator (2001)
Marginal effective tax rate when moving from social assistance to work
at a wage level equivalent to:
Single Single parent, 2 children 1 earner couple 
% of APW 33% 50% 67% 100% 150% 33% 50% 67% 100% 150% 33% 50% 67% 100% 150%
BE 85 71 67 64 61 97 77 71 67 63 97 78 69 63 61
DK 96 96 83 72 69 84 92 87 76 72 34 59 73 70 67
DE 84 90 80 71 67 84 90 85 74 67 84 90 81 69 62
GR 16 16 16 18 22 16 16 16 16 20 16 16 16 18 22
ES 69 50 44 40 37 100 68 58 46 40 88 60 47 41 37
FR 81 83 71 60 52 69 75 81 69 55 76 83 86 65 54
IE 100 87 73 59 54 51 50 54 60 53 100 100 87 68 54
IT 10 16 20 27 31 -1 -1 -2 17 27 7 8 13 24 30
LU 89 92 76 63 58 86 94 82 59 54 79 90 98 73 59
NL 97 92 84 72 59 93 82 80 70 59 96 96 92 78 63
AT 100 88 75 64 57 100 99 84 69 61 100 100 86 71 62
PT 55 50 42 36 35 55 55 55 52 45 55 55 55 54 44
FI 100 86 78 67 61 70 65 66 65 60 100 97 91 78 69
SE 100 98 82 67 60 82 63 61 60 56 100 100 98 78 67
UK 80 78 70 58 49 81 45 56 65 57 88 84 82 66 55
CZ 83 70 59 49 43 100 94 80 67 57 100 92 79 64 53
HU 69 55 53 49 51 61 45 38 39 45 69 55 53 49 51
PL 92 72 63 53 47 100 86 84 68 57 100 94 78 63 54
SK 99 81 72 56 46 100 100 91 72 59 100 100 100 80 62
NO 83 85 71 60 56 78 73 69 68 60 93 91 76 63 56
SZ 100 100 81 63 53 100 100 92 69 56 100 100 95 71 57
US 21 29 29 29 33 30 33 43 45 40 18 25 32 31 31
JP 79 69 56 43 36 108 103 95 70 55 79 84 71 54 43
1 earner couple with  2 children 2 earners couple* 2 earners couple with 2 children*
% of APW 33% 50% 67% 100% 150% 33% 50% 67% 100% 150% 33% 50% 67% 100% 150%
BE 97 72 65 60 59 46 45 49 51 52 46 45 48 51 52
DK 37 58 74 74 69 56 52 50 50 55 83 70 64 59 61
DE 84 90 77 69 62 42 45 47 48 49 52 51 51 51 51
GR 16 16 16 16 20 16 16 16 18 22 16 16 16 16 20
ES 106 77 64 49 42 18 16 19 23 25 15 12 15 20 23
FR 68 75 82 74 58 21 23 27 30 31 56 43 41 37 34
IE 100 95 87 72 57 12 15 18 22 24 34 29 29 29 29
IT -5 -4 -7 12 26 28 33 32 35 37 37 44 43 44 43
LU 75 87 93 76 59 14 17 20 24 28 14 14 14 18 24
NL 96 94 90 78 63 35 33 36 39 38 38 35 38 40 39
AT 100 100 97 78 67 21 20 24 30 34 21 20 24 30 34
PT 55 55 55 57 56 42 33 30 28 27 87 73 57 46 39
FI 100 100 99 89 76 25 27 30 35 40 42 38 38 40 43
SE 100 100 100 84 71 27 27 29 32 36 37 37 37 36 40
UK 93 66 72 74 62 7 15 19 24 26 63 49 44 40 38
CZ 100 100 96 77 63 31 29 28 28 29 31 30 30 31 31
HU 61 45 38 39 45 21 23 27 32 40 21 23 27 32 40
PL 100 100 91 80 65 31 32 33 33 33 54 47 44 41 41
SK 100 100 100 96 72 32 28 27 26 27 81 61 51 46 40
NO 100 99 92 73 63 26 29 30 32 37 26 29 30 32 37
SZ 100 100 100 75 59 20 21 23 25 27 20 21 22 24 26
US 30 37 46 49 43 27 28 28 29 29 27 20 22 24 26
JP 79 84 86 71 56 15 16 16 17 18 36 28 24 25 23
Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models.
* The wage level of the first earner is fixed at 67% of the APW, while the wage level of the second earner  is indicated in each column
 
 
Particularly relevant is the disincentive for the breadwinner of a couple with two 
young children. This is a result of the recognition that larger families require more 
resources. As a result, means-tested benefits are often substantially larger than for 
single persons. This implies that the range of benefit withdrawal will extend further 
up the earnings scale. For one-earner couples with two children we therefore see that 
in seven member states, taking up a job with a wage close to 50% of APW earnings 
results in about the same net income as remaining with no work at all (Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden). There is therefore a relatively 
high risk that social assistance recipients might remain trapped in long-term benefit - 44 - 
dependence. The potential disincentive to take up a job remains strong up to wage 
levels of 67% of APW in most of the aforementioned EU Member States. In Finland  
and Sweden, a relatively high marginal income tax rate (above 25%, considering both 
personal income tax and social security contributions), combines with the withdrawal 
of means-tested benefits to generate a METRit of 100%.  
A move from inactivity to work at the average wage level (100% of APW) of one 
spouse can still be problematic (or financially unrewarding, given METRit higher than 
80%) for  jobless households with children in Austria, The Netherlands, Finland and 
Sweden. To recoup a greater part of lost subsidies, a job paying more than the average 
wage is required. In the first three of these countries, 50% or more of the high METRit 
is due to the withdrawal of social assistance while in Sweden we can see that the 
withdrawal of the social assistance benefit and the housing benefit has roughly the 
same influence as income taxes (see Table A4.4 in the annex A). 
The METRit for our hypothetical household with 2 earners (‘with or without children) 
shows the financial incentive for the second spouse to move from inactivity to work 
(in our calculation the first earner is assumed to be always employed at 67% of the 
APW wage level).  The METRit when the second earner in a family with 2 children 
decides to take up a job (see last panel in table 9) is relatively high in Denmark, 
Germany and Portugal. While in Portugal this is mainly due to the withdrawal of 
social assistance, in Germany it is mainly the result of the joint taxation of family 
income.    
As mentioned in Box 1, high participation disincentives generated by the tax-benefit 
system have been found to be more likely to have an impact on labour market 
behaviour when they concern certain groups of persons, one being lone parents. Lone 
parent social assistance recipients often face METRit that are higher than for other 
household types. At the same time, the direct benefit of staying home to engage in 
unpaid childcare or housework will frequently be larger than in households where 
there are no children or where responsibilities can be shared. It is interesting to note to 
what extent recent policy effort to overcome inactivity trap for these persons in some 
countries has succeeded in designing appropriate measures. For example, in the UK, 
METRit for lone parents receiving social assistance are usually lower than for other 
family types. A lone parent taking up a minimum wage job (50% of APW earnings) 
will see 45% of his/her earnings “taxed away” while for singles, one-earner couples 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
 
The scope of the modelling approach taken in this paper has been discussed in some 
detail in the preceding sections. We have also highlighted some of the limitations and 
caveats to be borne in mind when interpreting results and, particularly, when 
comparing them across countries. In this section we briefly re-iterate these issues and 
discuss how some of them are addressed in parallel work undertaken jointly by the 
European Commission and OECD. 
The results presented in this paper can be characterised in terms of the following 
features: 
1.  as tax-benefit indicators they describe features of tax-benefit systems as they 
apply to individuals in specific situations (rather than the country population 
as a whole), thus they can be considered as policy indicators; 
2.  as work incentive indicators they relate to the financial trade-off applying to 
individuals’ participation and working time/effort decisions (rather than the 
behavioural response of individuals facing these trade-offs); 
3.  as income indicators, they focus on household disposable income (rather than 
labour costs), current income (rather than longer-term or life-time income), 
and cash incomes (rather than broader income concepts including benefits in 
kind, etc.). 
Indicators such as the METRs and NRRs presented here provide point estimates for 
one particular set of circumstances which makes it essential that the sensitivity 
analyses be undertaken with respect to the assumptions underlying the calculations. 
Evaluating taxes and benefits for a wide range of earnings and household types goes 
some way towards such an assessment. However, while having results for different 
scenarios is a starting point, we would ideally want to know how important each of 
the scenarios is in a particular country in order to have a basis for choosing between 
them. This is particularly important if indicators are to be compared across countries. 
Some of the relevant issues have been anticipated and are currently being 
investigated. These include the question of how relevant different types of social 
benefits are when considering individual household circumstances: how likely is it 
that individuals actually receive the social benefits to which they are legally entitled? 
One specific facet of this issue concerns the receipt of different types of social 
benefits at the same time. For instance, unemployed individuals in low-income 
families may receive unemployment benefits and, at the same time, a low overall 
family income may make the family as a whole eligible for social assistance or 
minimum income benefits. While in some countries, the concurrent receipt of these 
two types of benefits is not legally possible, the situation is less clear in others and the 
most appropriate modelling assumption will therefore depend on how many cases of 
concurrent benefit receipt there are in practice. 
Clearly, the decision whether to include minimum income schemes in the calculation 
can have a considerable impact on relevant indicators. This is particularly the case for 
countries operating relatively generous minimum income schemes. In the present 
paper, we have presented all indicators under the assumption that the unemployed - 46 - 
person receives unemployment insurance benefits and, where legally possible, also 
minimum income benefits. However, all indicators have been computed under both 
assumptions (receiving and not receiving social assistance) and the “no Social 
Assistance” results are available on request. 
Another issue that arises when comparing net household incomes across countries is 
the conceptual scope of the net income definition (as discussed in section II). Social 
transfers can take the form of direct cash payments to recipients. Alternatively, they 
can be delivered indirectly by intervening in the markets of goods and services likely 
to be consumed by intended recipients. Subsidised housing or childcare services are 
prime examples of the latter approach. In a similar way, taxes may directly reduce 
people’s current incomes (income taxes or employees’ social insurance contributions). 
But they may also alter the price structure in relevant markets affecting wages (taxes 
on employers including employer’s social insurance contributions: see footnote 17) 
and the prices of goods and services (indirect taxes).  
Tax/benefit models are primarily designed to capture the direct effects on current cash 
incomes. As such, they do not normally consider: 
•   benefits in-kind; 
•   the value of deferred benefits bought by current contributions to social 
insurance or compulsory private insurance schemes; 
•   differences of consumption possibilities due to indirect taxes;  
•   the effects on gross wages resulting from the imposition of taxes levied on the 
employer. 
This focus is useful since direct cash payments made to households are of 
considerable interest. In comparing results across countries and over time it is 
nevertheless important to keep in mind differences in the extent to which direct 
payments capture the functioning of taxes and benefits. While tax/benefit models 
based on typical households cannot fully capture these differences, it is possible to 
complement the main output of these models (current cash household income and its 
components) in order to illustrate limitations of a strict focus on this income concept. 
In the framework of the present EC-OECD project, work is currently being 
undertaken in four areas. First, insurance contributions paid by employers are now 
computed alongside current cash household incomes. Whilst these are not directly 
included in (most) of the indicators produced, they do provide important contextual 
background. Secondly, a detailed review of available evidence on benefit take-up 
analyses the extent and determinants of non-benefit take-up across countries. Thirdly, 
a study of coverage rates using both survey data and administrative sources aims to 
improve our understanding of who the benefit recipients are and how the combination 
of different benefits contributes to incomes of different types of household. Finally, 
efforts are underway to be able to compare household incomes after childcare costs 
have been deducted and respective subsidies taken into account. This is particularly 
relevant since childcare costs can use up a considerable part of family budgets and can 
therefore have important implications for parents’ labour supply decisions. Since 
childcare is one area where institutional arrangements vary greatly across countries, it - 47 - 
is not sufficient to only take into account childcare benefits paid directly to parents 
since subsidies to childcare institutions can have equally important effects on family 
budgets. To capture these factors, information on childcare costs has been collected 
and is currently being reviewed. A subsequent analysis of the implications for 
families’ budgets of countries’ childcare arrangements will build on this. 
V.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This note has presented a cross-country comparison of 3 indicators of so-called 
unemployment, inactivity and low-wage traps for a set of hypothetical family types. 
Technically speaking, these are marginal effective tax rates (METRs) and constitute 
the main empirical results of the joint European Commission-OECD project allowing 
comparable tax-benefit calculation to be performed within a consistent conceptual 
framework. 
These indicators provide a useful picture of the financial (dis)incentive to take up a 
job (unemployment/inactivity trap) or increasing working time or work efforts (low-
wage trap) when potential earnings are low. Results have been presented for all 
current EU Member States along with a range of Candidate and non-EU countries. By 
taking into account the interactions between various components of each country’s 
tax-benefit system, the calculations presented in this note provide a detailed picture of 
the mechanics of tax-benefit systems. The plots of net incomes for different earnings 
levels (budget constraints) allow us to address issues of work incentives and benefit 
adequacy in a single framework. 
The resulting METRs vary greatly across individual circumstances and family 
structures. Moreover, certain benefits (e.g. housing benefits and family benefits) are 
often available to certain groups of unemployed or low-income households. Figures 
presented here show the extent to which features of the tax system and the possibility 
of receiving means-tested benefits can produce METRs that can be much higher at the 
bottom than the top end of the earnings distribution. This implies that low-skilled 
individuals are more likely to confront unemployment, inactivity or low-wage traps. 
The analysis of available figures shows that, as a result of the interaction of tax and 
benefit provisions, there is a risk of a low-wage trap for employed persons in several 
Member States, especially in those where means-testing has traditionally played an 
important role in the benefit system. We have also seen that the risk is the highest for 
households whose overall gross earning is close to the minimum wage and, in most 
case, not higher than 60-70% of APW earnings. 
For persons entitled to unemployment benefit, we have seen that the risk of an 
unemployment trap is particularly high when, as a result of depreciation of past skills 
of an unemployed person, potential re-entry wages are lower than those before 
unemployment. When re-entry wages are lower than earnings before unemployment, 
individuals in Member States may find there is little, if any, immediate financial 
incentive to return to work. Any related work disincentives are also more likely to be 
relevant for the low-skilled because their unemployment spells tend to be longer and 
more frequent than for highly skilled workers. It is important to note that the work 
incentive indicators presented in this paper are based on the assumption that the 
unemployed person actually has a choice. Strictly enforced job search requirements - 48 - 
can go some way towards reducing the possibility of job refusals. Also, while an 
important influence especially for low-income households, the immediate financial 
gain is likely not to be the only consideration when deciding whether to return to 
work. Nevertheless, unemployment traps are a distinct possibility which, along with 
benefit adequacy, needs to be taken into account when discussing benefit reforms.  
As one would expect, the likelihood of an inactivity trap for people receiving means-
tested benefits is also highest for low-skilled workers with low earnings potential - 
possibly leading to continued benefit dependency and progressive marginalisation in 
the labour market. To some extent, this is more worrying than the possibility of an 
unemployment trap. The duration of unemployment insurance benefits is usually 
limited and benefits are more likely to be subject to stringent job search conditions. 
While the institutional diversity is considerable, these features restricting benefit 
recipiency apply to a lesser extent to means-tested benefits of “last resort”. At the 
same time, concerns over poverty levels make re-designing these benefit schemes 
more difficult. Job-search requirements and other conditions need to be more finely 
tuned than in the case of unemployment benefit recipients who have already, and 
recently, demonstrated their ability to work. Careful analysis of budget constraints 
can, however, help to reduce any existing negative impact on work incentives. 
Earnings disregard allows benefit recipients to maintain some work attachment, while 
in-work benefits can increase the attractiveness of taking up employment. In the case 
of non-working spouses, potential inactivity traps can be addressed by reducing the 
degree to which taxes paid by the working (or unemployed) spouse would be affected 
if the non-working spouse were to take up employment. Finally, integrating and co-
ordinating the functioning of different parts of the tax-benefit system can prevent 
situations where taxes in combination with the withdrawal of a number of benefits 
generate METRs close to or in excess of 100%. 
The results presented in this note allow us to identify countries and family types that 
face hardly any financial incentive to increase work efforts or to take up a job. Recent 
reforms to “make work pay” and to reduce the tax burden on labour, especially for 
low wage earners, have contributed to lower marginal (effective) tax rates on transfer 
recipients. This has diminished the risk of potential poverty and unemployment traps 
at certain income levels. Yet, despite such efforts there are still fundamental trade-offs 
in the ability of low income support programmes to be effective in relieving poverty 
and to have well-targeted benefits while maintaining desirable work incentives. We 
have seen that the risk of negative effects on work incentives remains particularly 
high in some member states. Mostly concerned are countries where income support 
and social policy measures are significant and where means-testing of benefits is 
substantial. On the other hand, the recourse to strict targeting through means-testing is 
almost inevitable if unsustainable budgetary costs are to be avoided. The search for a 
suitable solution to the “challenging triangle” of welfare, that is designing a 
satisfactory income-support scheme for low-income families, while minimising 
disincentives to work and avoiding excessive budgetary cost, remains the key issue in 
the agenda of the reform of tax-benefit systems in many European countries. A 
continued monitoring of the mechanics of tax-benefit systems can serve as a valuable 
input into this process.                                                                              
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Table A1 – Low-wage trap indicator     2001 
Marginal effective tax rate and its main components, at different wage levels, as wage increase by 1% of the APW wage level 
A1.1    Single person
% of APW 33 50 67 100 150
Components METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC
BE -20.0 0% 0% 0% 126% -314% 71.6 0% 0% 0% 19% 52% 53.7 0% 0% 0% 41% 13% 55.1 0% 0% 0% 41% 14% 55.5 0% 0% 0% 41% 14%
DK 108.7 70% 22% 0% 8% 8% 44.9 0% 0% 0% 36% 9% 56.0 0% 0% 0% 38% 18% 50.4 0% 0% 0% 41% 9% 63.5 0% 0% 0% 55% 9%
DE 100.0 22% 42% 0% 16% 21% 70.3 6% 11% 0% 33% 21% 51.2 0% 0% 0% 31% 21% 57.5 0% 0% 0% 37% 21% 59.4 0% 0% 0% 47% 13%
GR 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 28.5 0% 0% 0% 13% 16% 41.1 0% 0% 0% 25% 16%
ES 6.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 23.2 0% 0% 0% 17% 6% 33.1 0% 0% 0% 27% 6% 28.8 0% 0% 0% 22% 6% 32.9 0% 0% 0% 27% 6%
FR 88.9 42% 29% 0% 4% 14% 17.5 0% 0% 0% 4% 14% 41.2 0% 0% 0% 28% 14% 33.9 0% 0% 0% 20% 13% 36.5 0% 0% 0% 27% 9%
IE 100.0 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20.0 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 24.0 0% 0% 0% 20% 4% 26.0 0% 0% 0% 20% 6% 47.9 0% 0% 0% 42% 6%
IT 10.0 0% 0% 0% 1% 9% 26.4 0% 0% 0% 17% 9% 31.8 0% 0% 0% 23% 9% 39.1 0% 0% 0% 30% 9% 39.1 0% 0% 0% 30% 9%
LU 109.2 100% 0% 0% -1% 10% 27.7 0% 0% 0% 14% 14% 30.7 0% 0% 0% 17% 14% 41.6 0% 0% 0% 28% 14% 52.7 0% 0% 0% 39% 14%
NL 100.0 75% 0% 0% 2% 23% 120.0 0% 76% 0% 8% 37% 44.9 0% 0% 0% 8% 37% 45.0 0% 0% 0% 40% 5% 42.0 0% 0% 0% 42% 0%
AT 100.0 49% 33% 0% 0% 18% 18.1 0% 0% 0% 0% 18% 36.9 0% 0% 0% 19% 18% 42.7 0% 0% 0% 25% 18% 49.9 0% 0% 0% 32% 18%
PT 55.5 44% 0% 0% 0% 11% 11.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 11% 23.0 0% 0% 0% 12% 11% 25.0 0% 0% 0% 14% 11% 35.0 0% 0% 0% 24% 11%
FI 54.4 5% 23% 0% 20% 7% 82.7 0% 45% 0% 31% 7% 41.1 0% 0% 0% 34% 7% 46.8 0% 0% 0% 40% 7% 52.5 0% 0% 0% 46% 7%
SE 100.0 33% 42% 0% 17% 9% 37.3 0% 0% 0% 29% 9% 37.2 0% 0% 0% 29% 9% 35.2 0% 0% 0% 31% 4% 51.6 0% 0% 0% 52% 0%
UK 72.6 0% 51% 0% 12% 10% 76.2 0% 44% 0% 22% 10% 32.0 0% 0% 0% 22% 10% 32.0 0% 0% 0% 22% 10% 32.0 0% 0% 0% 22% 10%
CZ 45.8 0% 20% 0% 13% 12% 45.8 0% 20% 0% 13% 13% 25.6 0% 0% 0% 13% 13% 30.0 0% 0% 0% 17% 12% 30.0 0% 0% 0% 17% 12%
HU 20.5 0% 0% 0% 8% 13% 38.6 0% 0% 0% 26% 12% 40.5 0% 0% 0% 28% 12% 40.5 0% 0% 0% 28% 12% 50.5 0% 0% 0% 38% 12%
PL 25.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% 34.2 0% 0% 0% 9% 25% 34.2 0% 0% 0% 9% 25% 34.2 0% 0% 0% 9% 25% 34.2 0% 0% 0% 9% 25%
SK 38.1 0% 25% 0% 0% 13% 45.5 0% 22% 0% 10% 13% 26.9 0% 4% 0% 10% 13% 23.3 0% 0% 0% 10% 13% 30.2 0% 0% 0% 17% 13%
NO 71.7 0% 36% 0% 28% 8% 35.8 0% 0% 0% 28% 8% 35.8 0% 0% 0% 28% 8% 35.8 0% 0% 0% 28% 8% 49.3 0% 0% 0% 41% 8%
SZ 100.0 42% 39% 0% 7% 12% 23.0 1% 1% 0% 9% 12% 23.4 0% 0% 0% 12% 12% 29.1 0% 0% 0% 18% 12% 33.4 0% 0% 0% 22% 12%
US 42.6 18% 0% 0% 17% 8% 29.5 0% 0% 0% 22% 8% 29.5 0% 0% 0% 22% 8% 29.5 0% 0% 0% 22% 8% 42.0 0% 0% 0% 34% 8%
JP 93.1 72% 0% 0% 11% 10% 17.4 0% 0% 0% 7% 10% 17.3 0% 0% 0% 7% 10% 21.6 0% 0% 0% 12% 10% 27.8 0% 0% 0% 18% 10%
A1.2    Single parent with 2 children
% of APW 33 50 67 100 150
Components METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC
BE -20.0 166% 0% 0% 0% -314% 71.6 0% 0% 0% 19% 52% 53.7 0% 0% 0% 41% 13% 55.1 0% 0% 0% 41% 14% 55.5 0% 0% 0% 41% 14%
DK 105.2 79% 14% 0% 5% 8% 105.2 79% 14% 0% 5% 8% 66.8 0% 11% 0% 38% 18% 50.4 0% 0% 0% 41% 9% 63.5 0% 0% 0% 55% 9%
DE 100.0 46% 34% 0% 0% 21% 100.0 30% 22% 0% 28% 21% 47.9 0% 0% 0% 27% 21% 55.4 0% 0% 0% 35% 21% 51.8 0% 0% 0% 39% 13%
GR 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 19.3 0% 0% 0% 3% 16% 41.1 0% 0% 0% 25% 16%
ES 6.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 6.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 6.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 28.8 0% 0% 0% 22% 6% 28.8 0% 0% 0% 22% 6%
FR 83.7 42% 24% 0% 4% 14% 83.7 42% 24% 0% 4% 14% 46.3 0% 24% 0% 8% 14% 21.1 0% 0% 0% 8% 13% 40.0 0% 0% 0% 31% 9%
IE 0.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 60.0 0% 0% 50% 10% 0% 62.4 0% 0% 48% 10% 4% 26.0 0% 0% 0% 20% 6% 47.9 0% 0% 0% 42% 6%
IT 10.0 0% 0% 0% 1% 9% 10.0 0% 0% 0% 1% 9% 120.0 0% 0% 116% 23% 9% 39.1 0% 0% 0% 30% 9% 39.1 0% 0% 0% 30% 9%
LU 110.3 100% 0% 0% 0% 10% 120.0 36% 491% 0% 0% 13% 14.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 14% 14.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 14% 49.2 0% 0% 0% 35% 14%
NL 100.0 98% 0% 0% 0% 2% 88.6 0% 48% 0% 8% 33% 40.6 0% 0% 0% 8% 33% 45.0 0% 0% 0% 40% 5% 42.0 0% 0% 0% 42% 0%
AT 100.0 56% 26% 0% 0% 18% 18.1 0% 0% 0% 0% 18% 36.9 0% 0% 0% 19% 18% 42.7 0% 0% 0% 25% 18% 49.9 0% 0% 0% 32% 18%
PT 55.5 44% 0% 0% 0% 11% 55.5 44% 0% 0% 0% 11% 55.5 45% 0% 0% 0% 11% 11.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 11% 35.0 0% 0% 0% 24% 11%
FI 45.5 0% 19% 0% 20% 7% 74.3 0% 37% 0% 31% 7% 87.7 0% 47% 0% 34% 7% 46.8 0% 0% 0% 40% 7% 52.5 0% 0% 0% 46% 7%
SE 25.5 0% 0% 0% 17% 9% 44.9 0% 8% 0% 29% 9% 57.2 0% 20% 0% 29% 9% 55.2 0% 20% 0% 31% 4% 51.6 0% 0% 0% 52% 0%
UK 88.2 78% 0% 0% 0% 10% 89.3 0% 20% 37% 22% 10% 89.3 0% 20% 37% 22% 10% 69.4 0% 0% 37% 22% 10% 32.0 0% 0% 0% 22% 10%
CZ 100.0 87% 0% 0% 0% 12% 17.3 0% 0% 0% 5% 13% 40.9 0% 15% 0% 13% 13% 36.0 0% 10% 0% 13% 12% 30.0 0% 0% 0% 17% 12%
HU 12.5 0% 0% 0% 0% 13% 12.5 0% 0% 0% 0% 12% 34.5 0% 0% 0% 22% 12% 40.5 0% 0% 0% 28% 12% 50.5 0% 0% 0% 38% 12%
PL 100.0 75% 0% 0% 0% 25% 34.2 0% 0% 0% 9% 25% 34.2 0% 0% 0% 9% 25% 34.2 0% 0% 0% 9% 25% 34.2 0% 0% 0% 9% 25%
SK 100.0 62% 25% 0% 0% 13% 100.0 62% 25% 0% 0% 13% 45.5 0% 22% 0% 10% 13% 23.3 0% 0% 0% 10% 13% 30.2 0% 0% 0% 17% 13%
NO 63.4 0% 0% 40% 17% 7% 63.4 0% 0% 40% 17% 7% 63.4 0% 0% 40% 17% 7% 35.8 0% 0% 0% 28% 8% 49.3 0% 0% 0% 41% 8%
SZ 100.0 59% 29% 0% 0% 12% 100.0 55% 27% 0% 6% 12% 19.5 0% 0% 0% 8% 12% 27.3 0% 0% 0% 16% 12% 29.7 0% 0% 0% 18% 12%
US 27.4 23% 0% 0% -3% 8% 48.5 23% 0% 0% 18% 8% 45.5 0% 0% 0% 38% 8% 50.5 0% 0% 0% 43% 8% 29.5 0% 0% 0% 22% 8%
JP 93.1 83% 0% 0% 0% 10% 93.1 81% 0% 0% 3% 10% 17.3 0% 0% 0% 7% 10% 18.6 0% 0% 0% 9% 10% 21.6 0% 0% 0% 12% 10% - 54 - 
 
 
A1.3    One-earner couple, without children
% of APW 33 50 67 100 150
Components METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC
BE -15.9 224% 0% 0% 74% -314% 62.3 0% 0% 0% 10% 52% 45.1 0% 0% 0% 32% 13% 51.0 0% 0% 0% 37% 14% 55.5 0% 0% 0% 41% 14%
DK 104.1 81% 11% 0% 4% 8% 115.6 80% 23% 0% 5% 8% 110.4 80% 12% 0% 1% 17% 44.9 0% 0% 0% 36% 9% 63.5 0% 0% 0% 55% 9%
DE 100.0 39% 41% 0% 0% 21% 100.0 39% 41% 0% 0% 21% 38.9 0% 0% 0% 18% 21% 47.5 0% 0% 0% 27% 21% 45.4 0% 0% 0% 33% 13%
GR 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 28.5 0% 0% 0% 13% 16% 41.1 0% 0% 0% 25% 16%
ES 6.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 6.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 26.4 0% 0% 0% 20% 6% 28.8 0% 0% 0% 22% 6% 32.9 0% 0% 0% 27% 6%
FR 90.8 42% 31% 0% 4% 14% 90.8 42% 31% 0% 4% 14% 29.7 8% 0% 0% 8% 14% 28.4 0% 0% 0% 15% 13% 30.4 0% 0% 0% 21% 9%
IE 100.0 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100.0 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 26.0 0% 0% 0% 20% 6% 25.9 0% 0% 0% 20% 6%
IT 10.0 0% 0% 0% 1% 9% 26.4 0% 0% 0% 17% 9% 31.8 0% 0% 0% 23% 9% 39.1 0% 0% 0% 30% 9% 39.1 0% 0% 0% 30% 9%
LU 110.4 100% 0% 0% 0% 10% 110.4 100% 0% 0% 0% 10% 14.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 14% 28.7 0% 0% 0% 15% 14% 36.1 0% 0% 0% 22% 14%
NL 100.0 98% 0% 0% 0% 2% 92.9 0% 48% 0% 8% 37% 44.9 0% 0% 0% 8% 37% 45.0 0% 0% 0% 40% 5% 42.0 0% 0% 0% 42% 0%
AT 100.0 55% 27% 0% 0% 18% 100.0 55% 27% 0% 0% 18% 36.9 0% 0% 0% 19% 18% 42.7 0% 0% 0% 25% 18% 49.9 0% 0% 0% 32% 18%
PT 55.5 44% 0% 0% 0% 11% 55.5 44% 0% 0% 0% 11% 55.5 45% 0% 0% 0% 11% 23.0 0% 0% 0% 12% 11% 25.0 0% 0% 0% 14% 11%
FI 100.0 51% 21% 0% 20% 7% 83.3 0% 46% 0% 31% 7% 95.4 0% 54% 0% 34% 7% 46.8 0% 0% 0% 40% 7% 52.5 0% 0% 0% 46% 7%
SE 100.0 24% 51% 0% 17% 9% 100.0 36% 27% 0% 29% 9% 37.2 0% 0% 0% 29% 9% 35.2 0% 0% 0% 31% 4% 51.6 0% 0% 0% 52% 0%
UK 72.6 0% 51% 0% 12% 10% 76.2 0% 44% 0% 22% 10% 69.9 0% 38% 0% 22% 10% 32.0 0% 0% 0% 22% 10% 32.0 0% 0% 0% 22% 10%
CZ 100.0 87% 0% 0% 0% 12% 25.6 0% 0% 0% 13% 13% 41.1 0% 15% 0% 13% 13% 27.6 0% 0% 0% 15% 12% 30.0 0% 0% 0% 17% 12%
HU 20.5 0% 0% 0% 8% 13% 38.6 0% 0% 0% 26% 12% 40.5 0% 0% 0% 28% 12% 40.5 0% 0% 0% 28% 12% 50.5 0% 0% 0% 38% 12%
PL 100.0 75% 0% 0% 0% 25% 25.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% 34.2 0% 0% 0% 9% 25% 34.2 0% 0% 0% 9% 25% 34.2 0% 0% 0% 9% 25%
SK 100.0 62% 25% 0% 0% 13% 100.0 54% 22% 0% 10% 13% 100.0 54% 22% 0% 10% 13% 23.3 0% 0% 0% 10% 13% 30.2 0% 0% 0% 17% 13%
NO 71.7 0% 36% 0% 28% 8% 35.8 0% 0% 0% 28% 8% 35.8 0% 0% 0% 28% 8% 35.8 0% 0% 0% 28% 8% 49.3 0% 0% 0% 41% 8%
SZ 100.0 53% 32% 0% 4% 12% 100.0 51% 30% 0% 7% 12% 21.6 0% 0% 0% 10% 12% 24.5 0% 0% 0% 13% 12% 27.6 0% 0% 0% 16% 12%
US 35.0 21% 0% 0% 7% 8% 46.4 17% 0% 0% 22% 8% 29.5 0% 0% 0% 22% 8% 29.5 0% 0% 0% 22% 8% 29.5 0% 0% 0% 22% 8%
JP 93.1 83% 0% 0% 0% 10% 93.1 81% 0% 0% 3% 10% 17.3 0% 0% 0% 7% 10% 18.6 0% 0% 0% 9% 10% 21.6 0% 0% 0% 12% 10%
A1.4    One-earner couple, with 2 children
% of APW 33 50 67 100 150
Components METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC
BE -20.0 166% 0% 0% 0% -314% 62.3 0% 0% 0% 10% 52% 45.1 0% 0% 0% 32% 13% 51.0 0% 0% 0% 37% 14% 55.5 0% 0% 0% 41% 14%
DK 99.7 92% 0% 0% 0% 8% 99.7 92% 0% 0% 0% 8% 116.1 92% 11% 0% -4% 17% 44.9 0% 0% 0% 36% 9% 63.5 0% 0% 0% 55% 9%
DE 100.0 48% 31% 0% 0% 21% 100.0 48% 31% 0% 0% 21% 60.4 0% 22% 0% 18% 21% 46.1 0% 0% 0% 26% 21% 45.3 0% 0% 0% 32% 13%
GR 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 19.3 0% 0% 0% 3% 16% 41.1 0% 0% 0% 25% 16%
ES 106.4 100% 0% 0% 0% 6% 6.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 6.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 23.2 0% 0% 0% 17% 6% 28.8 0% 0% 0% 22% 6%
FR 83.7 42% 24% 0% 4% 14% 83.7 42% 24% 0% 4% 14% 88.2 42% 24% 0% 8% 14% 21.1 0% 0% 0% 8% 13% 24.6 0% 0% 0% 15% 9%
IE 100.0 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 60.0 0% 0% 60% 0% 0% 61.6 0% 0% 58% 0% 4% 26.0 0% 0% 0% 20% 6% 25.9 0% 0% 0% 20% 6%
IT 10.0 0% 0% 0% 1% 9% 10.0 0% 0% 0% 1% 9% 31.8 0% 0% 0% 23% 9% 120.0 0% 0% 267% 30% 9% 39.1 0% 0% 0% 30% 9%
LU 110.4 100% 0% 0% 0% 10% 110.4 100% 0% 0% 0% 10% 110.3 100% 0% 0% 0% 10% 14.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 14% 36.1 0% 0% 0% 22% 14%
NL 100.0 98% 0% 0% 0% 2% 92.9 0% 48% 0% 8% 37% 44.9 0% 0% 0% 8% 37% 45.0 0% 0% 0% 40% 5% 42.0 0% 0% 0% 42% 0%
AT 100.0 60% 22% 0% 0% 18% 100.0 60% 22% 0% 0% 18% 36.9 0% 0% 0% 19% 18% 42.7 0% 0% 0% 25% 18% 49.9 0% 0% 0% 32% 18%
PT 55.5 44% 0% 0% 0% 11% 55.5 45% 0% 0% 0% 11% 55.5 45% 0% 0% 0% 11% 67.5 44% 0% 0% 12% 11% 25.0 0% 0% 0% 14% 11%
FI 100.0 73% 0% 0% 20% 7% 100.0 27% 36% 0% 31% 7% 85.3 0% 44% 0% 34% 7% 46.8 0% 0% 0% 40% 7% 52.5 0% 0% 0% 46% 7%
SE 100.0 37% 38% 0% 17% 9% 100.0 29% 34% 0% 29% 9% 100.0 29% 34% 0% 29% 9% 35.2 0% 0% 0% 31% 4% 51.6 0% 0% 0% 52% 0%
UK 88.2 78% 0% 0% 0% 10% 89.3 0% 20% 37% 22% 10% 89.3 0% 20% 37% 22% 10% 69.4 0% 0% 37% 22% 10% 32.0 0% 0% 0% 22% 10%
CZ 100.0 87% 0% 0% 0% 12% 100.0 88% 0% 0% 0% 13% 25.6 0% 0% 0% 13% 13% 37.7 0% 12% 0% 13% 12% 30.0 0% 0% 0% 17% 12%
HU 12.5 0% 0% 0% 0% 13% 12.5 0% 0% 0% 0% 12% 34.5 0% 0% 0% 22% 12% 40.5 0% 0% 0% 28% 12% 50.5 0% 0% 0% 38% 12%
PL 100.0 75% 0% 0% 0% 25% 100.0 75% 0% 0% 0% 25% 34.2 0% 0% 0% 9% 25% 34.2 0% 0% 0% 9% 25% 34.2 0% 0% 0% 9% 25%
SK 100.0 62% 25% 0% 0% 13% 100.0 62% 25% 0% 0% 13% 100.0 55% 22% 0% 10% 13% 23.3 0% 0% 0% 10% 13% 30.2 0% 0% 0% 17% 13%
NO 100.0 92% 0% 0% 0% 8% 76.5 0% 41% 0% 28% 8% 35.8 0% 0% 0% 28% 8% 35.8 0% 0% 0% 28% 8% 49.3 0% 0% 0% 41% 8%
SZ 100.0 62% 27% 0% 0% 12% 100.0 58% 25% 0% 6% 12% 89.8 50% 21% 0% 7% 12% 23.6 0% 0% 0% 12% 12% 27.6 0% 0% 0% 16% 12%
US 80.1 0% 0% 80% -7% 8% 48.5 23% 0% 0% 18% 8% 63.7 18% 0% 0% 38% 8% 50.5 0% 0% 0% 43% 8% 29.5 0% 0% 0% 22% 8%
JP 93.1 83% 0% 0% 0% 10% 93.1 83% 0% 0% 0% 10% 93.1 83% 0% 0% 0% 10% 18.6 0% 0% 0% 9% 10% 21.6 0% 0% 0% 12% 10% - 55 - 
 
A1.5    Two-earner couple without children. Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings from 0 to 200% of APW.
% of APW 33 50 67 100 150
Components METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC
BE -20.0 0% 0% 0% 127% -309% 72.3 0% 0% 0% 20% 53% 55.5 0% 0% 0% 41% 14% 55.5 0% 0% 0% 41% 14% 55.5 0% 0% 0% 41% 14%
DK 44.9 0% 0% 0% 36% 9% 44.9 0% 0% 0% 36% 9% 56.0 0% 0% 0% 38% 18% 50.4 0% 0% 0% 41% 9% 63.5 0% 0% 0% 55% 9%
DE 55.5 0% 0% 0% 35% 21% 54.2 0% 0% 0% 34% 21% 51.2 0% 0% 0% 31% 21% 54.2 0% 0% 0% 34% 21% 45.1 0% 0% 0% 32% 13%
GR 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 28.5 0% 0% 0% 13% 16% 41.1 0% 0% 0% 25% 16%
ES 6.3 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 23.2 0% 0% 0% 17% 6% 33.1 0% 0% 0% 27% 6% 28.8 0% 0% 0% 22% 6% 32.9 0% 0% 0% 27% 6%
FR 24.8 0% 0% 0% 11% 13% 24.8 0% 0% 0% 11% 14% 34.8 0% 0% 0% 21% 13% 33.9 0% 0% 0% 20% 14% 30.4 0% 0% 0% 21% 9%
IE 20.0 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 20.0 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 24.0 0% 0% 0% 20% 4% 26.0 0% 0% 0% 20% 6% 47.9 0% 0% 0% 42% 6%
IT 51.1 0% 0% 0% 42% 9% 26.4 0% 0% 0% 17% 9% 31.8 0% 0% 0% 23% 9% 39.1 0% 0% 0% 30% 9% 39.1 0% 0% 0% 30% 9%
LU 14.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 14% 26.9 0% 0% 0% 13% 14% 30.6 0% 0% 0% 17% 14% 34.2 0% 0% 0% 20% 14% 41.6 0% 0% 0% 28% 14%
NL 24.6 0% 0% 0% 2% 23% 44.9 0% 0% 0% 8% 37% 44.9 0% 0% 0% 8% 37% 45.0 0% 0% 0% 40% 5% 42.0 0% 0% 0% 42% 0%
AT 18.1 0% 0% 0% 0% 18% 18.1 0% 0% 0% 0% 18% 36.9 0% 0% 0% 19% 18% 42.7 0% 0% 0% 25% 18% 49.9 0% 0% 0% 32% 18%
PT 14.6 0% 0% 0% 4% 11% 14.6 0% 0% 0% 4% 11% 23.0 0% 0% 0% 12% 11% 23.0 0% 0% 0% 12% 11% 25.0 0% 0% 0% 14% 11%
FI 27.0 0% 0% 0% 20% 7% 37.3 0% 0% 0% 31% 7% 41.1 0% 0% 0% 34% 7% 46.8 0% 0% 0% 40% 7% 52.5 0% 0% 0% 46% 7%
SE 25.5 0% 0% 0% 17% 9% 37.3 0% 0% 0% 29% 9% 37.2 0% 0% 0% 29% 9% 35.2 0% 0% 0% 31% 4% 51.6 0% 0% 0% 52% 0%
UK 21.8 0% 0% 0% 12% 10% 32.0 0% 0% 0% 22% 10% 32.0 0% 0% 0% 22% 10% 32.0 0% 0% 0% 22% 10% 32.0 0% 0% 0% 22% 10%
CZ 25.6 0% 0% 0% 13% 12% 25.6 0% 0% 0% 13% 12% 25.6 0% 0% 0% 13% 12% 30.0 0% 0% 0% 18% 12% 30.0 0% 0% 0% 17% 12%
HU 20.5 0% 0% 0% 8% 12% 38.6 0% 0% 0% 26% 12% 40.5 0% 0% 0% 28% 12% 40.5 0% 0% 0% 28% 12% 50.5 0% 0% 0% 38% 12%
PL 34.2 0% 0% 0% 9% 25% 34.2 0% 0% 0% 9% 25% 34.2 0% 0% 0% 9% 25% 34.2 0% 0% 0% 9% 25% 34.2 0% 0% 0% 9% 25%
SK 12.8 0% 0% 0% 0% 13% 23.3 0% 0% 0% 10% 13% 23.3 0% 0% 0% 10% 13% 23.3 0% 0% 0% 10% 13% 30.2 0% 0% 0% 17% 13%
NO 35.8 0% 0% 0% 28% 8% 35.8 0% 0% 0% 28% 8% 35.8 0% 0% 0% 28% 8% 35.8 0% 0% 0% 28% 8% 49.3 0% 0% 0% 42% 8%
SZ 23.6 0% 0% 0% 12% 12% 27.3 0% 0% 0% 16% 12% 26.8 0% 0% 0% 15% 12% 32.9 0% 0% 0% 21% 12% 35.9 0% 0% 0% 24% 12%
US 29.5 0% 0% 0% 22% 8% 29.5 0% 0% 0% 22% 8% 29.5 0% 0% 0% 22% 8% 29.5 0% 0% 0% 22% 8% 29.5 0% 0% 0% 22% 8%
JP 13.8 0% 0% 0% 4% 10% 17.4 0% 0% 0% 7% 10% 17.4 0% 0% 0% 7% 10% 21.6 0% 0% 0% 12% 10% 22.2 0% 0% 0% 12% 10%
A1.6    Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings from 0 to 200% of APW.
% of APW 33 50 67 100 150
Components METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR lw= SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC
BE -20.0 0% 0% 0% 127% -309% 72.3 0% 0% 0% 20% 53% 55.5 0% 0% 0% 41% 14% 55.5 0% 0% 0% 41% 14% 55.5 0% 0% 0% 41% 14%
DK 44.9 0% 0% 0% 36% 9% 44.9 0% 0% 0% 36% 9% 56.0 0% 0% 0% 38% 18% 50.4 0% 0% 0% 41% 9% 63.5 0% 0% 0% 55% 9%
DE 50.2 0% 0% 0% 30% 21% 52.4 0% 0% 0% 32% 21% 51.0 0% 0% 0% 30% 21% 54.0 0% 0% 0% 33% 21% 42.4 0% 0% 0% 30% 13%
GR 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 19.3 0% 0% 0% 3% 16% 41.1 0% 0% 0% 25% 16%
ES 6.3 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 6.3 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 26.4 0% 0% 0% 20% 6% 28.8 0% 0% 0% 22% 6% 32.9 0% 0% 0% 27% 6%
FR 17.5 0% 0% 0% 4% 13% 17.5 0% 0% 0% 4% 14% 29.3 0% 0% 0% 16% 13% 28.4 0% 0% 0% 15% 14% 30.4 0% 0% 0% 21% 9%
IE 20.0 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 20.0 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 24.0 0% 0% 0% 20% 4% 26.0 0% 0% 0% 20% 6% 47.9 0% 0% 0% 42% 6%
IT 120.0 0% 0% 267% 1% 9% 26.4 0% 0% 0% 17% 9% 31.8 0% 0% 0% 23% 9% 39.1 0% 0% 0% 30% 9% 39.1 0% 0% 0% 30% 9%
LU 14.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 14% 13.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 14% 13.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 14% 34.2 0% 0% 0% 20% 14% 41.6 0% 0% 0% 28% 14%
NL 24.6 0% 0% 0% 2% 23% 44.9 0% 0% 0% 8% 37% 44.9 0% 0% 0% 8% 37% 45.0 0% 0% 0% 40% 5% 42.0 0% 0% 0% 42% 0%
AT 18.1 0% 0% 0% 0% 18% 18.1 0% 0% 0% 0% 18% 36.9 0% 0% 0% 19% 18% 42.7 0% 0% 0% 25% 18% 49.9 0% 0% 0% 32% 18%
PT 82.2 71% 0% 0% 0% 11% 11.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 11% 11.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 11% 23.0 0% 0% 0% 12% 11% 25.0 0% 0% 0% 14% 11%
FI 27.0 0% 0% 0% 20% 7% 37.3 0% 0% 0% 31% 7% 41.1 0% 0% 0% 34% 7% 46.8 0% 0% 0% 40% 7% 52.5 0% 0% 0% 46% 7%
SE 45.5 0% 20% 0% 17% 9% 37.3 0% 0% 0% 29% 9% 37.2 0% 0% 0% 29% 9% 35.2 0% 0% 0% 31% 4% 51.6 0% 0% 0% 52% 0%
UK 10.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 32.0 0% 0% 0% 22% 10% 32.0 0% 0% 0% 22% 10% 32.0 0% 0% 0% 22% 10% 32.0 0% 0% 0% 22% 10%
CZ 26.7 0% 14% 0% 0% 12% 30.7 0% 13% 0% 5% 12% 25.6 0% 0% 0% 13% 12% 25.6 0% 0% 0% 13% 12% 30.0 0% 0% 0% 18% 12%
HU 20.5 0% 0% 0% 8% 12% 38.6 0% 0% 0% 26% 12% 40.5 0% 0% 0% 28% 12% 40.5 0% 0% 0% 28% 12% 50.5 0% 0% 0% 38% 12%
PL 34.2 0% 0% 0% 9% 25% 34.2 0% 0% 0% 9% 25% 34.2 0% 0% 0% 9% 25% 34.2 0% 0% 0% 9% 25% 34.2 0% 0% 0% 9% 25%
SK 12.8 0% 0% 0% 0% 13% 23.3 0% 0% 0% 10% 13% 23.3 0% 0% 0% 10% 13% 23.3 0% 0% 0% 10% 13% 30.2 0% 0% 0% 17% 13%
NO 35.8 0% 0% 0% 28% 8% 35.8 0% 0% 0% 28% 8% 35.8 0% 0% 0% 28% 8% 35.8 0% 0% 0% 28% 8% 49.3 0% 0% 0% 42% 8%
SZ 21.7 0% 0% 0% 10% 12% 24.5 0% 0% 0% 13% 12% 26.8 0% 0% 0% 15% 12% 30.8 0% 0% 0% 19% 12% 35.0 0% 0% 0% 23% 12%
US 4.5 0% 0% 0% -3% 8% 24.5 0% 0% 0% 17% 8% 29.5 0% 0% 0% 22% 8% 29.5 0% 0% 0% 22% 8% 29.5 0% 0% 0% 22% 8%
JP 10.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 12.6 0% 0% 0% 3% 10% 17.4 0% 0% 0% 7% 10% 18.6 0% 0% 0% 9% 10% 21.6 0% 0% 0% 12% 10% 
      Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models. - 56 - 
Table A2 - Unemployment trap indicator     2001 
METR for an unemployed person (previous work= 67% of APW wage level), returning to work at a wage equivalent to: 
A2.1    Single person
 % of APW 50 67 100 150
Components METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC
BE 100 73% 0% 0% 0% 16% 11% 89 55% 0% 0% 0% 21% 13% 78 37% 0% 0% 0% 28% 14% 71 24% 0% 0% 0% 32% 14%
DK 107 104% 0% 0% 0% -4% 7% 91 78% 0% 0% 0% 6% 7% 78 52% 0% 0% 0% 18% 8% 73 35% 0% 0% 0% 30% 8%
DE 100 53% 6% 12% 0% 8% 21% 88 40% 5% 9% 0% 14% 21% 77 27% 3% 6% 0% 20% 21% 70 18% 2% 4% 0% 27% 19%
GR 101 69% 0% 16% 0% 0% 16% 79 52% 0% 12% 0% 0% 16% 60 35% 0% 8% 0% 2% 16% 50 23% 0% 5% 0% 6% 16%
ES 100 94% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 81 70% 0% 0% 0% 5% 6% 65 47% 0% 0% 0% 11% 6% 53 31% 0% 0% 0% 16% 6%
FR 103 88% 0% 0% 0% 4% 12% 87 65% 0% 0% 0% 9% 12% 70 44% 0% 0% 0% 14% 13% 59 29% 0% 0% 0% 18% 12%
IE 87 48% 36% 0% 0% 4% 0% 73 35% 27% 0% 0% 8% 2% 59 24% 18% 0% 0% 12% 5% 54 16% 12% 0% 0% 21% 5%
IT 69 54% 0% 0% 0% 6% 9% 60 40% 0% 0% 0% 10% 9% 53 27% 0% 0% 0% 17% 9% 49 18% 0% 0% 0% 22% 9%
LU 107 107% 0% 0% 0% -1% 2% 88 80% 0% 0% 0% 3% 5% 71 54% 0% 0% 0% 9% 8% 63 36% 0% 0% 0% 17% 10%
NL 93 94% 0% 3% 0% 0% -3% 85 70% 0% 6% 0% 2% 7% 72 47% 0% 4% 0% 8% 13% 60 31% 0% 3% 0% 17% 9%
AT 88 57% 8% 5% 0% -1% 18% 75 43% 6% 4% 0% 4% 18% 64 29% 4% 3% 0% 10% 18% 57 19% 3% 2% 0% 15% 18%
PT 111 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 11% 88 75% 0% 0% 0% 2% 11% 67 50% 0% 0% 0% 5% 11% 55 33% 0% 0% 0% 11% 11%
FI 90 75% 0% 7% 0% 2% 5% 81 56% 0% 9% 0% 10% 6% 69 37% 0% 6% 0% 19% 6% 63 25% 0% 4% 0% 27% 6%
SE 105 107% 0% 0% 0% -2% -1% 87 80% 0% 0% 0% 6% 1% 70 54% 0% 0% 0% 14% 3% 62 36% 0% 0% 0% 23% 4%
UK 78 29% 0% 35% 0% 9% 5% 70 22% 0% 30% 0% 12% 6% 58 15% 0% 20% 0% 16% 8% 49 10% 0% 13% 0% 18% 8%
CZ 80 53% 0% 7% 0% 7% 13% 67 39% 0% 6% 0% 9% 13% 54 26% 0% 4% 0% 11% 13% 46 18% 0% 3% 0% 13% 13%
HU 84 83% 0% 0% 0% -4% 6% 75 62% 0% 2% 0% 4% 8% 64 41% 0% 1% 0% 12% 9% 61 28% 0% 1% 0% 22% 10%
PL 92 55% 0% 15% 0% -4% 25% 77 41% 0% 12% 0% 0% 25% 63 28% 0% 8% 0% 3% 25% 53 18% 0% 5% 0% 5% 25%
SK 88 67% 0% 5% 0% 3% 13% 77 50% 0% 9% 0% 5% 13% 59 34% 0% 6% 0% 7% 13% 49 22% 0% 4% 0% 10% 13%
NO 89 84% 0% 0% 0% 5% 1% 75 62% 0% 0% 0% 9% 3% 62 42% 0% 0% 0% 15% 5% 57 28% 0% 0% 0% 24% 6%
SZ 115 107% 0% 0% 0% -3% 10% 92 80% 0% 0% 0% 1% 11% 71 54% 0% 0% 0% 6% 11% 58 36% 0% 0% 0% 11% 11%
US 85 71% 0% 0% 0% 5% 8% 71 53% 0% 0% 0% 10% 8% 57 36% 0% 0% 0% 14% 8% 51 24% 0% 0% 0% 20% 8%
JP 94 79% 0% 0% 0% 4% 10% 74 59% 0% 0% 0% 5% 10% 56 40% 0% 0% 0% 6% 10% 45 26% 0% 0% 0% 8% 10%
A2.2    Single parent with 2 children
 % of APW 50 67 100 150
Components METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC
BE 91 73% 0% 0% 0% 7% 11% 82 55% 0% 0% 0% 15% 13% 74 37% 0% 0% 0% 23% 14% 68 24% 0% 0% 0% 30% 14%
DK 104 104% -5% -1% 0% -2% 8% 97 78% 0% 5% 0% 6% 7% 83 52% 0% 5% 0% 18% 8% 76 35% 0% 3% 0% 30% 8%
DE 100 71% 3% 2% 0% 3% 21% 93 53% 6% 4% 0% 9% 21% 79 36% 4% 3% 0% 17% 21% 70 24% 3% 2% 7% 16% 19%
GR 107 69% 0% 22% 0% 0% 16% 84 52% 0% 16% 0% 0% 16% 61 35% 0% 11% 0% 0% 16% 51 23% 0% 7% 0% 5% 16%
ES 100 94% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 82 70% 0% 0% 6% 0% 6% 62 47% 0% 0% 4% 5% 6% 51 31% 0% 0% 2% 11% 6%
FR 89 88% -13% -1% 0% 4% 12% 92 65% 0% 7% 0% 7% 12% 76 44% 0% 12% 0% 8% 13% 60 29% 0% 8% 0% 10% 12%
IE 50 24% 10% 0% 15% 2% 0% 54 18% 7% 0% 22% 4% 2% 60 12% 5% 0% 32% 6% 5% 53 8% 3% 0% 21% 15% 5%
IT 74 54% 0% 0% 11% 0% 9% 53 40% 0% 0% 0% 4% 9% 54 27% 0% 0% 5% 13% 9% 52 18% 0% 0% 6% 19% 9%
LU 104 114% -1% -10% 0% 0% 1% 89 85% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 64 57% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 57 38% 0% 0% 0% 9% 10%
NL 92 94% 0% 2% 0% 0% -4% 87 70% 0% 10% 0% 2% 6% 75 47% 0% 9% 0% 8% 12% 62 31% 0% 6% 0% 17% 8%
AT 99 71% 10% 5% 0% -4% 18% 84 53% 7% 3% 0% 2% 18% 69 35% 5% 2% 0% 9% 18% 61 24% 3% 2% 0% 14% 18%
PT 77 100% -34% 0% 0% 0% 11% 72 75% -14% 0% 0% 0% 11% 63 50% 0% 0% 2% 0% 11% 52 33% 0% 0% 1% 6% 11%
FI 94 87% 0% 3% 0% -1% 5% 88 65% 0% 9% 0% 8% 5% 79 43% 0% 12% 0% 18% 6% 70 29% 0% 8% 0% 26% 6%
SE 103 107% 0% -1% 0% -2% -1% 91 80% 0% 4% 0% 6% 1% 80 54% 0% 9% 0% 14% 3% 69 36% 0% 7% 0% 23% 4%
UK 45 29% 28% 18% -39% 4% 5% 56 22% 21% 18% -19% 8% 6% 65 15% 14% 20% -4% 13% 8% 57 10% 9% 13% 0% 16% 8%
CZ 94 56% 25% 0% 0% 0% 13% 80 42% 19% 3% 0% 3% 13% 67 28% 13% 7% 1% 6% 13% 57 19% 8% 4% 3% 10% 13%
HU 89 83% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 71 62% 0% 2% 0% 0% 8% 61 41% 0% 1% 0% 9% 9% 59 28% 0% 1% 0% 21% 10%
PL 86 55% 9% 0% 0% -4% 25% 84 41% 7% 12% 0% 0% 25% 68 28% 5% 8% 0% 3% 25% 57 18% 3% 5% 0% 5% 25%
SK 100 67% 14% 6% 0% 0% 13% 91 50% 17% 10% 0% 2% 13% 72 34% 11% 10% 0% 5% 13% 59 22% 7% 7% 3% 7% 13%
NO 96 90% 0% 0% 4% 2% 1% 87 67% 0% 0% 13% 4% 2% 79 45% 0% 0% 20% 11% 4% 67 30% 0% 0% 13% 19% 5%
SZ 100 107% -11% -5% 0% -1% 10% 92 80% 0% 0% 0% 1% 11% 69 54% 0% 0% 0% 4% 11% 56 36% 0% 0% 0% 8% 11%
US 59 75% 0% 0% 0% -24% 8% 63 56% 11% 0% 0% -11% 8% 58 38% 7% 0% 0% 6% 8% 49 25% 5% 0% 0% 12% 8%
JP 103 79% -5% 0% 19% 0% 10% 95 59% 10% 0% 14% 2% 10% 70 40% 7% 0% 9% 4% 10% 55 26% 5% 0% 8% 6% 10% - 57 - 
 
 
A2.3    One-earner couple, without children
 % of APW 50 67 100 150
Components METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC
BE 92 73% 0% 0% 0% 8% 11% 80 55% 0% 0% 0% 12% 13% 70 37% 0% 0% 0% 20% 14% 65 24% 0% 0% 0% 27% 14%
DK 73 104% -47% -8% 0% 14% 9% 83 78% -15% -1% 0% 12% 9% 77 52% 0% 1% 0% 16% 8% 71 35% 0% 1% 0% 27% 8%
DE 100 53% 13% 13% 0% 0% 21% 88 40% 13% 13% 0% 2% 21% 74 27% 9% 9% 0% 9% 21% 65 18% 6% 6% 0% 16% 19%
GR 101 69% 0% 16% 0% 0% 16% 79 52% 0% 12% 0% 0% 16% 60 35% 0% 8% 0% 2% 16% 50 23% 0% 5% 0% 6% 16%
ES 100 94% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 77 70% 0% 0% 0% 1% 6% 61 47% 0% 0% 0% 8% 6% 50 31% 0% 0% 0% 13% 6%
FR 87 88% -14% -1% 0% 3% 12% 89 65% 0% 5% 0% 7% 12% 68 44% 0% 3% 0% 8% 13% 55 29% 0% 2% 0% 12% 12%
IE 100 78% 22% 0% 0% 0% 0% 87 58% 27% 0% 0% 0% 2% 68 39% 18% 0% 0% 6% 5% 54 26% 12% 0% 0% 11% 5%
IT 67 54% 0% 0% 3% 1% 9% 57 40% 0% 0% 1% 7% 9% 53 27% 0% 0% 3% 15% 9% 49 18% 0% 0% 2% 20% 9%
LU 102 107% -7% 0% 0% 0% 2% 107 80% 15% 7% 0% 0% 4% 79 54% 10% 5% 0% 3% 7% 63 36% 7% 3% 0% 8% 10%
NL 96 104% 1% -2% 0% -1% -7% 91 77% 1% 7% 0% 1% 4% 77 52% 1% 6% 0% 7% 11% 63 35% 0% 4% 0% 17% 7%
AT 100 62% 14% 7% 0% -1% 18% 86 46% 13% 6% 0% 2% 18% 71 31% 9% 4% 0% 9% 18% 62 21% 6% 3% 0% 14% 18%
PT 77 100% -34% 0% 0% 0% 11% 72 75% -14% 0% 0% 0% 11% 65 50% 0% 0% 0% 3% 11% 51 33% 0% 0% 0% 7% 11%
FI 97 75% 8% 7% 0% 2% 5% 91 56% 6% 14% 0% 10% 6% 78 37% 4% 12% 0% 19% 6% 69 25% 3% 8% 0% 27% 6%
SE 100 107% -3% -2% 0% -2% -1% 98 80% 6% 5% 0% 6% 1% 78 54% 4% 3% 0% 14% 3% 67 36% 3% 2% 0% 23% 4%
UK 84 29% 17% 24% 0% 9% 5% 82 22% 12% 29% 0% 12% 6% 66 15% 8% 20% 0% 16% 8% 55 10% 6% 13% 0% 18% 8%
CZ 92 54% 22% 0% 0% 4% 13% 79 41% 16% 3% 0% 6% 13% 64 27% 11% 5% 0% 8% 13% 53 18% 7% 4% 0% 11% 13%
HU 84 83% 0% 0% 0% -4% 6% 75 62% 0% 2% 0% 4% 8% 64 41% 0% 1% 0% 12% 9% 61 28% 0% 1% 0% 22% 10%
PL 94 55% 0% 15% 0% -2% 25% 78 41% 0% 12% 0% 0% 25% 63 28% 0% 8% 0% 3% 25% 54 18% 0% 5% 0% 5% 25%
SK 100 67% 14% 6% 0% 1% 13% 100 50% 24% 10% 0% 3% 13% 80 34% 18% 10% 0% 6% 13% 62 22% 12% 7% 0% 8% 13%
NO 101 84% 0% 11% 0% 5% 1% 83 62% 0% 8% 0% 9% 3% 67 42% 0% 6% 0% 15% 5% 59 28% 0% 4% 0% 22% 6%
SZ 100 107% -10% -6% 0% -2% 10% 95 80% 2% 1% 0% 1% 11% 71 54% 1% 1% 0% 4% 11% 57 36% 1% 1% 0% 8% 11%
US 83 71% 0% 0% 0% 4% 8% 75 53% 6% 0% 0% 9% 8% 60 36% 4% 0% 0% 13% 8% 50 24% 3% 0% 0% 16% 8%
JP 84 79% -5% 0% 0% 0% 10% 71 59% 0% 0% 0% 2% 10% 54 40% 0% 0% 0% 4% 10% 43 26% 0% 0% 0% 6% 10%
A2.4    One-earner couple, with 2 children
 % of APW 50 67 100 150
Components METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC
BE 87 73% 0% 0% 0% 2% 11% 76 55% 0% 0% 0% 8% 13% 68 37% 0% 0% 0% 17% 14% 64 24% 0% 0% 0% 25% 14%
DK 76 104% -55% 0% 0% 17% 9% 87 78% -18% 5% 0% 13% 9% 82 52% 0% 6% 0% 16% 8% 75 35% 0% 4% 0% 27% 8%
DE 100 70% 6% 4% 0% 0% 21% 85 52% 9% 1% 0% 2% 21% 75 35% 6% 4% 0% 9% 21% 65 23% 4% 3% 0% 16% 19%
GR 107 69% 0% 22% 0% 0% 16% 84 52% 0% 16% 0% 0% 16% 61 35% 0% 11% 0% 0% 16% 51 23% 0% 7% 0% 5% 16%
ES 100 94% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 82 70% 0% 0% 6% 0% 6% 61 47% 0% 0% 4% 4% 6% 50 31% 0% 0% 2% 10% 6%
FR 78 88% -24% -1% 0% 3% 12% 84 65% -7% 7% 0% 7% 12% 76 44% 0% 12% 0% 7% 13% 59 29% 0% 8% 0% 9% 12%
IE 95 92% 36% 0% -33% 0% 0% 87 69% 27% 0% -11% 0% 2% 72 46% 18% 0% 0% 3% 5% 57 31% 12% 0% 0% 9% 5%
IT 78 54% 0% 0% 14% 0% 9% 54 40% 0% 0% 3% 2% 9% 53 27% 0% 0% 5% 12% 9% 53 18% 0% 0% 8% 18% 9%
LU 101 114% -14% 0% 0% 0% 1% 104 85% 15% 0% 0% 0% 4% 83 57% 15% 5% 0% 0% 7% 64 38% 10% 3% 0% 4% 9%
NL 94 104% 0% -2% 0% -1% -7% 90 77% 0% 7% 0% 1% 4% 78 52% 0% 7% 0% 8% 12% 63 35% 0% 5% 0% 17% 7%
AT 100 74% 7% 2% 0% -1% 18% 97 55% 14% 5% 0% 4% 18% 78 37% 10% 3% 0% 10% 18% 67 25% 6% 2% 0% 15% 18%
PT 55 100% -56% 0% 0% 0% 11% 55 75% -30% 0% 0% 0% 11% 57 50% -6% 0% 2% 0% 11% 56 33% 6% 0% 1% 4% 11%
FI 100 87% 6% 3% 0% -1% 5% 99 65% 12% 9% 0% 8% 5% 89 43% 8% 14% 0% 18% 6% 76 29% 5% 9% 0% 26% 6%
SE 100 107% -2% -2% 0% -2% -1% 100 80% 6% 7% 0% 6% 1% 84 54% 5% 8% 0% 14% 3% 71 36% 4% 5% 0% 23% 4%
UK 66 29% 45% 22% -39% 4% 5% 72 22% 33% 21% -19% 8% 6% 74 15% 22% 20% -4% 13% 8% 62 10% 15% 13% 0% 16% 8%
CZ 100 58% 29% 0% 0% 0% 13% 96 43% 39% 0% 0% 1% 13% 77 29% 26% 3% 1% 5% 13% 63 19% 18% 4% 1% 8% 13%
HU 89 83% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 71 62% 0% 2% 0% 0% 8% 61 41% 0% 1% 0% 9% 9% 59 28% 0% 1% 0% 21% 10%
PL 100 55% 22% 0% 0% -2% 25% 91 41% 25% 0% 0% 0% 25% 80 28% 17% 8% 0% 3% 25% 65 18% 11% 5% 0% 5% 25%
SK 100 67% 14% 6% 0% 0% 13% 100 50% 26% 11% 0% 0% 13% 96 34% 33% 14% 0% 3% 13% 72 22% 22% 9% 0% 6% 13%
NO 99 90% 1% 5% 0% 3% 1% 92 67% 1% 13% 0% 8% 3% 73 45% 1% 9% 0% 15% 4% 63 30% 0% 6% 0% 21% 5%
SZ 100 107% -12% -5% 0% -1% 10% 100 80% 6% 3% 0% 1% 11% 75 54% 4% 2% 0% 4% 11% 59 36% 3% 1% 0% 7% 11%
US 59 75% 0% 0% 0% -24% 8% 62 56% 11% 0% 0% -13% 8% 60 38% 11% 0% 0% 4% 8% 50 25% 7% 0% 0% 10% 8%
JP 84 79% -5% 0% 0% 0% 10% 86 59% 17% 0% 0% 0% 10% 71 40% 19% 0% 0% 2% 10% 56 26% 13% 0% 2% 4% 10% - 58 - 
 
A2.5    Two-earner couple without children. Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings from 0 to 200% of APW.
 % of APW 50 67 100 150
Components METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC
BE 99 67% 0% 0% 0% 19% 13% 89 50% 0% 0% 0% 24% 15% 78 34% 0% 0% 0% 30% 15% 70 22% 0% 0% 0% 34% 14%
DK 107 104% 0% 0% 0% -4% 7% 91 78% 0% 0% 0% 6% 7% 78 52% 0% 0% 0% 18% 8% 73 35% 0% 0% 0% 30% 8%
DE 99 53% 0% 0% 0% 25% 21% 86 40% 0% 0% 0% 26% 21% 75 27% 0% 0% 0% 28% 21% 67 18% 0% 0% 0% 30% 19%
GR 101 69% 0% 16% 0% 0% 16% 79 52% 0% 12% 0% 0% 16% 60 35% 0% 8% 0% 2% 16% 50 23% 0% 5% 0% 6% 16%
ES 100 94% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 81 70% 0% 0% 0% 5% 6% 65 47% 0% 0% 0% 11% 6% 53 31% 0% 0% 0% 16% 6%
FR 104 88% 0% 0% 0% 4% 12% 88 65% 0% 0% 0% 10% 12% 70 44% 0% 0% 0% 14% 13% 58 29% 0% 0% 0% 16% 12%
IE 54 48% 0% 0% 0% 6% 0% 48 35% 0% 0% 0% 10% 2% 42 24% 0% 0% 0% 13% 5% 37 16% 0% 0% 0% 16% 5%
IT 75 54% 0% 0% 1% 11% 9% 64 40% 0% 0% 1% 14% 9% 56 27% 0% 0% 1% 20% 9% 51 18% 0% 0% 0% 23% 9%
LU 102 107% 0% 0% 0% -7% 2% 83 80% 0% 0% 0% -1% 5% 66 54% 0% 0% 0% 5% 8% 57 36% 0% 0% 0% 11% 10%
NL 89 94% 0% 0% 0% 0% -4% 78 70% 0% 0% 0% 2% 6% 67 47% 0% 0% 0% 8% 12% 57 31% 0% 0% 0% 17% 8%
AT 80 60% 0% 0% 0% 2% 18% 69 45% 0% 0% 0% 6% 18% 60 30% 0% 0% 0% 12% 18% 54 20% 0% 0% 0% 16% 18%
PT 114 100% 0% 0% 0% 3% 11% 91 75% 0% 0% 0% 5% 11% 68 50% 0% 0% 0% 7% 11% 54 33% 0% 0% 0% 9% 11%
FI 82 75% 0% 0% 0% 2% 5% 71 56% 0% 0% 0% 10% 6% 63 37% 0% 0% 0% 19% 6% 58 25% 0% 0% 0% 27% 6%
SE 105 107% 0% 0% 0% -2% -1% 87 80% 0% 0% 0% 6% 1% 70 54% 0% 0% 0% 14% 3% 62 36% 0% 0% 0% 23% 4%
UK 43 29% 0% 0% 0% 9% 5% 41 22% 0% 0% 0% 12% 6% 38 15% 0% 0% 0% 16% 8% 36 10% 0% 0% 0% 18% 8%
CZ 76 53% 0% 0% 0% 11% 13% 63 39% 0% 0% 0% 11% 13% 51 26% 0% 0% 0% 12% 13% 44 18% 0% 0% 0% 14% 13%
HU 84 83% 0% 0% 0% -4% 6% 73 62% 0% 0% 0% 4% 8% 62 41% 0% 0% 0% 12% 9% 60 28% 0% 0% 0% 22% 10%
PL 77 55% 0% 0% 0% -4% 25% 66 41% 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% 55 28% 0% 0% 0% 3% 25% 48 18% 0% 0% 0% 5% 25%
SK 85 67% 0% 0% 0% 5% 13% 69 50% 0% 0% 0% 7% 13% 54 34% 0% 0% 0% 8% 13% 45 22% 0% 0% 0% 10% 13%
NO 89 84% 0% 0% 0% 5% 1% 75 62% 0% 0% 0% 9% 3% 62 42% 0% 0% 0% 15% 5% 57 28% 0% 0% 0% 24% 6%
SZ 108 107% 0% 0% 0% -5% 6% 88 80% 0% 0% 0% 0% 8% 68 54% 0% 0% 0% 6% 9% 56 36% 0% 0% 0% 11% 10%
US 85 71% 0% 0% 0% 6% 8% 71 53% 0% 0% 0% 10% 8% 57 36% 0% 0% 0% 14% 8% 48 24% 0% 0% 0% 17% 8%
JP 95 79% 0% 0% 0% 6% 10% 75 59% 0% 0% 0% 6% 10% 56 40% 0% 0% 0% 7% 10% 45 26% 0% 0% 0% 8% 10%
A2.6    Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings from 0 to 200% of APW.
 % of APW 50 67 100 150
Components METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC
BE 99 67% 0% 0% 0% 19% 13% 89 50% 0% 0% 0% 24% 15% 78 34% 0% 0% 0% 30% 15% 70 22% 0% 0% 0% 33% 14%
DK 107 104% 0% 0% 0% -4% 7% 91 78% 0% 0% 0% 6% 7% 78 52% 0% 0% 0% 18% 8% 73 35% 0% 0% 0% 30% 8%
DE 114 70% 0% 0% 0% 23% 21% 98 52% 0% 0% 0% 25% 21% 83 35% 0% 0% 0% 27% 21% 72 23% 0% 0% 7% 23% 19%
GR 107 69% 0% 22% 0% 0% 16% 84 52% 0% 16% 0% 0% 16% 61 35% 0% 11% 0% 0% 16% 51 23% 0% 7% 0% 5% 16%
ES 103 94% 0% 0% 0% 3% 6% 83 70% 0% 0% 0% 7% 6% 65 47% 0% 0% 0% 12% 6% 54 31% 0% 0% 0% 16% 6%
FR 104 88% 0% 0% 0% 5% 12% 87 65% 0% 0% 0% 9% 12% 68 44% 0% 0% 0% 11% 13% 55 29% 0% 0% 0% 13% 12%
IE 72 62% 0% 0% 0% 10% 0% 61 46% 0% 0% 0% 12% 2% 51 31% 0% 0% 0% 15% 5% 43 21% 0% 0% 0% 17% 5%
IT 80 54% 0% 0% 9% 8% 9% 70 40% 0% 0% 9% 12% 9% 62 27% 0% 0% 8% 18% 9% 55 18% 0% 0% 5% 22% 9%
LU 115 114% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 89 85% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 68 57% 0% 0% 0% 4% 7% 58 38% 0% 0% 0% 10% 10%
NL 89 94% 0% 0% 0% 0% -4% 78 70% 0% 0% 0% 2% 6% 67 47% 0% 0% 0% 8% 13% 57 31% 0% 0% 0% 17% 8%
AT 86 66% 0% 0% 0% 2% 18% 74 49% 0% 0% 0% 6% 18% 63 33% 0% 0% 0% 12% 18% 56 22% 0% 0% 0% 16% 18%
PT 111 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 11% 86 75% 0% 0% 0% 0% 11% 65 50% 0% 0% 0% 4% 11% 52 33% 0% 0% 0% 7% 11%
FI 91 87% 0% 0% 0% -1% 5% 78 65% 0% 0% 0% 8% 5% 67 43% 0% 0% 0% 18% 6% 61 29% 0% 0% 0% 26% 6%
SE 105 107% 0% 0% 0% -2% -1% 87 80% 0% 0% 0% 6% 1% 70 54% 0% 0% 0% 14% 3% 62 36% 0% 0% 0% 23% 4%
UK 54 29% 0% 0% 16% 4% 5% 49 22% 0% 0% 12% 8% 6% 43 15% 0% 0% 8% 13% 8% 39 10% 0% 0% 5% 16% 8%
CZ 77 56% 0% 4% 0% 3% 13% 65 42% 0% 4% 0% 6% 13% 55 28% 0% 3% 3% 8% 13% 46 19% 0% 2% 2% 11% 13%
HU 84 83% 0% 0% 0% -4% 6% 73 62% 0% 0% 0% 4% 8% 62 41% 0% 0% 0% 12% 9% 60 28% 0% 0% 0% 22% 10%
PL 77 55% 0% 0% 0% -4% 25% 66 41% 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% 55 28% 0% 0% 0% 3% 25% 51 18% 0% 0% 2% 5% 25%
SK 85 67% 0% 0% 0% 5% 13% 69 50% 0% 0% 0% 7% 13% 58 34% 0% 0% 4% 8% 13% 48 22% 0% 0% 3% 10% 13%
NO 94 90% 0% 0% 0% 3% 1% 78 67% 0% 0% 0% 8% 3% 64 45% 0% 0% 0% 15% 4% 59 30% 0% 0% 0% 23% 5%
SZ 109 107% 0% 0% 0% -4% 6% 88 80% 0% 0% 0% 0% 8% 68 54% 0% 0% 0% 6% 9% 56 36% 0% 0% 0% 10% 10%
US 83 75% 0% 0% 0% 0% 8% 69 56% 0% 0% 0% 5% 8% 56 38% 0% 0% 0% 10% 8% 47 25% 0% 0% 0% 14% 8%
JP 91 79% 0% 0% 0% 2% 10% 71 59% 0% 0% 0% 2% 10% 56 40% 0% 0% 3% 4% 10% 44 26% 0% 0% 2% 6% 10% 
Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models. - 59 - 
Table A3 - Unemployment trap indicator     2001 
METR for an unemployed person (previous work= 100% of APW wage level), returning to work at a wage equivalent to: 
A3.1    Single person
 % of APW 50 67 100 150
Components METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC
BE 100.0 73% 0% 0% 0% 16% 11% 88.8 55% 0% 0% 0% 21% 13% 78.4 37% 0% 0% 0% 28% 14% 70.9 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1
DK 106.8 104% 0% 0% 0% -4% 7% 91.1 78% 0% 0% 0% 6% 7% 77.7 52% 0% 0% 0% 18% 8% 72.7 35% 0% 0% 0% 30% 8%
DE 100.8 72% 0% 0% 0% 8% 21% 88.4 54% 0% 0% 0% 14% 21% 76.9 36% 0% 0% 0% 20% 21% 70.4 24% 0% 0% 0% 27% 19%
GR 112.0 80% 0% 16% 0% 0% 16% 87.6 60% 0% 12% 0% 0% 16% 65.7 40% 0% 8% 0% 2% 16% 53.7 27% 0% 5% 0% 6% 16%
ES 129.3 131% 0% 0% 0% -8% 6% 103.1 98% 0% 0% 0% -1% 6% 79.2 66% 0% 0% 0% 7% 6% 63.1 44% 0% 0% 0% 13% 6%
FR 120.5 115% 0% 0% 0% -5% 11% 99.5 86% 0% 0% 0% 2% 12% 78.8 57% 0% 0% 0% 9% 12% 64.8 38% 0% 0% 0% 14% 12%
IE 87.3 48% 36% 0% 0% 4% 0% 72.6 35% 27% 0% 0% 8% 2% 58.5 24% 18% 0% 0% 12% 5% 54.0 16% 12% 0% 0% 21% 5%
IT 91.9 80% 0% 0% 0% 3% 9% 76.6 60% 0% 0% 0% 8% 9% 64.6 40% 0% 0% 0% 15% 9% 56.4 27% 0% 0% 0% 21% 9%
LU 144.0 160% 0% 0% 0% -11% -5% 115.0 119% 0% 0% 0% -5% 0% 89.1 80% 0% 0% 0% 4% 5% 75.2 53% 0% 0% 0% 14% 8%
NL 110.1 140% 0% -6% 0% -4% -20% 97.8 104% 0% 0% 0% -1% -6% 80.5 70% 0% 0% 0% 6% 5% 65.4 47% 0% 0% 0% 16% 3%
AT 96.0 79% 0% 0% 0% -1% 18% 81.0 59% 0% 0% 0% 4% 18% 67.7 39% 0% 0% 0% 10% 18% 59.7 26% 0% 0% 0% 15% 18%
PT 1 4 1 . 0 1 3 0 %0 %0 %0 %0 % 1 1 % 1 0 9 . 8 9 7 %0 %0 %0 %2 % 1 1 % 8 1 . 4 6 5 %0 %0 %0 %5 % 1 1 % 6 5 . 2 4 3 %0 %0 %0 % 1 1 % 1 1 %
FI 98.9 98% 0% 0% 0% -4% 5% 87.5 73% 0% 4% 0% 5% 5% 73.4 49% 0% 3% 0% 16% 6% 65.6 33% 0% 2% 0% 25% 6%
SE 133.5 153% 0% 0% 0% -16% -4% 108.9 114% 0% 0% 0% -4% -1% 84.9 76% 0% 0% 0% 7% 2% 72.0 51% 0% 0% 0% 18% 3%
UK 78.4 29% 0% 35% 0% 9% 5% 70.4 22% 0% 30% 0% 12% 6% 57.7 15% 0% 20% 0% 16% 8% 49.1 10% 0% 13% 0% 18% 8%
CZ 97.4 77% 0% 1% 0% 7% 13% 79.6 57% 0% 1% 0% 9% 13% 62.3 38% 0% 1% 0% 11% 13% 51.5 26% 0% 0% 0% 13% 13%
HU 84.2 83% 0% 0% 0% -4% 6% 74.9 62% 0% 2% 0% 4% 8% 63.6 41% 0% 1% 0% 12% 9% 61.1 28% 0% 1% 0% 22% 10%
PL 92.1 55% 0% 15% 0% -4% 25% 77.4 41% 0% 12% 0% 0% 25% 63.1 28% 0% 8% 0% 3% 25% 53.5 18% 0% 5% 0% 5% 25%
SK 111.3 100% 0% -5% 0% 3% 13% 94.6 75% 0% 2% 0% 5% 13% 71.1 50% 0% 2% 0% 7% 13% 56.7 33% 0% 1% 0% 10% 13%
NO 117.2 125% 0% 0% 0% -6% -2% 95.3 93% 0% 0% 0% 2% 1% 75.6 62% 0% 0% 0% 10% 3% 66.5 42% 0% 0% 0% 20% 5%
SZ 142.6 140% 0% 0% 0% -7% 10% 112.6 104% 0% 0% 0% -2% 11% 84.4 70% 0% 0% 0% 4% 11% 67.2 47% 0% 0% 0% 9% 11%
US 107.6 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 8% 87.8 75% 0% 0% 0% 6% 8% 68.5 50% 0% 0% 0% 11% 8% 58.8 33% 0% 0% 0% 18% 8%
JP 1 1 5 . 6 1 0 1 %0 %0 %0 %4 % 1 0 % 9 0 . 6 7 5 %0 %0 %0 %5 % 1 0 % 6 6 . 8 5 1 %0 %0 %0 %6 % 1 0 % 5 2 . 1 3 4 %0 %0 %0 %8 % 1 0 %
A3.2    Single parent with 2 children
 % of APW 50 67 100 150
Components METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC
BE 91.3 73% 0% 0% 0% 7% 11% 82.3 55% 0% 0% 0% 15% 13% 74.0 37% 0% 0% 0% 23% 14% 68.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1
DK 104.1 104% -5% -1% 0% -2% 8% 96.5 78% 0% 5% 0% 6% 7% 82.5 52% 0% 5% 0% 18% 8% 75.9 35% 0% 3% 0% 30% 8%
DE 114.7 97% -5% -2% 0% 3% 21% 104.1 73% 0% 1% 0% 9% 21% 86.7 49% 0% 1% 0% 17% 21% 74.9 32% 0% 1% 7% 16% 19%
GR 125.7 88% 0% 22% 0% 0% 16% 97.9 66% 0% 16% 0% 0% 16% 70.8 44% 0% 11% 0% 0% 16% 57.1 29% 0% 7% 0% 5% 16%
ES 137.9 140% 0% 0% -7% -1% 6% 110.1 104% 0% 0% 0% -1% 6% 81.1 70% 0% 0% 0% 5% 6% 63.7 47% 0% 0% 0% 11% 6%
FR 100.6 115% -13% -9% 0% -3% 11% 100.0 86% 0% 1% 0% 2% 12% 81.7 57% 0% 8% 0% 4% 12% 63.3 38% 0% 5% 0% 8% 12%
IE 50.5 24% 10% 0% 15% 2% 0% 54.3 18% 7% 0% 22% 4% 2% 60.0 12% 5% 0% 32% 6% 5% 52.5 8% 3% 0% 21% 15% 5%
IT 99.9 80% 0% 0% 11% 0% 9% 73.0 60% 0% 0% 0% 4% 9% 67.1 40% 0% 0% 5% 13% 9% 60.7 27% 0% 0% 6% 19% 9%
LU 153.7 170% -1% -10% 0% 0% -6% 126.1 127% 0% 0% 0% 0% -1% 89.1 85% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 73.4 57% 0% 0% 0% 9% 7%
NL 104.1 140% 0% -13% 0% -4% -19% 96.6 104% 0% -1% 0% -1% -6% 81.2 70% 0% 1% 0% 6% 4% 65.8 47% 0% 1% 0% 16% 3%
AT 106.3 92% 0% 0% 0% -4% 18% 88.7 69% 0% 0% 0% 2% 18% 72.9 46% 0% 0% 0% 9% 18% 63.1 31% 0% 0% 0% 14% 18%
PT 106.8 130% -34% 0% 0% 0% 11% 93.8 97% -14% 0% 0% 0% 11% 77.6 65% 0% 0% 2% 0% 11% 61.8 43% 0% 0% 1% 6% 11%
FI 103.5 110% 0% -3% 0% -8% 5% 94.5 82% 0% 5% 0% 2% 5% 84.0 55% 0% 9% 0% 14% 6% 72.7 37% 0% 6% 0% 24% 6%
SE 123.1 153% 0% -10% 0% -16% -4% 106.1 114% 0% -3% 0% -4% -1% 89.6 76% 0% 5% 0% 7% 2% 76.0 51% 0% 4% 0% 18% 3%
UK 45.0 29% 28% 18% -39% 4% 5% 56.2 22% 21% 18% -19% 8% 6% 65.3 15% 14% 20% -4% 13% 8% 56.7 10% 9% 13% 0% 16% 8%
CZ 9 4 . 4 8 1 %1 %0 %0 %0 % 1 3 % 7 9 . 5 6 0 %1 %3 %0 %3 % 1 3 % 6 7 . 5 4 1 %0 %7 %1 %6 % 1 3 % 5 6 . 7 2 7 %0 %4 %3 % 1 0 % 1 3 %
HU 88.6 83% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 71.2 62% 0% 2% 0% 0% 8% 61.0 41% 0% 1% 0% 9% 9% 59.3 28% 0% 1% 0% 21% 10%
PL 86.1 55% 9% 0% 0% -4% 25% 84.4 41% 7% 12% 0% 0% 25% 67.8 28% 5% 8% 0% 3% 25% 56.6 18% 3% 5% 0% 5% 25%
SK 1 0 1 . 1 1 0 0 % - 8 % - 4 %0 %0 % 1 3 % 9 2 . 3 7 5 %0 %3 %0 %2 % 1 3 % 7 2 . 5 5 0 %0 %5 %0 %5 % 1 3 % 5 9 . 4 3 3 %0 %3 %3 %7 % 1 3 %
NO 113.1 131% 0% 0% -12% -4% -2% 99.2 98% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 87.8 66% 0% 0% 12% 8% 2% 72.9 44% 0% 0% 8% 17% 4%
SZ 145.4 160% -12% -6% 0% -7% 10% 126.3 119% 0% 0% 0% -3% 10% 92.1 80% 0% 0% 0% 1% 11% 70.7 53% 0% 0% 0% 6% 11%
US 68.1 100% -14% 0% 0% -26% 8% 70.0 75% 0% 0% 0% -13% 8% 62.9 50% 0% 0% 0% 5% 8% 52.1 33% 0% 0% 0% 11% 8%
JP 92.3 101% -19% 0% 0% 0% 10% 87.6 75% 0% 0% 0% 2% 10% 64.6 51% 0% 0% 0% 4% 10% 51.8 34% 0% 0% 2% 6% 10% - 60 - 
 
 
A3.3    One-earner couple, without children
 % of APW 50 67 100 150
Components METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC
BE 92.2 73% 0% 0% 0% 8% 11% 80.0 55% 0% 0% 0% 12% 13% 70.5 37% 0% 0% 0% 20% 14% 65.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1
DK 72.6 104% -47% -8% 0% 14% 9% 82.9 78% -15% -1% 0% 12% 9% 77.1 52% 0% 1% 0% 16% 8% 71.1 35% 0% 1% 0% 27% 8%
DE 100.0 73% 3% 4% 0% 0% 21% 88.3 54% 6% 6% 0% 2% 21% 73.9 36% 4% 4% 0% 9% 21% 65.0 24% 3% 3% 0% 16% 19%
GR 120.0 88% 0% 16% 0% 0% 16% 93.6 66% 0% 12% 0% 0% 16% 69.7 44% 0% 8% 0% 2% 16% 56.4 29% 0% 5% 0% 6% 16%
ES 135.1 131% 0% 0% 0% -3% 6% 103.4 98% 0% 0% 0% -1% 6% 78.2 66% 0% 0% 0% 6% 6% 61.8 44% 0% 0% 0% 12% 6%
FR 100.0 115% -14% -7% 0% -4% 11% 98.6 86% 0% 0% 0% 1% 12% 74.1 57% 0% 0% 0% 4% 12% 59.6 38% 0% 0% 0% 9% 12%
IE 1 0 0 . 0 7 8 % 2 2 %0 %0 %0 %0 % 8 6 . 9 5 8 % 2 7 %0 %0 %0 %2 % 6 7 . 7 3 9 % 1 8 %0 %0 %6 %5 % 5 3 . 8 2 6 % 1 2 %0 %0 % 1 1 %5 %
IT 92.8 80% 0% 0% 3% 1% 9% 76.1 60% 0% 0% 1% 6% 9% 66.6 40% 0% 0% 3% 15% 9% 57.7 27% 0% 0% 2% 20% 9%
LU 118.4 160% -28% -10% 0% 0% -4% 119.2 119% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 87.0 80% 0% 0% 0% 2% 5% 68.6 53% 0% 0% 0% 7% 8%
NL 102.4 140% 0% -13% 0% -4% -20% 96.4 104% 0% -1% 0% -1% -6% 80.7 70% 0% 0% 0% 6% 5% 65.2 47% 0% 0% 0% 16% 3%
AT 100.0 84% 0% 0% 0% -1% 18% 85.5 62% 2% 1% 0% 2% 18% 70.8 42% 2% 1% 0% 9% 18% 61.7 28% 1% 0% 0% 14% 18%
PT 106.8 130% -34% 0% 0% 0% 11% 93.8 97% -14% 0% 0% 0% 11% 79.5 65% 0% 0% 0% 3% 11% 60.8 43% 0% 0% 0% 7% 11%
FI 98.9 98% 0% 0% 0% -4% 5% 92.2 73% 0% 9% 0% 5% 5% 79.1 49% 0% 8% 0% 16% 6% 69.3 33% 0% 6% 0% 25% 6%
SE 114.1 153% -11% -8% 0% -16% -4% 108.9 114% 0% 0% 0% -4% -1% 84.9 76% 0% 0% 0% 7% 2% 72.0 51% 0% 0% 0% 18% 3%
UK 84.2 29% 17% 24% 0% 9% 5% 82.2 22% 12% 29% 0% 12% 6% 66.0 15% 8% 20% 0% 16% 8% 54.7 10% 6% 13% 0% 18% 8%
CZ 9 5 . 3 7 9 %0 %0 %0 %4 % 1 3 % 8 1 . 1 5 9 %0 %3 %0 %6 % 1 3 % 6 5 . 9 4 0 %0 %5 %0 %8 % 1 3 % 5 3 . 9 2 6 %0 %4 %0 % 1 1 % 1 3 %
HU 84.2 83% 0% 0% 0% -4% 6% 74.9 62% 0% 2% 0% 4% 8% 63.6 41% 0% 1% 0% 12% 9% 61.1 28% 0% 1% 0% 22% 10%
PL 93.8 55% 0% 15% 0% -2% 25% 77.7 41% 0% 12% 0% 0% 25% 63.4 28% 0% 8% 0% 3% 25% 53.6 18% 0% 5% 0% 5% 25%
SK 100.0 100% -10% -4% 0% 1% 13% 100.0 75% 7% 3% 0% 3% 13% 79.8 50% 6% 5% 0% 6% 13% 62.0 33% 4% 4% 0% 8% 13%
NO 117.2 125% 0% 0% 0% -6% -2% 95.3 93% 0% 0% 0% 2% 1% 75.6 62% 0% 0% 0% 10% 3% 64.8 42% 0% 0% 0% 19% 5%
SZ 124.1 140% -13% -8% 0% -5% 10% 113.1 104% 0% 0% 0% -2% 11% 83.5 70% 0% 0% 0% 3% 11% 64.9 47% 0% 0% 0% 7% 11%
US 99.8 100% -8% 0% 0% 0% 8% 87.8 75% 0% 0% 0% 6% 8% 68.5 50% 0% 0% 0% 11% 8% 55.5 33% 0% 0% 0% 15% 8%
JP 105.9 101% -6% 0% 0% 0% 10% 87.6 75% 0% 0% 0% 2% 10% 64.6 51% 0% 0% 0% 4% 10% 49.9 34% 0% 0% 0% 6% 10%
A3.4    One-earner couple, with 2 children
 % of APW 50 67 100 150
Components METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC
BE 86.8 73% 0% 0% 0% 2% 11% 75.9 55% 0% 0% 0% 8% 13% 67.7 37% 0% 0% 0% 17% 14% 63.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1
DK 75.5 104% -55% 0% 0% 17% 9% 87.1 78% -18% 5% 0% 13% 9% 82.3 52% 0% 6% 0% 16% 8% 74.6 35% 0% 4% 0% 27% 8%
DE 1 1 4 . 6 9 4 % - 7 %7 %0 %0 % 2 1 % 9 5 . 5 7 0 %0 %3 %0 %2 % 2 1 % 8 1 . 8 4 7 %0 %6 %0 %9 % 2 1 % 7 0 . 3 3 1 %0 %4 %0 % 1 6 % 1 9 %
GR 125.7 88% 0% 22% 0% 0% 16% 97.9 66% 0% 16% 0% 0% 16% 70.8 44% 0% 11% 0% 0% 16% 57.1 29% 0% 7% 0% 5% 16%
ES 138.9 140% 0% 0% -7% 0% 6% 110.8 104% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 80.0 70% 0% 0% 0% 4% 6% 62.8 47% 0% 0% 0% 10% 6%
FR 89.0 115% -24% -9% 0% -4% 11% 92.1 86% -7% 1% 0% 1% 12% 81.3 57% 0% 8% 0% 4% 12% 62.3 38% 0% 5% 0% 7% 12%
IE 95.3 92% 36% 0% -33% 0% 0% 87.3 69% 27% 0% -11% 0% 2% 71.8 46% 18% 0% 0% 3% 5% 56.5 31% 12% 0% 0% 9% 5%
IT 103.7 80% 0% 0% 14% 0% 9% 73.5 60% 0% 0% 3% 2% 9% 66.3 40% 0% 0% 5% 12% 9% 62.1 27% 0% 0% 8% 18% 9%
LU 112.6 170% -43% -10% 0% 0% -4% 112.1 127% -7% -7% 0% 0% -1% 89.1 85% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 67.6 57% 0% 0% 0% 4% 7%
NL 102.4 140% 0% -13% 0% -4% -20% 96.4 104% 0% -1% 0% -1% -6% 82.3 70% 0% 1% 0% 6% 5% 66.2 47% 0% 1% 0% 16% 3%
AT 100.0 95% -9% -3% 0% -1% 18% 96.6 71% 2% 1% 0% 4% 18% 78.2 48% 2% 1% 0% 10% 18% 66.7 32% 1% 0% 0% 15% 18%
PT 67.4 130% -74% 0% 0% 0% 11% 64.4 97% -44% 0% 0% 0% 11% 63.2 65% -15% 0% 2% 0% 11% 59.7 43% 0% 0% 1% 4% 11%
FI 100.0 110% -4% -3% 0% -8% 5% 98.8 82% 5% 5% 0% 2% 5% 88.8 55% 3% 11% 0% 14% 6% 75.9 37% 2% 7% 0% 24% 6%
SE 104.1 153% -13% -17% 0% -16% -4% 103.1 114% -2% -4% 0% -4% -1% 85.9 76% 0% 1% 0% 7% 2% 72.6 51% 0% 1% 0% 18% 3%
UK 65.8 29% 45% 22% -39% 4% 5% 71.8 22% 33% 21% -19% 8% 6% 73.6 15% 22% 20% -4% 13% 8% 62.3 10% 15% 13% 0% 16% 8%
CZ 100.0 83% 5% 0% 0% 0% 13% 95.9 62% 21% 0% 0% 1% 13% 76.8 41% 14% 3% 1% 5% 13% 62.8 28% 9% 4% 1% 8% 13%
HU 88.6 83% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 71.2 62% 0% 2% 0% 0% 8% 61.0 41% 0% 1% 0% 9% 9% 59.3 28% 0% 1% 0% 21% 10%
PL 100.0 55% 22% 0% 0% -2% 25% 91.0 41% 25% 0% 0% 0% 25% 80.0 28% 17% 8% 0% 3% 25% 64.7 18% 11% 5% 0% 5% 25%
SK 100.0 100% -9% -4% 0% 0% 13% 100.0 75% 9% 4% 0% 0% 13% 96.1 50% 21% 9% 0% 3% 13% 71.8 33% 14% 6% 0% 6% 13%
NO 108.8 131% 0% -13% 0% -7% -2% 98.6 98% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 77.9 66% 0% 0% 0% 10% 3% 66.3 44% 0% 0% 0% 18% 4%
SZ 134.0 160% -20% -9% 0% -7% 10% 125.4 119% -1% 0% 0% -3% 10% 91.8 80% 0% 0% 0% 1% 11% 70.0 53% 0% 0% 0% 6% 11%
US 68.0 100% -14% 0% 0% -26% 8% 68.5 75% 1% 0% 0% -14% 8% 64.1 50% 4% 0% 0% 3% 8% 53.0 33% 2% 0% 0% 10% 8%
JP 84.1 101% -27% 0% 0% 0% 10% 86.4 75% 1% 0% 0% 0% 10% 71.0 51% 8% 0% 0% 2% 10% 55.6 34% 6% 0% 2% 4% 10% - 61 - 
 
A3.5    Two-earner couple without children. Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings from 0 to 200% of APW.
 % of APW 50 67 100 150
Components METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC
BE 99.0 67% 0% 0% 0% 19% 13% 88.8 50% 0% 0% 0% 24% 15% 77.8 34% 0% 0% 0% 30% 15% 70.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1
DK 106.8 104% 0% 0% 0% -4% 7% 91.2 78% 0% 0% 0% 6% 7% 77.8 52% 0% 0% 0% 18% 8% 72.8 35% 0% 0% 0% 30% 8%
DE 118.0 73% 0% 0% 0% 25% 21% 100.7 54% 0% 0% 0% 26% 21% 84.6 36% 0% 0% 0% 28% 21% 73.7 24% 0% 0% 0% 30% 19%
GR 112.0 80% 0% 16% 0% 0% 16% 87.6 60% 0% 12% 0% 0% 16% 65.7 40% 0% 8% 0% 2% 16% 53.7 27% 0% 5% 0% 6% 16%
ES 129.3 131% 0% 0% 0% -8% 6% 103.1 98% 0% 0% 0% -1% 6% 79.2 66% 0% 0% 0% 7% 6% 63.1 44% 0% 0% 0% 13% 6%
FR 119.8 115% 0% 0% 0% -6% 11% 100.0 86% 0% 0% 0% 3% 12% 78.3 57% 0% 0% 0% 9% 12% 63.1 38% 0% 0% 0% 13% 12%
IE 53.7 48% 0% 0% 0% 6% 0% 47.5 35% 0% 0% 0% 10% 2% 41.8 24% 0% 0% 0% 13% 5% 37.0 16% 0% 0% 0% 16% 5%
IT 91.9 80% 0% 0% 0% 3% 9% 76.6 60% 0% 0% 0% 8% 9% 64.6 40% 0% 0% 0% 15% 9% 56.4 27% 0% 0% 0% 21% 9%
LU 139.0 160% 0% 0% 0% -16% -5% 111.0 119% 0% 0% 0% -9% 0% 84.8 80% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5% 69.1 53% 0% 0% 0% 8% 8%
NL 114.7 140% 0% 0% 0% -4% -21% 97.0 104% 0% 0% 0% -1% -7% 80.0 70% 0% 0% 0% 6% 4% 65.0 47% 0% 0% 0% 16% 3%
AT 100.8 81% 0% 0% 0% 2% 18% 84.6 60% 0% 0% 0% 6% 18% 70.1 40% 0% 0% 0% 12% 18% 61.3 27% 0% 0% 0% 16% 18%
PT 1 4 3 . 6 1 3 0 %0 %0 %0 %3 % 1 1 % 1 1 2 . 8 9 7 %0 %0 %0 %5 % 1 1 % 8 3 . 2 6 5 %0 %0 %0 %7 % 1 1 % 6 3 . 7 4 3 %0 %0 %0 %9 % 1 1 %
FI 98.5 98% 0% 0% 0% -4% 5% 83.5 73% 0% 0% 0% 5% 5% 70.7 49% 0% 0% 0% 16% 6% 63.8 33% 0% 0% 0% 25% 6%
SE 133.5 153% 0% 0% 0% -16% -4% 108.9 114% 0% 0% 0% -4% -1% 84.9 76% 0% 0% 0% 7% 2% 72.0 51% 0% 0% 0% 18% 3%
UK 43.4 29% 0% 0% 0% 9% 5% 40.5 22% 0% 0% 0% 12% 6% 37.7 15% 0% 0% 0% 16% 8% 35.8 10% 0% 0% 0% 18% 8%
CZ 99.9 77% 0% 0% 0% 11% 13% 81.0 57% 0% 0% 0% 11% 13% 63.3 38% 0% 0% 0% 12% 13% 52.2 26% 0% 0% 0% 14% 13%
HU 84.2 83% 0% 0% 0% -4% 6% 73.1 62% 0% 0% 0% 4% 8% 62.3 41% 0% 0% 0% 12% 9% 60.2 28% 0% 0% 0% 22% 10%
PL 7 6 . 6 5 5 %0 %0 %0 % - 4 % 2 5 % 6 5 . 9 4 1 %0 %0 %0 %0 % 2 5 % 5 5 . 4 2 8 %0 %0 %0 %3 % 2 5 % 4 8 . 3 1 8 %0 %0 %0 %5 % 2 5 %
SK 1 1 8 . 2 1 0 0 %0 %0 %0 %5 % 1 3 % 9 4 . 1 7 5 %0 %0 %0 %7 % 1 3 % 7 0 . 7 5 0 %0 %0 %0 %8 % 1 3 % 5 6 . 4 3 3 %0 %0 %0 % 1 0 % 1 3 %
NO 117.2 125% 0% 0% 0% -6% -2% 95.3 93% 0% 0% 0% 2% 1% 75.6 62% 0% 0% 0% 10% 3% 66.5 42% 0% 0% 0% 20% 5%
SZ 133.7 140% 0% 0% 0% -11% 4% 106.8 104% 0% 0% 0% -4% 6% 81.0 70% 0% 0% 0% 3% 8% 64.8 47% 0% 0% 0% 9% 9%
US 107.6 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 8% 87.8 75% 0% 0% 0% 6% 8% 68.5 50% 0% 0% 0% 11% 8% 55.5 33% 0% 0% 0% 15% 8%
JP 1 1 6 . 9 1 0 1 %0 %0 %0 %6 % 1 0 % 9 1 . 6 7 5 %0 %0 %0 %6 % 1 0 % 6 7 . 5 5 1 %0 %0 %0 %7 % 1 0 % 5 2 . 2 3 4 %0 %0 %0 %8 % 1 0 %
A3.6    Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings from 0 to 200% of APW.
 % of APW 50 67 100 150
Components METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METR ut = UB + SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC
BE 99.0 67% 0% 0% 0% 19% 13% 88.8 50% 0% 0% 0% 24% 15% 77.8 34% 0% 0% 0% 30% 15% 70.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1
DK 106.8 104% 0% 0% 0% -4% 7% 91.2 78% 0% 0% 0% 6% 7% 77.8 52% 0% 0% 0% 18% 8% 72.8 35% 0% 0% 0% 30% 8%
DE 138.2 94% 0% 0% 0% 23% 21% 116.1 70% 0% 0% 0% 25% 21% 94.9 47% 0% 0% 0% 27% 21% 80.1 31% 0% 0% 7% 23% 19%
GR 125.7 88% 0% 22% 0% 0% 16% 97.9 66% 0% 16% 0% 0% 16% 70.8 44% 0% 11% 0% 0% 16% 57.1 29% 0% 7% 0% 5% 16%
ES 140.4 140% 0% 0% 0% -6% 6% 110.7 104% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 83.9 70% 0% 0% 0% 8% 6% 65.9 47% 0% 0% 0% 13% 6%
FR 121.5 115% 0% 0% 0% -4% 11% 99.9 86% 0% 0% 0% 3% 12% 76.5 57% 0% 0% 0% 7% 12% 60.5 38% 0% 0% 0% 10% 12%
IE 71.9 62% 0% 0% 0% 10% 0% 61.1 46% 0% 0% 0% 12% 2% 50.8 31% 0% 0% 0% 15% 5% 43.0 21% 0% 0% 0% 17% 5%
IT 95.4 80% 0% 0% 3% 3% 9% 81.2 60% 0% 0% 5% 8% 9% 69.5 40% 0% 0% 5% 15% 9% 59.8 27% 0% 0% 3% 21% 9%
LU 154.9 170% 0% 0% 0% -9% -6% 119.1 127% 0% 0% 0% -7% -1% 88.2 85% 0% 0% 0% -1% 4% 71.3 57% 0% 0% 0% 7% 7%
NL 114.5 140% 0% 0% 0% -4% -22% 97.0 104% 0% 0% 0% -1% -7% 80.0 70% 0% 0% 0% 6% 4% 65.0 47% 0% 0% 0% 16% 3%
AT 106.8 87% 0% 0% 0% 2% 18% 89.1 65% 0% 0% 0% 6% 18% 73.1 43% 0% 0% 0% 12% 18% 63.3 29% 0% 0% 0% 16% 18%
PT 1 4 1 . 0 1 3 0 %0 %0 %0 %0 % 1 1 % 1 0 8 . 0 9 7 %0 %0 %0 %0 % 1 1 % 7 9 . 8 6 5 %0 %0 %0 %4 % 1 1 % 6 1 . 5 4 3 %0 %0 %0 %7 % 1 1 %
FI 106.3 110% 0% 0% 0% -8% 5% 89.3 82% 0% 0% 0% 2% 5% 74.6 55% 0% 0% 0% 14% 6% 66.4 37% 0% 0% 0% 24% 6%
SE 133.5 153% 0% 0% 0% -16% -4% 108.9 114% 0% 0% 0% -4% -1% 84.9 76% 0% 0% 0% 7% 2% 72.0 51% 0% 0% 0% 18% 3%
UK 54.3 29% 0% 0% 16% 4% 5% 48.6 22% 0% 0% 12% 8% 6% 43.2 15% 0% 0% 8% 13% 8% 39.4 10% 0% 0% 5% 16% 8%
CZ 9 7 . 4 8 1 %0 %1 %0 %3 % 1 3 % 8 0 . 2 6 0 %0 %1 %0 %6 % 1 3 % 6 5 . 3 4 1 %0 %1 %3 %8 % 1 3 % 5 3 . 1 2 7 %0 %1 %2 % 1 1 % 1 3 %
HU 84.2 83% 0% 0% 0% -4% 6% 73.1 62% 0% 0% 0% 4% 8% 62.3 41% 0% 0% 0% 12% 9% 60.2 28% 0% 0% 0% 22% 10%
PL 7 6 . 6 5 5 %0 %0 %0 % - 4 % 2 5 % 6 5 . 9 4 1 %0 %0 %0 %0 % 2 5 % 5 5 . 4 2 8 %0 %0 %0 %3 % 2 5 % 5 0 . 8 1 8 %0 %0 %2 %5 % 2 5 %
SK 1 1 8 . 2 1 0 0 %0 %0 %0 %5 % 1 3 % 9 4 . 1 7 5 %0 %0 %0 %7 % 1 3 % 7 4 . 9 5 0 %0 %0 %4 %8 % 1 3 % 5 9 . 2 3 3 %0 %0 %3 % 1 0 % 1 3 %
NO 121.7 131% 0% 0% 0% -7% -2% 98.6 98% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 77.9 66% 0% 0% 0% 10% 3% 68.0 44% 0% 0% 0% 20% 4%
SZ 150.0 160% 0% 0% 0% -13% 3% 118.3 119% 0% 0% 0% -7% 6% 88.6 80% 0% 0% 0% 1% 8% 69.5 53% 0% 0% 0% 7% 9%
US 107.6 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 8% 86.9 75% 0% 0% 0% 5% 8% 67.9 50% 0% 0% 0% 10% 8% 55.1 33% 0% 0% 0% 14% 8%
JP 1 1 2 . 8 1 0 1 %0 %0 %0 %2 % 1 0 % 8 7 . 4 7 5 %0 %0 %0 %2 % 1 0 % 6 7 . 3 5 1 %0 %0 %3 %4 % 1 0 % 5 1 . 7 3 4 %0 %0 %2 %6 % 1 0 %  
Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models. - 62 - 
Table A4 - Inactivity trap indicator for jobless persons     2001 
Moving from social assistance to work, at a wage level equivalent to: 
A4.1    Single person
% of APW 33 50 67 100 150
Components METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC
BE 85.4 67% 0% 0% 6% 13% 70.7 44% 0% 0% 16% 11% 66.9 33% 0% 0% 21% 13% 63.7 22% 0% 0% 28% 14% 61.1 15% 0% 0% 32% 14%
DK 96.2 40% 22% 0% 17% 18% 96.1 43% 23% 0% 16% 13% 83.1 32% 17% 0% 21% 12% 72.4 22% 12% 0% 28% 11% 69.2 14% 8% 0% 37% 10%
DE 84.2 22% 41% 0% 0% 21% 89.6 21% 40% 0% 8% 21% 80.1 16% 30% 0% 14% 21% 71.3 11% 20% 0% 20% 21% 66.6 7% 13% 0% 27% 19%
GR 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 17.7 0% 0% 0% 2% 16% 21.7 0% 0% 0% 6% 16%
ES 68.9 63% 0% 0% 0% 6% 50.1 41% 0% 0% 2% 6% 43.9 31% 0% 0% 7% 6% 39.6 21% 0% 0% 13% 6% 36.7 14% 0% 0% 17% 6%
FR 81.2 42% 22% 0% 4% 13% 82.9 39% 26% 0% 4% 14% 71.5 29% 19% 0% 9% 13% 60.0 20% 13% 0% 14% 14% 52.3 13% 9% 0% 18% 13%
IE 100.0 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 87.3 83% 0% 0% 4% 0% 72.6 62% 0% 0% 8% 2% 58.5 42% 0% 0% 12% 5% 54.0 28% 0% 0% 21% 5%
IT 10.0 0% 0% 0% 1% 9% 16.1 0% 0% 0% 7% 9% 20.0 0% 0% 0% 11% 9% 26.6 0% 0% 0% 17% 9% 31.1 0% 0% 0% 22% 9%
LU 89.0 78% 0% 0% -1% 11% 92.2 71% 10% 0% 0% 11% 76.3 53% 7% 0% 4% 12% 63.2 36% 5% 0% 10% 13% 57.9 24% 3% 0% 18% 13%
NL 96.6 83% -3% 0% 1% 16% 92.2 60% 11% 0% 2% 19% 84.4 45% 13% 0% 3% 23% 71.5 30% 8% 0% 9% 24% 59.4 20% 6% 0% 18% 16%
AT 100.0 49% 34% 0% -1% 18% 87.7 42% 29% 0% -1% 18% 74.8 31% 21% 0% 4% 18% 63.6 21% 14% 0% 10% 18% 57.0 14% 10% 0% 15% 18%
PT 55.5 44% 0% 0% 0% 11% 50.4 39% 0% 0% 0% 11% 42.1 29% 0% 0% 2% 11% 36.1 20% 0% 0% 5% 11% 35.0 13% 0% 0% 11% 11%
FI 100.0 70% 13% 0% 12% 6% 86.2 46% 18% 0% 15% 6% 78.0 34% 17% 0% 20% 6% 67.1 23% 12% 0% 26% 7% 61.3 15% 8% 0% 32% 7%
SE 100.0 32% 41% 0% 20% 7% 98.1 31% 40% 0% 20% 7% 82.5 23% 30% 0% 22% 7% 67.2 16% 20% 0% 25% 7% 60.2 10% 13% 0% 30% 6%
UK 79.7 44% 30% 0% 3% 3% 78.4 29% 35% 0% 9% 5% 70.4 22% 30% 0% 12% 6% 57.7 15% 20% 0% 16% 8% 49.1 10% 13% 0% 18% 8%
CZ 83.2 65% 2% 0% 4% 13% 70.5 43% 8% 0% 7% 13% 59.4 32% 6% 0% 9% 13% 48.8 21% 4% 0% 11% 13% 42.5 14% 3% 0% 13% 13%
HU 69.2 49% 0% 0% 8% 12% 55.1 32% 0% 0% 10% 13% 53.3 24% 2% 0% 15% 13% 49.1 16% 1% 0% 19% 13% 51.4 11% 1% 0% 27% 13%
PL 92.4 44% 23% 0% 0% 25% 72.4 29% 15% 0% 3% 25% 62.7 22% 12% 0% 4% 25% 53.3 15% 8% 0% 6% 25% 46.9 10% 5% 0% 7% 25%
SK 99.1 61% 25% 0% 0% 13% 80.5 40% 24% 0% 3% 13% 71.6 30% 24% 0% 5% 13% 55.7 20% 16% 0% 7% 13% 46.4 13% 11% 0% 10% 13%
NO 82.8 59% 6% 0% 10% 8% 84.9 39% 22% 0% 16% 8% 71.2 29% 17% 0% 18% 8% 59.5 20% 11% 0% 21% 8% 55.8 13% 7% 0% 28% 8%
SZ 100.0 44% 40% 0% 4% 12% 100.0 43% 40% 0% 5% 12% 80.7 32% 30% 0% 7% 12% 63.1 22% 20% 0% 10% 12% 53.0 14% 13% 0% 14% 12%
US 20.8 5% 0% 0% 8% 8% 29.4 10% 0% 0% 12% 8% 29.4 7% 0% 0% 14% 8% 29.4 5% 0% 0% 17% 8% 32.7 3% 0% 0% 22% 8%
JP 79.4 67% 0% 0% 3% 10% 68.6 54% 0% 0% 4% 10% 55.6 40% 0% 0% 5% 10% 43.3 27% 0% 0% 6% 10% 36.5 18% 0% 0% 8% 10%
A4.2    Single parent with 2 children
% of APW 33 50 67 100 150
Components METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC
BE 96.9 84% 0% 0% 0% 13% 76.6 59% 0% 0% 7% 11% 71.4 44% 0% 0% 15% 13% 66.6 29% 0% 0% 23% 14% 63.1 20% 0% 0% 30% 14%
DK 84.5 41% 10% 0% 16% 18% 91.6 54% 11% 0% 12% 15% 87.2 44% 14% 0% 17% 12% 76.3 30% 11% 0% 25% 11% 71.8 20% 7% 0% 34% 10%
DE 84.2 37% 27% 0% 0% 21% 89.6 38% 28% 0% 3% 21% 85.3 32% 23% 0% 9% 21% 74.1 21% 16% 0% 17% 21% 66.5 14% 10% 7% 16% 19%
GR 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 20.5 0% 0% 0% 5% 16%
ES 100.2 94% 0% 0% 0% 6% 68.3 62% 0% 0% 0% 6% 58.1 46% 0% 6% 0% 6% 46.3 31% 0% 4% 5% 6% 40.5 21% 0% 2% 11% 6%
FR 68.9 42% 11% 0% 3% 13% 75.4 42% 17% 0% 3% 14% 81.2 41% 20% 0% 7% 13% 69.1 28% 21% 0% 7% 14% 54.9 18% 14% 0% 10% 13%
IE 50.9 51% 0% 0% 0% 0% 50.5 34% 0% 15% 2% 0% 54.3 25% 0% 22% 4% 2% 60.0 17% 0% 32% 6% 5% 52.5 11% 0% 21% 15% 5%
IT -0.7 0% 0% -11% 1% 9% -0.6 0% 0% -11% 1% 9% -2.1 0% 0% -16% 5% 9% 16.9 0% 0% -6% 14% 9% 27.2 0% 0% -1% 19% 9%
LU 85.8 75% 0% 0% 0% 11% 94.2 83% 0% 0% 0% 11% 81.7 63% 7% 0% 0% 12% 59.3 42% 5% 0% 0% 12% 53.5 28% 3% 0% 9% 13%
NL 93.3 97% -7% 0% 0% 3% 82.2 78% 0% 0% 0% 5% 80.2 58% 8% 0% 2% 12% 70.2 39% 8% 0% 8% 16% 58.5 26% 5% 0% 17% 10%
AT 100.0 60% 28% 0% -6% 18% 99.5 58% 27% 0% -4% 18% 83.6 44% 20% 0% 2% 18% 69.5 29% 13% 0% 9% 18% 60.9 19% 9% 0% 14% 18%
PT 55.5 44% 0% 0% 0% 11% 55.5 44% 0% 0% 0% 11% 55.5 44% 0% 0% 0% 11% 51.9 39% 0% 2% 0% 11% 44.7 26% 0% 1% 6% 11%
FI 70.3 49% 3% 0% 12% 6% 64.7 32% 10% 0% 15% 6% 65.5 24% 15% 0% 20% 6% 64.6 16% 16% 0% 26% 7% 59.7 11% 11% 0% 32% 7%
SE 81.9 34% 21% 0% 20% 7% 63.3 22% 14% 0% 20% 7% 61.4 17% 15% 0% 22% 7% 59.7 11% 17% 0% 25% 7% 56.1 7% 12% 0% 30% 6%
UK 80.6 78% 0% 0% 0% 3% 45.0 57% 18% -39% 4% 5% 56.2 43% 18% -19% 8% 6% 65.3 29% 20% -4% 13% 8% 56.7 19% 13% 0% 16% 8%
CZ 100.0 88% 0% 0% 0% 13% 94.4 82% 0% 0% 0% 13% 79.5 61% 3% 0% 3% 13% 67.5 41% 7% 1% 6% 13% 56.7 27% 4% 3% 10% 13%
HU 61.2 49% 0% 0% 0% 12% 44.7 32% 0% 0% 0% 13% 38.4 24% 2% 0% 0% 13% 39.0 16% 1% 0% 9% 13% 44.7 11% 1% 0% 21% 13%
PL 100.0 75% 0% 0% 0% 25% 86.1 58% 0% 0% 3% 25% 84.4 43% 12% 0% 4% 25% 67.8 29% 8% 0% 6% 25% 56.6 19% 5% 0% 7% 25%
SK 100.0 62% 25% 0% 0% 13% 100.0 62% 25% 0% 0% 13% 91.5 52% 25% 0% 2% 13% 71.9 35% 20% 0% 5% 13% 59.1 23% 13% 3% 7% 13%
NO 78.3 0% 33% 29% 7% 10% 73.2 0% 22% 33% 10% 9% 69.4 0% 16% 34% 11% 8% 67.9 0% 11% 34% 15% 8% 59.6 0% 7% 23% 22% 8%
SZ 100.0 76% 37% -25% 0% 12% 100.0 69% 34% -16% 1% 12% 92.4 60% 30% -12% 3% 12% 69.3 40% 20% -8% 6% 12% 55.6 27% 13% -5% 9% 12%
US 30.0 6% 0% 53% -37% 8% 32.5 11% 0% 35% -22% 8% 43.5 19% 0% 26% -10% 8% 45.1 13% 0% 18% 7% 8% 40.3 9% 0% 12% 12% 8%
JP 107.6 69% 0% 28% 0% 10% 102.7 74% 0% 19% 0% 10% 95.3 69% 0% 14% 2% 10% 69.8 46% 0% 9% 4% 10% 55.2 31% 0% 8% 6% 10% - 63 - 
 
 
A4.3    One-earner couple, without children
% of APW 33 50 67 100 150
Components METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC
BE 97.5 82% 0% 0% 2% 13% 77.6 59% 0% 0% 8% 11% 69.0 44% 0% 0% 12% 13% 63.1 29% 0% 0% 20% 14% 60.5 20% 0% 0% 27% 14%
DK 34.3 -3% -15% 0% 33% 18% 59.4 24% -4% 0% 24% 15% 73.0 38% 2% 0% 19% 13% 70.4 36% 3% 0% 21% 11% 66.7 24% 2% 0% 30% 10%
DE 84.2 31% 33% 0% 0% 21% 89.6 34% 35% 0% 0% 21% 80.5 29% 30% 0% 2% 21% 68.7 19% 20% 0% 9% 21% 61.5 13% 13% 0% 16% 19%
GR 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 17.7 0% 0% 0% 2% 16% 21.7 0% 0% 0% 6% 16%
ES 87.7 81% 0% 0% 0% 6% 60.0 54% 0% 0% 0% 6% 47.4 40% 0% 0% 1% 6% 40.7 27% 0% 0% 8% 6% 36.8 18% 0% 0% 13% 6%
FR 75.6 42% 17% 0% 3% 13% 82.6 42% 24% 0% 3% 14% 85.7 42% 23% 0% 7% 13% 65.4 28% 16% 0% 8% 14% 53.8 19% 10% 0% 12% 13%
IE 100.0 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100.0 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 86.9 85% 0% 0% 0% 2% 67.7 57% 0% 0% 6% 5% 53.8 38% 0% 0% 11% 5%
IT 7.3 0% 0% -3% 1% 9% 8.2 0% 0% -3% 2% 9% 13.0 0% 0% -3% 7% 9% 24.3 0% 0% 0% 15% 9% 29.5 0% 0% 0% 20% 9%
LU 79.2 68% 0% 0% 0% 12% 89.8 79% 0% 0% 0% 11% 97.9 79% 7% 0% 0% 11% 72.7 53% 5% 0% 3% 12% 59.0 36% 3% 0% 8% 13%
NL 95.7 95% -4% 0% 0% 5% 96.4 86% -1% 0% 1% 10% 91.9 64% 8% 0% 3% 17% 77.7 43% 6% 0% 8% 20% 63.2 29% 4% 0% 17% 13%
AT 100.0 56% 27% 0% -1% 18% 100.0 56% 27% 0% -1% 18% 85.5 44% 21% 0% 2% 18% 70.8 30% 14% 0% 9% 18% 61.7 20% 10% 0% 14% 18%
PT 55.5 44% 0% 0% 0% 11% 55.5 44% 0% 0% 0% 11% 55.5 44% 0% 0% 0% 11% 53.8 39% 0% 0% 3% 11% 43.7 26% 0% 0% 7% 11%
FI 100.0 73% 9% 0% 12% 6% 97.4 60% 16% 0% 15% 6% 91.0 45% 20% 0% 20% 6% 78.3 30% 16% 0% 26% 7% 68.8 20% 11% 0% 32% 7%
SE 100.0 37% 36% 0% 20% 7% 100.0 35% 38% 0% 20% 7% 98.4 34% 35% 0% 22% 7% 77.9 23% 23% 0% 25% 7% 67.3 15% 15% 0% 30% 6%
UK 88.5 69% 14% 0% 3% 3% 84.2 46% 24% 0% 9% 5% 82.2 34% 29% 0% 12% 6% 66.0 23% 20% 0% 16% 8% 54.7 15% 13% 0% 18% 8%
CZ 100.0 88% 0% 0% 0% 13% 92.4 76% 0% 0% 4% 13% 78.9 57% 3% 0% 6% 13% 64.5 38% 5% 0% 8% 13% 53.0 25% 4% 0% 11% 13%
HU 69.2 49% 0% 0% 8% 12% 55.1 32% 0% 0% 10% 13% 53.3 24% 2% 0% 15% 13% 49.1 16% 1% 0% 19% 13% 51.4 11% 1% 0% 27% 13%
PL 100.0 75% 0% 0% 0% 25% 93.8 53% 15% 0% 0% 25% 77.7 40% 12% 0% 1% 25% 63.4 27% 8% 0% 4% 25% 53.6 18% 5% 0% 6% 25%
SK 100.0 62% 25% 0% 0% 13% 100.0 61% 25% 0% 1% 13% 100.0 60% 24% 0% 3% 13% 79.8 41% 20% 0% 6% 13% 62.0 28% 13% 0% 8% 13%
NO 92.6 78% 6% 0% 1% 8% 91.4 51% 22% 0% 10% 8% 76.1 38% 17% 0% 13% 8% 62.8 26% 11% 0% 18% 8% 56.2 17% 7% 0% 24% 8%
SZ 100.0 54% 33% 0% 1% 12% 100.0 54% 32% 0% 3% 12% 95.1 50% 30% 0% 4% 12% 71.4 33% 20% 0% 7% 12% 56.9 22% 13% 0% 10% 12%
US 17.6 6% 0% 0% 4% 8% 25.1 10% 0% 0% 7% 8% 32.1 14% 0% 0% 11% 8% 31.2 9% 0% 0% 14% 8% 30.6 6% 0% 0% 17% 8%
JP 79.4 69% 0% 0% 0% 10% 84.1 74% 0% 0% 0% 10% 71.3 59% 0% 0% 2% 10% 53.7 40% 0% 0% 4% 10% 42.6 26% 0% 0% 6% 10%
A4.4    One-earner couple, with 2 children
% of APW 33 50 67 100 150
Components METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC
BE 96.9 84% 0% 0% 0% 13% 72.2 59% 0% 0% 2% 11% 65.0 44% 0% 0% 8% 13% 60.4 29% 0% 0% 17% 14% 58.7 20% 0% 0% 25% 14%
DK 36.7 -23% 0% 0% 41% 18% 58.2 16% 0% 0% 27% 15% 74.2 35% 5% 0% 20% 13% 73.6 36% 6% 0% 21% 11% 68.8 24% 4% 0% 30% 10%
DE 84.2 38% 25% 0% 0% 21% 89.6 42% 27% 0% 0% 21% 76.8 36% 18% 0% 2% 21% 69.3 24% 16% 0% 9% 21% 62.0 16% 11% 0% 16% 19%
GR 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 20.5 0% 0% 0% 5% 16%
ES 106.3 100% 0% 0% 0% 6% 76.6 70% 0% 0% 0% 6% 64.3 52% 0% 6% 0% 6% 48.8 35% 0% 4% 4% 6% 42.0 23% 0% 2% 10% 6%
FR 68.2 42% 11% 0% 2% 13% 74.9 42% 17% 0% 3% 14% 81.6 42% 20% 0% 6% 13% 74.3 33% 21% 0% 7% 14% 57.7 22% 14% 0% 9% 13%
IE 100.0 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 95.3 128% 0% -33% 0% 0% 87.3 96% 0% -11% 0% 2% 71.8 64% 0% 0% 3% 5% 56.5 43% 0% 0% 9% 5%
IT -4.5 0% 0% -15% 1% 9% -4.4 0% 0% -14% 1% 9% -7.1 0% 0% -19% 3% 9% 12.3 0% 0% -9% 12% 9% 26.1 0% 0% -1% 18% 9%
LU 75.5 64% 0% 0% 0% 12% 87.3 76% 0% 0% 0% 11% 93.2 82% 0% 0% 0% 11% 76.4 60% 5% 0% 0% 12% 59.2 40% 3% 0% 4% 13%
NL 95.7 95% -4% 0% 0% 5% 93.9 86% -1% 0% 1% 8% 90.0 64% 8% 0% 3% 15% 78.0 43% 7% 0% 8% 19% 63.4 29% 5% 0% 17% 12%
AT 100.0 61% 22% 0% -1% 18% 100.0 61% 22% 0% -1% 18% 96.6 55% 20% 0% 4% 18% 78.2 37% 13% 0% 10% 18% 66.7 24% 9% 0% 15% 18%
PT 55.5 44% 0% 0% 0% 11% 55.5 44% 0% 0% 0% 11% 55.5 44% 0% 0% 0% 11% 57.2 44% 0% 2% 0% 11% 55.7 39% 0% 1% 4% 11%
FI 100.0 82% 0% 0% 12% 6% 100.0 71% 7% 0% 15% 6% 98.8 60% 12% 0% 20% 6% 88.8 40% 16% 0% 26% 7% 75.9 27% 11% 0% 32% 7%
SE 100.0 46% 27% 0% 20% 7% 100.0 43% 30% 0% 20% 7% 100.0 39% 31% 0% 22% 7% 83.8 28% 24% 0% 25% 7% 71.2 19% 16% 0% 30% 6%
UK 93.1 90% 0% 0% 0% 3% 65.8 74% 22% -39% 4% 5% 71.8 55% 21% -19% 8% 6% 73.6 37% 20% -4% 13% 8% 62.3 25% 13% 0% 16% 8%
CZ 100.0 88% 0% 0% 0% 13% 100.0 88% 0% 0% 0% 13% 95.9 83% 0% 0% 1% 13% 76.8 55% 3% 1% 5% 13% 62.8 37% 4% 1% 8% 13%
HU 61.2 49% 0% 0% 0% 12% 44.7 32% 0% 0% 0% 13% 38.4 24% 2% 0% 0% 13% 39.0 16% 1% 0% 9% 13% 44.7 11% 1% 0% 21% 13%
PL 100.0 75% 0% 0% 0% 25% 100.0 75% 0% 0% 0% 25% 91.0 65% 0% 0% 1% 25% 80.0 43% 8% 0% 4% 25% 64.7 29% 5% 0% 6% 25%
SK 100.0 62% 25% 0% 0% 13% 100.0 62% 25% 0% 0% 13% 100.0 62% 25% 0% 0% 13% 96.1 56% 23% 0% 3% 13% 71.8 38% 16% 0% 6% 13%
NO 100.0 92% 0% 0% 0% 8% 99.4 76% 12% 0% 4% 8% 91.6 57% 19% 0% 9% 8% 73.2 38% 12% 0% 15% 8% 63.2 25% 8% 0% 22% 8%
SZ 100.0 79% 34% -25% 0% 12% 100.0 72% 31% -16% 1% 12% 100.0 69% 30% -12% 3% 12% 74.8 46% 20% -8% 5% 12% 58.7 31% 13% -5% 8% 12%
US 29.9 6% 0% 54% -38% 8% 37.4 9% 0% 43% -23% 8% 45.6 18% 0% 32% -12% 8% 48.8 15% 0% 22% 4% 8% 42.8 10% 0% 14% 11% 8%
JP 79.4 69% 0% 0% 0% 10% 84.1 74% 0% 0% 0% 10% 86.4 76% 0% 0% 0% 10% 71.0 59% 0% 0% 2% 10% 55.6 39% 0% 2% 4% 10% - 64 - 
 
A4.5    Two-earner couple without children. Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings from 0 to 200% of APW.
% of APW 33 50 67 100 150
Components METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC
BE 45.8 0% 0% 0% 30% 16% 45.1 0% 0% 0% 32% 13% 48.6 0% 0% 0% 34% 15% 50.9 0% 0% 0% 36% 15% 52.4 0% 0% 0% 38% 14%
DK 55.6 12% 0% 0% 27% 16% 52.1 8% 0% 0% 30% 14% 50.4 6% 0% 0% 32% 12% 50.4 4% 0% 0% 35% 11% 54.5 3% 0% 0% 41% 11%
DE 41.9 0% 0% 0% 21% 21% 45.5 0% 0% 0% 25% 21% 46.6 0% 0% 0% 26% 21% 48.3 0% 0% 0% 28% 21% 49.5 0% 0% 0% 30% 19%
GR 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 17.7 0% 0% 0% 2% 16% 21.7 0% 0% 0% 6% 16%
ES 18.1 0% 0% 0% 12% 6% 16.5 0% 0% 0% 10% 6% 18.9 0% 0% 0% 13% 6% 22.8 0% 0% 0% 16% 6% 25.5 0% 0% 0% 19% 6%
FR 21.4 0% 0% 0% 8% 14% 22.5 0% 0% 0% 9% 14% 27.4 0% 0% 0% 14% 14% 29.7 0% 0% 0% 16% 13% 30.7 0% 0% 0% 18% 13%
IE 12.0 0% 0% 0% 12% 0% 14.7 0% 0% 0% 15% 0% 18.4 0% 0% 0% 16% 2% 22.3 0% 0% 0% 17% 5% 24.0 0% 0% 0% 19% 5%
IT 28.4 0% 0% 6% 13% 9% 32.6 0% 0% 4% 19% 9% 32.3 0% 0% 3% 20% 9% 34.9 0% 0% 2% 24% 9% 36.6 0% 0% 1% 26% 9%
LU 13.6 0% 0% 0% 0% 14% 16.7 0% 0% 0% 3% 14% 19.7 0% 0% 0% 6% 14% 23.7 0% 0% 0% 10% 14% 28.3 0% 0% 0% 14% 14%
NL 35.1 0% 4% 0% 3% 29% 32.7 0% 2% 0% 3% 27% 35.8 0% 2% 0% 4% 30% 39.0 0% 1% 0% 9% 28% 37.7 0% 1% 0% 18% 19%
AT 21.4 0% 0% 0% 3% 18% 20.2 0% 0% 0% 2% 18% 24.5 0% 0% 0% 6% 18% 29.8 0% 0% 0% 12% 18% 34.5 0% 0% 0% 16% 18%
PT 42.0 29% 0% 0% 2% 11% 32.7 19% 0% 0% 3% 11% 30.0 14% 0% 0% 5% 11% 27.7 10% 0% 0% 7% 11% 26.7 6% 0% 0% 9% 11%
FI 25.4 0% 8% 0% 12% 6% 26.8 0% 5% 0% 15% 6% 30.0 0% 4% 0% 20% 6% 34.9 0% 3% 0% 26% 7% 39.9 0% 2% 0% 32% 7%
SE 26.7 0% 0% 0% 20% 7% 26.9 0% 0% 0% 20% 7% 29.4 0% 0% 0% 22% 7% 31.7 0% 0% 0% 25% 7% 36.5 0% 0% 0% 30% 6%
UK 6 . 70 %1 %0 %3 %3 % 1 5 . 10 %1 %0 %9 %5 % 1 9 . 40 %1 %0 % 1 2 %6 % 2 3 . 50 %0 %0 % 1 6 %8 % 2 6 . 40 %0 %0 % 1 8 %8 %
CZ 31.3 0% 10% 0% 9% 13% 29.4 0% 6% 0% 11% 13% 28.4 0% 5% 0% 11% 13% 28.0 0% 3% 0% 12% 13% 28.7 0% 2% 0% 14% 13%
HU 20.5 0% 0% 0% 8% 12% 23.0 0% 0% 0% 10% 13% 27.4 0% 0% 0% 15% 12% 31.7 0% 0% 0% 19% 12% 39.8 0% 0% 0% 27% 13%
PL 30.8 0% 0% 0% 6% 25% 32.0 0% 0% 0% 7% 25% 32.5 0% 0% 0% 8% 25% 33.1 0% 0% 0% 8% 25% 33.4 0% 0% 0% 8% 25%
SK 31.9 5% 11% 0% 3% 13% 28.5 3% 7% 0% 5% 13% 27.1 2% 5% 0% 7% 13% 25.9 2% 4% 0% 8% 13% 26.5 1% 2% 0% 10% 13%
NO 26.1 0% 0% 0% 18% 8% 29.4 0% 0% 0% 22% 8% 29.7 0% 0% 0% 22% 8% 31.7 0% 0% 0% 24% 8% 37.2 0% 0% 0% 29% 8%
SZ 19.6 0% 0% 0% 8% 12% 21.3 0% 0% 0% 10% 12% 22.9 0% 0% 0% 11% 12% 24.8 0% 0% 0% 13% 12% 27.3 0% 0% 0% 16% 12%
US 27.1 0% 0% 0% 19% 8% 27.9 0% 0% 0% 20% 8% 28.3 0% 0% 0% 21% 8% 28.7 0% 0% 0% 21% 8% 28.9 0% 0% 0% 21% 8%
JP 15.3 0% 0% 0% 5% 10% 15.8 0% 0% 0% 6% 10% 16.2 0% 0% 0% 6% 10% 16.9 0% 0% 0% 7% 10% 18.4 0% 0% 0% 8% 10%
A4.6    Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings from 0 to 200% of APW.
% of APW 33 50 67 100 150
Components METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC METRit = SA + HB + FB + IT  + SSC
BE 45.7 0% 0% 0% 30% 16% 45.0 0% 0% 0% 32% 13% 48.5 0% 0% 0% 34% 15% 50.8 0% 0% 0% 36% 15% 52.4 0% 0% 0% 38% 14%
DK 82.7 44% 8% 0% 15% 15% 70.0 29% 6% 0% 22% 13% 63.7 22% 4% 0% 26% 12% 59.4 14% 3% 0% 31% 11% 60.5 10% 2% 0% 38% 11%
DE 51.7 0% 11% 0% 20% 21% 51.3 0% 7% 0% 23% 21% 51.3 0% 5% 0% 25% 21% 51.4 0% 4% 0% 27% 21% 51.2 0% 2% 7% 23% 19%
GR 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 20.5 0% 0% 0% 5% 16%
ES 15.1 0% 0% 0% 9% 6% 12.2 0% 0% 0% 6% 6% 15.0 0% 0% 0% 9% 6% 19.8 0% 0% 0% 13% 6% 23.2 0% 0% 0% 17% 6%
FR 56.4 15% 23% 0% 5% 14% 43.2 10% 15% 0% 5% 14% 41.5 7% 11% 0% 9% 14% 37.3 5% 8% 0% 11% 13% 34.4 3% 5% 0% 13% 13%
IE 33.5 0% 0% 21% 12% 0% 28.9 0% 0% 14% 15% 0% 29.0 0% 0% 11% 16% 2% 29.3 0% 0% 7% 17% 5% 28.7 0% 0% 5% 19% 5%
IT 36.8 0% 0% 11% 17% 9% 44.4 0% 0% 16% 19% 9% 43.2 0% 0% 14% 20% 9% 44.0 0% 0% 11% 24% 9% 42.8 0% 0% 8% 26% 9%
LU 13.6 0% 0% 0% 0% 14% 13.7 0% 0% 0% 0% 14% 13.8 0% 0% 0% 0% 14% 17.6 0% 0% 0% 4% 14% 24.3 0% 0% 0% 10% 14%
NL 38.4 0% 6% 0% 3% 29% 34.9 0% 4% 0% 3% 28% 37.6 0% 3% 0% 4% 30% 40.2 0% 2% 0% 9% 29% 38.5 0% 1% 0% 18% 19%
AT 21.4 0% 0% 0% 3% 18% 20.2 0% 0% 0% 2% 18% 24.5 0% 0% 0% 6% 18% 29.8 0% 0% 0% 12% 18% 34.5 0% 0% 0% 16% 18%
PT 87.0 71% 0% 5% 0% 11% 72.6 58% 0% 3% 0% 11% 57.0 44% 0% 2% 0% 11% 45.6 29% 0% 2% 4% 11% 38.7 19% 0% 1% 7% 11%
FI 41.6 0% 24% 0% 12% 6% 37.5 0% 16% 0% 15% 6% 38.0 0% 12% 0% 20% 6% 40.3 0% 8% 0% 26% 7% 43.5 0% 5% 0% 32% 7%
SE 37.4 4% 7% 0% 20% 7% 36.6 3% 7% 0% 20% 7% 36.6 2% 5% 0% 22% 7% 36.5 1% 3% 0% 25% 7% 39.7 1% 2% 0% 30% 6%
UK 62.9 0% 11% 49% 0% 3% 48.5 0% 7% 32% 4% 5% 44.3 0% 5% 24% 8% 6% 40.3 0% 4% 16% 13% 8% 37.5 0% 2% 11% 16% 8%
CZ 31.3 0% 11% 3% 5% 13% 29.7 0% 12% 2% 3% 13% 29.6 0% 10% 1% 6% 13% 31.5 0% 7% 4% 8% 13% 30.5 0% 4% 3% 11% 13%
HU 20.5 0% 0% 0% 8% 12% 23.0 0% 0% 0% 10% 13% 27.4 0% 0% 0% 15% 12% 31.7 0% 0% 0% 19% 12% 39.8 0% 0% 0% 27% 13%
PL 54.3 0% 23% 0% 6% 25% 47.4 0% 15% 0% 7% 25% 44.1 0% 12% 0% 8% 25% 40.8 0% 8% 0% 8% 25% 41.0 0% 5% 2% 8% 25%
SK 81.0 45% 20% 0% 3% 13% 60.9 30% 13% 0% 5% 13% 51.4 22% 10% 0% 7% 13% 46.3 15% 7% 4% 8% 13% 40.1 10% 4% 3% 10% 13%
NO 26.1 0% 0% 0% 18% 8% 29.4 0% 0% 0% 22% 8% 29.7 0% 0% 0% 22% 8% 31.7 0% 0% 0% 24% 8% 37.2 0% 0% 0% 29% 8%
SZ 20.2 2% 1% 0% 6% 12% 21.1 1% 0% 0% 8% 12% 22.1 1% 0% 0% 10% 12% 24.2 0% 0% 0% 12% 12% 26.5 0% 0% 0% 14% 12%
US 26.8 10% 0% 0% 9% 8% 20.4 6% 0% 0% 6% 8% 21.8 5% 0% 0% 9% 8% 24.3 3% 0% 0% 13% 8% 26.0 2% 0% 0% 16% 8%
JP 36.2 24% 0% 0% 2% 10% 27.6 16% 0% 0% 2% 10% 23.8 12% 0% 0% 2% 10% 24.7 8% 0% 3% 4% 10% 23.3 5% 0% 2% 6% 10% 
      Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models. - 65 - 






(Marginal effective tax rate at different wage  levels, as wage increase by 1% of APW wage level) 
P o A P W 3 33 43 53 63 73 83 94 04 14 24 34 44 54 64 74 84 95 05 15 25 35 45 55 65 75 85 96 06 16 26 36 46 56 66 7
Column - METR
BE
Single -20 41 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 70 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 59 50 53 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54
S i n g l e W 2 C - 2 01 31 31 32 54 84 84 84 84 84 87 07 27 27 27 27 27 27 25 95 05 35 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 4
1 e a r n e r C - 1 62 92 92 93 03 23 23 23 23 23 26 06 26 26 26 26 26 26 24 63 43 83 83 83 83 83 84 34 54 54 54 54 54 54 5




Single 109 109 116 113 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 17 56 56 46 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 49 56
SingleW2C 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 111 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 106 -6 120 111 -16 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 60 67
1earnerC 104 104 109 106 106 106 106 106 106 107 107 112 107 107 112 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 115 105 105 105 105 110




Single 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 70 50 53 53 51 53 51 54 54 50 47 50 50 50 48 51 51 51
SingleW2C 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 -20 71 69 72 89 47 45 48 48 48
1earnerC 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 82 21 21 21 21 32 38 38 34 38 39 35 39




S i n g l e1 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 6
SingleW2C 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
1earnerC 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16




S i n g l e6666666668 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 6 2 6 2 6 2 6 2 6 2 6 2 6 2 6 2 6 2 6 2 8 3 3 3 3
S i n g l e W 2 C66666666666666666666666 1 0 1 9 8 9 8 9 866666666
1 e a r n e r C666666666666666666666666666666 1 3 2 6 2 6 2 6 2 6




Single 89 104 89 89 104 89 89 104 89 89 104 89 104 86 116 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 120 56 29 29 35 41 41 41 41
SingleW2C 84 96 84 84 96 84 84 96 84 84 96 84 96 84 84 96 84 84 96 84 84 96 84 84 96 84 120 100 88 88 100 88 82 58 46
1earnerC 91 107 91 91 107 91 91 107 91 91 107 91 107 91 91 107 91 91 107 91 91 107 91 91 120 59 120 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 30




S i n g l e 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 02 62 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 0 1 2 02 42 42 42 42 4
SingleW2C 0 0 36 50 50 50 58 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 120 62 62 62 62 62
1 e a r n e r C 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 6 800000 1 2 044444




S i n g l e1 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 16 36 37 32 62 64 42 64 42 62 64 42 62 63 03 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 2
S i n g l e W 2 C1 01 01 01 01 01 0 - 2 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 02 43 23 23 2 - 2 03 23 23 23 23 23 23 2 1 2 0
1 e a r n e r C1 01 01 01 01 01 0 - 2 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 03 62 62 64 42 62 63 06 13 23 23 2 - 2 03 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 2




Single 109 109 109 108 109 109 109 108 109 120 14 26 26 27 27 26 27 28 27 29 29 27 29 27 30 31 29 31 31 29 31 32 31 32 31
S i n g l e W 2 C 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 2 01 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 4
1earnerC 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 120 14 14 14 14




Single 100 100 100 110 62 63 102 65 65 120 25 99 94 25 113 120 45 120 110 45 120 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
S i n g l e W 2 C 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 5 2 21 84 42 42 68 46 56 58 97 94 19 09 44 19 49 64 18 78 44 18 58 64 18 68 94 1
1earnerC 100 100 100 78 120 100 100 100 100 100 120 100 100 100 98 69 69 93 84 45 95 98 45 98 100 45 92 88 45 89 91 45 91 93 45




S i n g l e 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 06 01 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 83 83 93 94 84 84 85 05 14 83 73 73 73 73 7
S i n g l e W 2 C 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 07 31 81 81 81 83 83 93 94 84 84 85 05 14 83 73 73 73 73 7
1earnerC 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 31 18 18 18 18 18 18 45 51 48 37 37 37 37 37
1earnerC2C 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 62 37 37 37 37
2earnerC_67 0
2earnerC2C_67 0 - 66 - 








(Marginal effective tax rate at different wage  levels, as wage increase by 1% of APW wage level) 
PoAPW 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100
Column - METR
BE
Single 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 61 62 62 63 66 67 67 67 64 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55
S i n g l e W 2 C5 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 46 16 26 26 36 66 66 66 66 35 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 5
1earnerC 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 46 48 48 48 48 55 57 57 57 60 60 60 60 57 50 50 50 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
1earnerC2C 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 46 48 48 48 48 55 57 57 57 59 59 59 59 57 50 50 50 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
2 e a r n e r C _ 6 73 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 94 24 24 24 24 24 44 95 15 45 45 65 65 65 75 74 94 74 74 74 84 84 63 94 0 - 2 0
2 e a r n e r C 2 C _ 6 73 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 94 24 24 24 24 24 44 95 15 45 45 65 65 65 65 64 94 74 74 74 84 84 63 94 0 - 2 0
DK
Single 56 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
S i n g l e W 2 C6 76 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 15 95 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 0
1earnerC 110 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 -8 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
1 e a r n e r C 2 C 1 1 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 1 0 4 1 0 4 1 0 5 - 25 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 14 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 5
2earnerC_67 120 68 68 96 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 25 45 45 45 45 45 45 51 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
2earnerC2C_67 120 74 74 101 110 110 110 110 110 104 103 103 103 103 103 104 22 56 56 56 56 56 61 56 56 51 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
DE
Single 51 49 52 52 49 52 52 52 50 53 53 53 51 54 54 51 54 55 55 52 55 55 56 53 56 56 56 53 57 57 54 57 57 58
S i n g l e W 2 C4 84 64 84 84 64 94 94 94 75 05 05 04 85 05 14 85 15 25 65 35 75 75 45 15 45 45 45 25 55 55 25 55 55 5
1earnerC 39 35 39 39 36 39 40 40 44 44 40 45 44 41 45 45 45 41 45 45 45 41 49 50 50 46 51 51 46 51 56 53 52 48
1earnerC2C 60 57 61 61 69 61 62 62 66 66 74 67 67 96 45 45 45 41 45 45 45 41 45 45 45 41 46 46 41 46 50 51 51 46
2 e a r n e r C _ 6 7 0 0 01 82 22 22 32 31 92 32 3 1 2 04 04 44 44 04 54 54 54 14 54 54 54 14 54 84 65 05 05 05 65 15 65 5
2earnerC2C_67 0 0 0 40 44 55 55 45 52 45 57 120 62 67 67 74 100 45 45 41 45 45 45 41 45 45 41 45 45 45 50 46 50 50
GR
Single 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 18 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 23 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
S i n g l e W 2 C1 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 9
1earnerC 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 18 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 23 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
1earnerC2C 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 19
2 e a r n e r C _ 6 71 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 6
2 e a r n e r C 2 C _ 6 71 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 6
ES
Single 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 32 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
SingleW2C 6 6 6 6 6 21 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 25 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 26 29 29 29 29 29
1earnerC 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 25 23 23 23 28 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
1earnerC2C 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 24 26 25 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
2 e a r n e r C _ 6 72 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 52 32 32 32 82 1 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
2 e a r n e r C 2 C _ 6 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 62 42 62 52 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 0 6 6 6 6 6
FR
Single 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 35 35 35 35 35 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
S i n g l e W 2 C4 65 84 64 65 84 64 65 84 64 65 84 64 65 84 64 67 34 54 55 84 54 5 1 2 02 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 1
1earnerC 30 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 53 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
1earnerC2C 88 100 88 88 100 88 88 100 88 88 100 80 46 58 46 46 73 45 45 58 45 45 120 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
2 e a r n e r C _ 6 76 62 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 1 - 2 01 61 61 61 61 61 61 64 82 32 37 02 52 52 52 52 5
2earnerC2C_67 120 99 87 87 99 87 87 99 87 87 99 80 45 58 45 45 58 -20 40 52 40 40 52 112 16 16 16 16 63 18 18 18 18 18
IE
S i n g l e2 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 4 1 2 02 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 6
S i n g l e W 2 C6 26 25 85 45 45 45 45 45 45 4 1 2 05 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 6 1 2 02 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 6
1 e a r n e r C 4 41 52 42 42 42 42 42 42 4 1 2 02 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 6
1 e a r n e r C 2 C6 26 26 26 26 26 26 2 1 2 0 4 4 1 2 0 6 6 6 6 6 6 61 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 6
2earnerC_67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
2earnerC2C_67 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 70 86 86 35 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
IT
Single 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 120 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
SingleW2C 120 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 120 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 120 39 39 39 39 39
1 e a r n e r C3 23 29 13 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 2 1 2 03 9 1 2 03 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 99 83 93 93 9
1 e a r n e r C 2 C3 23 23 23 23 2 1 2 03 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 2 1 2 03 93 93 93 9 1 2 03 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 9 1 2 0
2 e a r n e r C _ 6 71 01 06 91 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 0 1 2 01 09 91 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 06 91 03 15 1
2 e a r n e r C 2 C _ 6 71 01 01 01 01 0 1 2 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 0 1 2 01 01 01 01 0 1 2 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 0 1 2 0
LU
Single 31 32 32 32 34 34 32 34 34 33 36 36 34 36 34 36 38 36 38 38 36 38 39 37 40 40 37 40 37 42 42 39 42 42
S i n g l e W 2 C1 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 4
1earnerC 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 17 26 27 27 26 27 27 26 27 27 26 27 27 26 29 27 29 29 27 29 29
1 e a r n e r C 2 C 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 2 01 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 4
2 e a r n e r C _ 6 71 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 4
2 e a r n e r C 2 C _ 6 71 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 4
NL
Single 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 48 49 49 46 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
S i n g l e W 2 C4 18 98 94 1 1 2 04 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 4 1 1 04 54 24 14 14 14 14 44 54 54 54 5
1earnerC 45 93 93 45 68 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 48 49 49 46 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
1 e a r n e r C 2 C4 59 39 34 5 1 2 04 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 8 1 1 44 94 64 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 5
2 e a r n e r C _ 6 73 68 58 53 66 03 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 22 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 5
2 e a r n e r C 2 C _ 6 73 68 58 53 6 1 2 03 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 6 - 1 13 63 63 63 63 63 29 02 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 5
AT
Single 37 37 39 41 40 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 40 41 41 41 41 41 42 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43
S i n g l e W 2 C3 73 73 94 14 04 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 04 14 14 14 14 14 24 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 3
1earnerC 37 37 39 41 40 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 40 41 41 41 41 41 42 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43
1earnerC2C 37 37 39 41 40 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 40 41 41 41 41 41 42 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43
2 e a r n e r C _ 6 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 01 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 71 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 8
2 e a r n e r C 2 C _ 6 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 01 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 71 81 8 1 2 01 81 81 81 81 8  - 67 - 








(Marginal effective tax rate at different wage  levels, as wage increase by 1% of APW wage level) 
P o A P W 3 33 43 53 63 73 83 94 04 14 24 34 44 54 64 74 84 95 05 15 25 35 45 55 65 75 85 96 06 16 26 36 46 56 66 7
Column - METR
PT
S i n g l e5 65 55 65 55 65 65 55 55 65 55 62 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 12 22 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 3
SingleW2C 56 55 55 56 55 56 55 55 56 55 56 55 55 56 56 55 56 55 56 56 55 55 56 55 56 55 55 56 55 56 55 56 55 55 55
1earnerC 56 55 55 56 55 56 55 55 56 55 55 56 55 55 56 55 56 56 55 56 55 55 56 55 55 56 55 55 56 55 56 55 55 55 56




S i n g l e5 45 07 25 05 07 25 05 07 24 94 76 96 25 98 26 06 18 36 08 36 06 0 1 2 03 73 94 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 1
SingleW2C 46 46 64 46 46 64 46 46 64 45 42 60 57 56 74 56 56 74 56 78 58 58 79 58 60 82 63 63 86 64 64 86 64 64 88
1earnerC 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 68 83 60 61 83 61 84 61 61 84 61 63 88 64 65 88 66 68 94 68 69 95




Single 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 69 36 37 32 37 37 37 36 32 37 37 37 39 35 37 39 38 37 35 37
SingleW2C 25 25 23 27 26 25 25 23 25 25 26 27 23 32 33 35 36 45 52 57 57 57 56 52 57 57 57 59 55 57 59 58 57 55 57
1earnerC 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 55 35 37




S i n g l e7 37 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 66 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 2
S i n g l e W 2 C8 87 87 87 82 91 0 - 2 07 27 58 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 9
1earnerC 73 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 70




S i n g l e4 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 62 82 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 6
SingleW2C 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 83 13 13 12 17 26 26 26 26 38 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
1 e a r n e r C 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 09 22 62 62 62 62 62 62 63 84 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 1




S i n g l e2 12 02 12 02 43 13 13 03 13 03 03 13 03 13 03 13 13 94 04 14 04 14 04 0 1 2 04 04 04 14 04 04 14 04 04 04 1
SingleW2C 13 12 13 13 12 13 13 12 13 13 12 13 12 12 13 13 12 12 13 13 12 13 12 12 120 12 12 13 12 12 12 13 12 12 34
1earnerC 21 20 21 20 24 31 31 30 31 30 30 31 30 31 30 31 31 39 40 41 40 41 40 40 120 40 40 41 40 40 41 40 40 40 41




S i n g l e2 53 13 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 4
SingleW2C 100 100 100 100 100 100 62 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 120 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
1 e a r n e r C 1 0 0 1 0 06 52 52 52 52 5 1 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 08 92 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 83 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 4




S i n g l e3 83 84 34 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 62 7
SingleW2C 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 75 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
1earnerC 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100




Single 72 73 74 68 77 120 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 36 36
SingleW2C 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 58 63 63
1 e a r n e r C7 27 37 46 87 77 87 97 28 18 3 1 2 03 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 63 6




Single 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 23 21 39 21 21 23 21 23 26 23 23 23 26 23 23 26 23 23
SingleW2C 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 57 20 19 19 35 21 20 20
1earnerC 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 89 20 21 22 22 22




Single 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 120 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
SingleW2C 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 29 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 51 64 120 64 64 106 46 46 46
1earnerC 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 36 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 120 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29




S i n g l e9 39 39 39 39 39 38 11 61 61 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 7
SingleW2C 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 67 17 17 17 17 17
1earnerC 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 67 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
1earnerC2C 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93
2earnerC_67 120
2earnerC2C_67 93 - 68 - 







(Marginal effective tax rate at different wage  levels, as wage increase by 1% of APW wage level) 
PoAPW 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100
Column - METR
PT
Single 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
S i n g l e W 2 C5 55 55 55 65 55 65 55 55 55 65 55 55 55 55 55 65 55 65 55 5 1 2 03 01 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 1
1 e a r n e r C5 65 55 55 65 55 55 55 55 6 1 2 06 86 76 86 76 86 86 76 76 76 86 84 22 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 3
1 e a r n e r C 2 C5 65 55 55 55 55 65 55 55 55 65 65 55 55 55 55 65 65 55 55 5 1 2 05 55 55 55 65 55 55 65 55 55 65 66 86 8
2 e a r n e r C _ 6 78 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 23 91 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 17 41 51 51 5
2 e a r n e r C 2 C _ 6 78 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 2 1 2 08 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 2
FI
Single 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 44 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
S i n g l e W 2 C8 86 46 48 86 56 58 96 56 68 96 66 89 67 17 29 87 27 25 84 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 7
1earnerC 95 69 69 96 69 69 73 41 41 41 41 44 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
1 e a r n e r C 2 C8 56 36 38 66 36 48 86 66 69 26 77 09 97 37 39 97 47 4 1 0 17 47 4 1 0 27 55 54 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 7
2 e a r n e r C _ 6 76 03 33 36 03 33 33 71 52 72 21 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 92 12 72 72 72 72 72 72 7
2 e a r n e r C 2 C _ 6 74 92 72 75 02 72 85 24 05 27 24 54 57 14 54 57 24 64 67 34 64 67 44 72 71 91 92 12 72 72 72 72 72 72 7
SE
Single 37 37 38 40 34 37 39 38 37 39 34 37 41 37 37 35 37 37 38 39 34 39 37 35 35 31 35 35 35 35 36 31 35 35
S i n g l e W 2 C5 75 75 86 05 45 75 95 85 75 95 45 76 15 75 75 55 75 75 85 95 45 95 75 55 55 15 55 55 55 55 65 15 55 5
1earnerC 37 37 38 40 34 37 39 38 37 39 34 37 41 37 37 35 37 37 38 39 34 39 37 35 35 31 35 35 35 35 36 31 35 35
1 e a r n e r C 2 C 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 08 55 75 95 85 75 95 45 76 15 74 03 53 73 73 83 93 43 93 73 53 53 13 53 53 53 53 63 13 53 5
2earnerC_67 9 4 9 4 9 9 8 33 35 30 33 34 33 33 30 33 34 35 33 30 33 33 34 33 30 33 35 34 33 31 22 27 26 25
2earnerC2C_67 -20 24 29 24 29 29 28 53 55 50 53 54 53 53 50 53 54 55 53 50 53 53 54 53 50 53 55 54 53 51 42 47 46 45
UK
Single 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
SingleW2C 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 -20 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 93 69 69 69 69 69
1earnerC 70 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
1earnerC2C 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 -20 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 97 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69
2 e a r n e r C _ 6 70 3 80000000000000000000002 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 2
2 e a r n e r C 2 C _ 6 71 96 08 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 47 15 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 65 96 05 95 96 06 21 01 01 01 0
CZ
Single 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
SingleW2C 41 41 41 41 41 112 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 36
1earnerC 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 30 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 28
1 e a r n e r C 2 C2 62 62 62 62 63 33 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 8 1 1 33 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 8
2 e a r n e r C _ 6 73 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 11 71 2 1 2 01 21 31 72 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 6
2 e a r n e r C 2 C _ 6 71 21 21 31 31 82 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 7 1 2 02 72 7 1 0 22 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 7
HU
Single 41 40 40 40 40 40 40 41 40 40 40 41 40 40 40 41 40 40 41 40 41 40 41 40 40 41 40 40 41 40 40 41 41 41
S i n g l e W 2 C3 44 14 04 14 14 04 14 04 14 14 04 14 04 04 04 14 04 04 14 14 04 04 14 04 04 14 04 04 14 04 14 04 14 1
1earnerC 41 40 40 40 40 40 40 41 40 40 40 41 40 40 40 41 40 40 41 40 41 40 41 40 40 41 40 40 41 40 40 41 41 41
1 e a r n e r C 2 C3 44 14 04 14 14 04 14 04 14 14 04 14 04 04 04 14 04 04 14 14 04 04 14 04 04 14 04 04 14 04 14 04 14 1
2 e a r n e r C _ 6 72 12 12 02 12 02 12 02 12 02 02 12 02 12 02 02 12 02 02 02 02 12 02 12 02 02 12 02 12 02 02 12 02 12 0
2 e a r n e r C 2 C _ 6 72 12 02 02 12 02 12 02 02 12 02 12 02 02 12 02 12 02 02 12 02 12 02 02 12 02 12 02 02 02 02 12 02 02 1
PL
Single 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
S i n g l e W 2 C3 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 4
1earnerC 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
1earnerC2C 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 120 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
2 e a r n e r C _ 6 71 51 51 51 51 52 03 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 4
2earnerC2C_67 15 15 15 15 15 20 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 120 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
SK
Single 27 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
S i n g l e W 2 C4 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 62 92 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 3
1earnerC 100 100 90 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 29 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
1earnerC2C 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 59 46 31 23 23 23 23
2 e a r n e r C _ 6 7 1 0 0 1 0 06 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 82 01 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 3 1 2 01 31 31 3
2earnerC2C_67 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99 38 34 13 13 13 13 120 13 13 13
NO
Single 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
S i n g l e W 2 C6 36 36 36 36 35 55 55 76 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 5 1 2 03 63 63 63 63 63 6
1earnerC 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
1 e a r n e r C 2 C3 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 6
2 e a r n e r C _ 6 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 02 52 52 53 43 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 6
2 e a r n e r C 2 C _ 6 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 02 52 52 53 43 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 6
SZ
Single 23 26 23 23 26 25 25 27 26 27 29 27 27 30 27 27 30 27 27 29 27 27 30 27 27 27 30 27 27 32 29 29 32 29
S i n g l e W 2 C2 02 02 02 12 02 02 02 22 12 12 12 32 12 12 12 12 32 12 32 32 52 32 32 32 52 32 52 52 52 72 52 52 52 7
1earnerC 22 24 22 22 22 22 24 22 22 22 22 24 22 22 22 22 26 23 24 23 24 23 26 24 25 24 25 27 24 25 24 25 26 25
1 e a r n e r C 2 C9 01 92 32 02 02 12 02 02 02 02 22 22 22 22 22 42 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 42 22 32 32 32 42 32 4
2earnerC_67 -20 20 19 24 20 20 21 21 22 22 22 24 22 22 22 22 24 22 22 22 22 22 24 22 22 22 24 26 23 24 23 24 26 24
2 e a r n e r C 2 C _ 6 71 81 71 71 71 92 01 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 92 02 42 02 02 02 22 22 22 22 22 22 42 22 22 22 22 22 22 2
US
Single 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
S i n g l e W 2 C4 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 65 05 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 1
1earnerC 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
1earnerC2C 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 120 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 51
2 e a r n e r C _ 6 72 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 51 41 41 41 41 72 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 9
2 e a r n e r C 2 C _ 6 76 46 46 46 46 46 4 63 13 13 13 1 1 2 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 11 41 41 41 4 5 4
JP
Single 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 18 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 21 22 22 22 22 22
S i n g l e W 2 C1 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 81 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 9
1earnerC 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 18 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
1earnerC2C 93 93 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 25 13 13 13 15 17 17 18 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
2earnerC_67 120 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 13 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
2earnerC2C_67 93 93 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 80 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
 Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models. - 69 - 
Figure A1 - Unemployment and inactivity trap indicators - 2001 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































METR (UT) 67% (2001) METR (UT) 100% (2001)
METR (IT) (2001)
 
*The curves are calculated for three different points of departure: 
  Metr(UT)100= for an unemployed person (with UB based on previous work=100% of APW) 
  Metr(UT)67= for an unemployed person (with UB based on previous work= 67% of APW) 
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Figure A2 - Unemployment and inactivity trap indicators - 2001 
METRs  for  transitions from unemployment or inactivity to work, at different wage levels* 
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*The curves are calculated for three different points of departure: 
  Metr(UT)100= for an unemployed person (with UB based on previous work=100% of APW) 
  Metr(UT)67= for an unemployed person (with UB based on previous work= 67% of APW) 
  Metr(IT)= for an inactive person moving from social assistance to work - 72 - 
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Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models. - 73 - 
Figure A3 - Unemployment and inactivity trap indicators - 2001 
METRs  for  transitions from unemployment or inactivity to work, at different wage levels* 
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*The curves are calculated for three different points of departure: 
  Metr(UT)100= for an unemployed person (with UB based on previous work=100% of APW) 
  Metr(UT)67= for an unemployed person (with UB based on previous work= 67% of APW) 
  Metr(IT)= for an inactive person moving from social assistance to work - 74 - 
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Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models. - 75 - 
Figure A4 - Unemployment and inactivity trap indicators - 2001 
METRs  for  transitions from unemployment or inactivity to work, at different wage levels* 
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*The curves are calculated for three different points of departure: 
  Metr(UT)100= for an unemployed person (with UB based on previous work=100% of APW) 
  Metr(UT)67= for an unemployed person (with UB based on previous work= 67% of APW) 
  Metr(IT)= for an inactive person moving from social assistance to work - 76 - 
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Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models. - 77 - 
Figure A5 - Unemployment and inactivity trap indicators - 2001 
METRs  for  transitions from unemployment or inactivity to work, at different wage levels* 
 
Belgium: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Denmark: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Germany: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Greece: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 






















































METR (UT) 67% (2001) METR (UT) 100% (2001)
METR (IT) (2001)
Spain: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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France: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Ireland: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Italy: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Luxembourg: Two-earner couple without children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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Netherlands: Two-earner couple without children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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*The curves are calculated for three different points of departure: 
  Metr(UT)100= for an unemployed person (with UB based on previous work=100% of APW) 
  Metr(UT)67= for an unemployed person (with UB based on previous work= 67% of APW) 
  Metr(IT)= for an inactive person moving from social assistance to work - 78 - 
 
 
Austria: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Portugal: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Finland: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Sweden: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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United Kingdom: Two-earner couple without children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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Czech Republic: Two-earner couple without children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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Hungary: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Poland: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Slovak Republic: Two-earner couple without children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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United States: Two-earner couple without children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models. - 79 - 
Figure A6 - Unemployment and inactivity trap indicators - 2001 
METRs  for  transitions from unemployment or inactivity to work, at different wage levels* 
 
Belgium: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Denmark: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Germany: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Greece: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Spain: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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France: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Ireland: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Italy: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Luxembourg: Two-earner couple with 2 children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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Netherlands: Two-earner couple with 2 children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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*The curves are calculated for three different points of departure: 
  Metr(UT)100= for an unemployed person (with UB based on previous work=100% of APW) 
  Metr(UT)67= for an unemployed person (with UB based on previous work= 67% of APW) 




Austria: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 






















































METR (UT) 67% (2001) METR (UT) 100% (2001)
METR (IT) (2001)
Portugal: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Finland: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Sweden: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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United Kingdom: Two-earner couple with 2 children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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Czech Republic: Two-earner couple with 2 children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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Hungary: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Poland: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Slovak Republic: Two-earner couple with 2 children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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METR (IT) (2001)
United States: Two-earner couple with 2 children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models. 









METRs calculated on gross wage  
and on labour cost 
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Table B1  -    Employers ' Social security contributions
(2001)
as % of Growss wage           as % of Labour cost  *
% of APW 50% 67% 100% 150% 50% 67% 100% 150%
BE 49% 30% 31% 32% 33% 23% 24% 24%
DK 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 0%
DE 21% 21% 21% 19% 17% 17% 17% 16%
GR 28% 28% 28% 28% 22% 22% 22% 22%
ES 31% 31% 31% 31% 23% 23% 23% 23%
FR 23% 29% 41% 41% 19% 22% 29% 29%
IE 9% 8% 12% 12% 8% 8% 11% 11%
IT 34% 34% 34% 34% 25% 25% 25% 25%
LU 14% 14% 14% 14% 12% 12% 12% 12%
NL 15% 16% 16% 10% 13% 14% 14% 9%
AT 22% 22% 22% 22% 18% 18% 18% 18%
PT 24% 24% 24% 24% 19% 19% 19% 19%
FI 25% 25% 25% 25% 20% 20% 20% 20%
SE 33% 33% 33% 33% 25% 25% 25% 25%
UK 6% 8% 9% 10% 6% 7% 8% 9%
CZ 35% 35% 35% 35% 26% 26% 26% 26%
HU 34% 34% 34% 34% 25% 25% 25% 25%
PL 20% 20% 20% 20% 17% 17% 17% 17%
SK 38% 38% 38% 38% 28% 28% 28% 28%
NO 13% 13% 13% 13% 11% 11% 11% 11%
SZ 12% 12% 12% 12% 10% 10% 10% 10%
US 8% 8% 8% 8% 7% 7% 7% 7%
JP 11% 11% 11% 11% 10% 10% 10% 10%
* Labour cost= Gross wage + Employers Social Security Contributions  
Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models. 
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Table B2                      Low-wage trap indicator 
 
Marginal effective tax rates calculated on gross wage (GW) and labour cost (LC)
METR lw
% of APW
GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC
BE -20.0 -20.0 71.6 83.5 53.7 65.6 55.1 66.7 55.5 67.0
DK 108.7 108.7 44.9 44.9 56.0 56.0 50.4 50.4 63.5 63.5
DE 100.0 100.0 70.3 75.3 51.2 59.5 57.5 64.8 59.4 64.0
GR 15.9 34.3 15.9 34.3 15.9 34.3 28.5 44.1 41.1 54.0
ES 6.4 28.3 23.2 41.2 33.1 48.8 28.8 45.5 32.9 48.6
FR 88.9 90.9 17.5 33.0 41.2 70.9 33.9 53.2 36.5 53.9
IE 100.0 100.0 20.0 26.3 24.0 30.0 26.0 33.9 47.9 53.4
IT 10.0 32.8 26.4 45.0 31.8 49.1 39.1 54.5 39.1 54.5
LU 109.2 108.1 27.7 36.5 30.7 39.1 41.6 48.7 52.7 58.4
NL 100.0 100.0 120.0 117.8 44.9 53.5 45.0 51.0 42.0 42.0
AT 100.0 100.0 18.1 32.7 36.9 48.1 42.7 52.9 49.9 58.8
PT 55.5 64.0 11.0 28.1 23.0 37.8 25.0 39.4 35.0 47.5
FI 54.4 63.5 82.7 86.2 41.1 52.9 46.8 57.4 52.5 62.0
SE 100.0 100.0 37.3 52.8 37.2 52.7 35.2 51.2 51.6 63.5
UK 72.6 75.5 76.2 78.7 32.0 39.2 32.0 39.2 32.0 39.2
CZ 45.8 59.9 45.8 59.9 25.6 44.9 30.0 48.1 30.0 48.1
HU 20.5 40.7 38.6 54.2 40.5 55.6 40.5 55.6 50.5 63.1
PL 25.0 37.7 34.2 45.3 34.2 45.3 34.2 45.3 34.2 45.3
Marginal effective tax rates calculated on gross wage (GW) and labour cost (LC)
METR lw
% of APW
GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC
BE -20.0 -20.0 71.6 83.5 53.7 65.6 55.1 66.7 55.5 67.0
DK 105.2 105.2 105.2 105.2 66.8 66.8 50.4 50.4 63.5 63.5
DE 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 47.9 56.8 55.4 63.0 51.8 57.2
GR 15.9 34.3 15.9 34.3 15.9 34.3 19.3 36.9 41.1 54.0
ES 6.4 28.3 6.4 28.3 6.4 28.3 28.8 45.5 28.8 45.5
FR 83.7 86.8 83.7 86.8 46.3 73.4 21.1 44.2 40.0 56.5
IE 0.0 7.8 60.0 63.1 62.4 65.3 26.0 33.9 47.9 53.4
IT 10.0 32.8 10.0 32.8 120.0 120.0 39.1 54.5 39.1 54.5
LU 110.3 109.1 120.0 120.0 14.0 24.4 14.0 24.4 49.2 55.3
NL 100.0 100.0 88.6 90.4 40.6 49.8 45.0 51.0 42.0 42.0
AT 100.0 100.0 18.1 32.7 36.9 48.1 42.7 52.9 49.9 58.8
PT 55.5 64.0 55.5 64.0 55.5 64.0 11.0 28.1 35.0 47.5
FI 45.5 56.4 74.3 79.5 87.7 90.1 46.8 57.4 52.5 62.0
SE 25.5 43.9 44.9 58.6 57.2 67.8 55.2 66.3 51.6 63.5
UK 88.2 89.5 89.3 90.4 89.3 90.4 69.4 72.7 32.0 39.2
CZ 100.0 100.0 17.3 38.7 40.9 56.2 36.0 52.6 30.0 48.1
HU 12.5 34.7 12.5 34.7 34.5 51.1 40.5 55.6 50.5 63.1
PL 100.0 100.0 34.2 45.3 34.2 45.3 34.2 45.3 34.2 45.3
Marginal effective tax rates calculated on gross wage (GW) and labour cost (LC)
METR lw
% of APW
GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC
BE -15.9 13.8 62.3 78.2 45.1 59.2 51.0 63.6 55.5 67.0
DK 104.1 104.1 115.6 115.6 110.4 110.4 44.9 44.9 63.5 63.5
DE 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 38.9 49.3 47.5 56.5 45.4 51.6
GR 15.9 34.3 15.9 34.3 15.9 34.3 28.5 44.1 41.1 54.0
ES 6.4 28.3 6.4 28.3 26.4 43.7 28.8 45.5 32.9 48.6
FR 90.8 92.5 90.8 92.5 29.7 65.2 28.4 49.3 30.4 49.4
IE 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 4.0 11.5 26.0 33.9 25.9 33.8
IT 10.0 32.8 26.4 45.0 31.8 49.1 39.1 54.5 39.1 54.5
LU 110.4 109.1 110.4 109.1 14.0 24.4 28.7 37.4 36.1 43.8
NL 100.0 100.0 92.9 94.0 44.9 53.5 45.0 51.0 42.0 42.0
AT 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 36.9 48.1 42.7 52.9 49.9 58.8
PT 55.5 64.0 55.5 64.0 55.5 64.0 23.0 37.8 25.0 39.4
FI 100.0 100.0 83.3 86.6 95.4 96.4 46.8 57.4 52.5 62.0
SE 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 37.2 52.7 35.2 51.2 51.6 63.5
UK 72.6 75.5 76.2 78.7 69.9 73.1 32.0 39.2 32.0 39.2
CZ 100.0 100.0 25.6 44.9 41.1 56.4 27.6 46.3 30.0 48.1
HU 20.5 40.7 38.6 54.2 40.5 55.6 40.5 55.6 50.5 63.1
PL 100.0 100.0 25.0 37.7 34.2 45.3 34.2 45.3 34.2 45.3
Single person (2001)
33 50 67 100 150
Single parent with 2 children (2001)
33 50 67 100 150
One-earner couple, without children (2001)
33 50 67 100 150
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Marginal effective tax rates calculated on gross wage (GW) and labour cost (LC)
METR lw
% of APW
GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC
BE -20.0 -20.0 62.3 78.2 45.1 59.2 51.0 63.6 55.5 67.0
DK 99.7 99.7 99.7 99.7 116.1 116.1 44.9 44.9 63.5 63.5
DE 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 60.4 67.2 46.1 55.3 45.3 51.5
GR 15.9 34.3 15.9 34.3 15.9 34.3 19.3 36.9 41.1 54.0
ES 106.4 104.9 6.4 28.3 6.4 28.3 23.2 41.2 28.8 45.5
FR 83.7 86.8 83.7 86.8 88.2 94.2 21.1 44.2 24.6 45.2
IE 100.0 100.0 60.0 63.1 61.6 64.6 26.0 33.9 25.9 33.8
IT 10.0 32.8 10.0 32.8 31.8 49.1 120.0 120.0 39.1 54.5
LU 110.4 109.1 110.4 109.1 110.3 109.1 14.0 24.4 36.1 43.8
NL 100.0 100.0 92.9 94.0 44.9 53.5 45.0 51.0 42.0 42.0
AT 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 36.9 48.1 42.7 52.9 49.9 58.8
PT 55.5 64.0 55.5 64.0 55.5 64.0 67.5 73.7 25.0 39.4
FI 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 85.3 88.2 46.8 57.4 52.5 62.0
SE 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 35.2 51.2 51.6 63.5
UK 88.2 89.5 89.3 90.4 89.3 90.4 69.4 72.7 32.0 39.2
CZ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 25.6 44.9 37.7 53.8 30.0 48.1
HU 12.5 34.7 12.5 34.7 34.5 51.1 40.5 55.6 50.5 63.1
PL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 34.2 45.3 34.2 45.3 34.2 45.3
Marginal effective tax rates calculated on gross wage (GW) and labour cost (LC)
METR lw
% of APW
GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC
BE -20.0 -20.0 72.3 84.0 55.5 67.0 55.5 67.0 55.5 67.0
DK 44.9 44.9 44.9 44.9 56.0 56.0 50.4 50.4 63.5 63.5
DE 55.5 63.0 54.2 62.0 51.2 59.5 54.2 62.0 45.1 51.3
GR 15.9 34.3 15.9 34.3 15.9 34.3 28.5 44.1 41.1 54.0
ES 6.3 28.3 23.2 41.2 33.1 48.8 28.8 45.5 32.9 48.6
FR 24.8 38.9 24.8 38.9 34.8 67.7 33.9 53.2 30.4 49.4
IE 20.0 26.3 20.0 26.3 24.0 30.0 26.0 33.9 47.9 53.4
IT 51.1 63.4 26.4 45.0 31.8 49.1 39.1 54.5 39.1 54.5
LU 14.0 24.4 26.9 35.7 30.6 39.0 34.2 42.2 41.6 48.7
NL 24.6 34.4 44.9 53.5 44.9 53.5 45.0 51.0 42.0 42.0
AT 18.1 32.7 18.1 32.7 36.9 48.1 42.7 52.9 49.9 58.8
PT 14.6 31.0 14.6 31.0 23.0 37.8 23.0 37.8 25.0 39.4
FI 27.0 41.6 37.3 49.9 41.1 52.9 46.8 57.4 52.5 62.0
SE 25.5 43.9 37.3 52.8 37.2 52.7 35.2 51.2 51.6 63.5
UK 21.8 30.1 32.0 39.2 32.0 39.2 32.0 39.2 32.0 39.2
CZ 25.6 44.9 25.6 44.9 25.6 44.9 30.0 48.1 30.0 48.1
HU 20.5 40.7 38.6 54.2 40.5 55.6 40.5 55.6 50.5 63.1
PL 34.2 45.3 34.2 45.3 34.2 45.3 34.2 45.3 34.2 45.3
Marginal effective tax rates calculated on gross wage (GW) and labour cost (LC)
METR lw
% of APW
GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC
BE -20.0 -20.0 72.3 84.0 55.5 67.0 55.5 67.0 55.5 67.0
DK 44.9 44.9 44.9 44.9 56.0 56.0 50.4 50.4 63.5 63.5
DE 50.2 58.7 52.4 60.5 51.0 59.4 54.0 61.9 42.4 49.0
GR 15.9 34.3 15.9 34.3 15.9 34.3 19.3 36.9 41.1 54.0
ES 6.3 28.3 6.3 28.3 26.4 43.7 28.8 45.5 32.9 48.6
FR 17.5 33.0 17.5 33.0 29.3 65.0 28.4 49.3 30.4 49.4
IE 20.0 26.3 20.0 26.3 24.0 30.0 26.0 33.9 47.9 53.4
IT 120.0 120.0 26.4 45.0 31.8 49.1 39.1 54.5 39.1 54.5
LU 14.0 24.4 13.9 24.4 13.9 24.4 34.2 42.2 41.6 48.7
NL 24.6 34.4 44.9 53.5 44.9 53.5 45.0 51.0 42.0 42.0
AT 18.1 32.7 18.1 32.7 36.9 48.1 42.7 52.9 49.9 58.8
PT 82.2 85.6 11.0 28.1 11.0 28.1 23.0 37.8 25.0 39.4
FI 27.0 41.6 37.3 49.9 41.1 52.9 46.8 57.4 52.5 62.0
SE 45.5 58.9 37.3 52.8 37.2 52.7 35.2 51.2 51.6 63.5
UK 10.0 19.6 32.0 39.2 32.0 39.2 32.0 39.2 32.0 39.2
CZ 26.7 45.7 30.7 48.7 25.6 44.9 25.6 44.9 30.0 48.1
HU 20.5 40.7 38.6 54.2 40.5 55.6 40.5 55.6 50.5 63.1
PL 34.2 45.3 34.2 45.3 34.2 45.3 34.2 45.3 34.2 45.3
One-earner couple, with 2 children (2001)
33 50 67 100 150
Two-earner couple without children. Principal earner with 67% of APW. 
Secondary earner earnings from 0 to 200% of APW. (2001)
33 50 67 100 150
Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal earner with 67% of APW. 
Secondary earner earnings from 0 to 200% of APW. (2001)
33 50 67 100 150
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Table B3                            Unemployment trap indicator 
 
Unemployment trap indicators calculated on gross wage (GW) and labour cost (LC)
METR ut (Previous work 67%)
% of APW
GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC
BE 100 100 89 91 78 84 71 78
DK 107 107 91 91 78 78 73 73
DE 100 100 88 90 77 81 70 75
GR 101 101 79 84 60 69 50 61
ES 100 100 81 86 65 73 53 64
FR 103 103 87 90 70 79 59 71
IE 87 88 73 75 59 63 54 59
IT 69 77 60 70 53 65 49 62
LU 107 106 88 89 71 74 63 67
NL 93 94 85 87 72 76 60 63
AT 88 90 75 79 64 70 57 65
PT 111 109 88 90 67 73 55 64
FI 90 92 81 84 69 75 63 70
SE 105 103 87 90 70 78 62 72
UK 78 80 70 72 58 61 49 54
CZ 80 85 67 75 54 66 46 60
HU 84 88 75 81 64 73 61 71
PL 92 93 77 81 63 69 53 61
Unemployment trap indicators calculated on gross wage (GW) and labour cost (LC)
METR ut (Previous work 67%)
% of APW
GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC
BE 91 93 82 86 74 80 68 76
DK 104 104 97 97 83 83 76 76
DE 100 100 93 94 79 83 70 75
GR 107 105 84 87 61 70 51 62
ES 100 100 82 86 62 71 51 63
FR 89 91 92 94 76 83 60 71
IE 50 54 54 58 60 64 53 58
IT 74 80 53 65 54 66 52 64
LU 104 104 89 90 64 69 57 62
NL 92 93 87 89 75 79 62 65
AT 99 100 84 87 69 75 61 68
PT 77 82 72 77 63 70 52 61
FI 94 95 88 90 79 84 70 76
SE 103 103 91 93 80 85 69 77
UK 45 48 56 59 65 68 57 61
CZ 94 96 80 85 67 76 57 68
HU 89 91 71 78 61 71 59 70
PL 86 88 84 87 68 73 57 64
Unemployment trap indicators calculated on gross wage (GW) and labour cost (LC)
METR ut (Previous work 67%)
% of APW
GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC
BE 92 93 80 85 70 78 65 74
DK 73 73 83 83 77 77 71 71
DE 100 100 88 90 74 78 65 71
GR 101 101 79 84 60 69 50 61
ES 100 100 77 83 61 70 50 62
FR 87 90 89 92 68 77 55 68
IE 100 100 87 88 68 71 54 59
IT 67 75 57 68 53 65 49 62
LU 102 102 107 106 79 81 63 67
NL 96 96 91 92 77 80 63 66
AT 100 100 86 88 71 76 62 69
PT 77 82 72 77 65 71 51 60
FI 97 98 91 93 78 83 69 75
SE 100 100 98 99 78 83 67 75
UK 84 85 82 83 66 69 55 59
CZ 92 94 79 84 64 74 53 65
HU 84 88 75 81 64 73 61 71
PL 94 95 78 82 63 70 54 61
One-earner couple, without children (2001)
50 67 100 150
Single parent with 2 children (2001)
50 67 100 150
Single person (2001)
50 67 100 150
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Unemployment trap indicators calculated on gross wage (GW) and labour cost (LC)
METR ut (Previous work 67%)
% of APW
GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC
BE 87 89 76 81 68 75 64 73
DK 76 76 87 87 82 82 75 75
DE 100 100 85 87 75 79 65 71
GR 107 105 84 87 61 70 51 62
ES 100 100 82 86 61 70 50 62
FR 78 82 84 87 76 83 59 71
IE 95 96 87 88 72 75 57 61
IT 78 83 54 66 53 65 53 65
LU 101 101 104 103 83 85 64 68
NL 94 95 90 92 78 81 63 67
AT 100 100 97 97 78 82 67 73
PT 55 64 55 64 57 65 56 64
FI 100 100 99 99 89 91 76 81
SE 100 100 100 100 84 88 71 78
UK 66 68 72 74 74 76 62 66
CZ 100 100 96 97 77 83 63 72
HU 89 91 71 78 61 71 59 70
PL 100 100 91 93 80 83 65 71
Unemployment trap indicators calculated on gross wage (GW) and labour cost (LC)
METR ut (Previous work 67%)
% of APW
GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC
BE 99 54 89 57 78 59 70 61
DK 1 0 7 4 69 14 67 84 77 35 1
DE 99 52 86 53 75 54 67 55
GR 1 0 1 5 67 95 36 05 05 04 9
ES 1 0 0 5 68 15 56 55 35 35 2
FR 1 0 4 5 68 85 77 05 85 85 6
IE 54 29 48 30 42 32 37 33
IT 75 49 64 49 56 50 51 52
LU 1 0 2 5 18 34 96 64 75 74 7
NL 89 46 78 47 67 49 57 45
AT 80 46 69 46 60 47 54 49
PT 1 1 4 5 99 15 66 85 25 44 9
FI 82 48 71 49 63 50 58 52
SE 1 0 5 5 88 75 87 05 66 25 7
UK 43 24 41 26 38 29 36 31
CZ 76 50 63 49 51 49 44 49
HU 84 52 73 53 62 53 60 56
PL 77 44 66 44 55 45 48 45
Unemployment trap indicators calculated on gross wage (GW) and labour cost (LC)
METR ut (Previous work 67%)
% of APW
GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC
BE 99 54 89 57 78 59 70 61
DK 1 0 7 4 69 14 67 84 77 35 1
DE 1 1 4 5 89 85 88 35 87 25 8
GR 1 0 7 5 88 45 56 15 15 14 9
ES 1 0 3 5 78 35 56 55 35 45 2
FR 1 0 4 5 68 75 66 85 65 55 5
IE 72 36 61 36 51 37 43 37
IT 80 51 70 51 62 53 55 53
LU 1 1 5 5 58 95 16 84 85 84 7
NL 89 46 78 47 67 49 57 46
AT 86 48 74 48 63 49 56 50
PT 1 1 1 5 88 65 46 55 15 24 8
FI 91 51 78 51 67 52 61 54
SE 1 0 5 5 88 75 87 05 66 25 7
UK 54 28 49 30 43 32 39 33
CZ 77 50 65 50 55 50 46 50
HU 84 52 73 53 62 53 60 56
PL 77 44 66 44 55 45 51 46
Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal earner with 67% of APW. 
Secondary earner earnings from 0 to 200% of APW. (2001)
50 67 100 150
Two-earner couple without children. Principal earner with 67% of APW. 
Secondary earner earnings from 0 to 200% of APW. (2001)
50 67 100 150
One-earner couple, with 2 children (2001)
50 67 100 150
 
Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models. - 87 - 
Table B4                       Unemployment trap indicator 
 
Unemployment trap indicators calculated on gross wage (GW) and labour cost (LC)
METR ut (Previous work 100%)
 % of APW
GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC
BE 100.0 100.0 88.8 91.4 78.4 83.5 70.9 78.0
DK 106.8 106.7 91.1 91.2 77.7 77.9 72.7 72.9
DE 100.8 100.7 88.4 90.4 76.9 80.8 70.4 75.1
GR 112.0 109.4 87.6 90.3 65.7 73.2 53.7 63.8
ES 129.3 122.4 103.1 102.4 79.2 84.1 63.1 71.7
FR 120.5 116.6 99.5 99.6 78.8 85.0 64.8 75.0
IE 87.3 88.3 72.6 74.7 58.5 63.0 54.0 58.9
IT 91.9 94.0 76.6 82.5 64.6 73.5 56.4 67.4
LU 144.0 138.7 115.0 113.2 89.1 90.4 75.2 78.2
NL 110.1 108.8 97.8 98.1 80.5 83.2 65.4 68.5
AT 96.0 96.7 81.0 84.4 67.7 73.5 59.7 66.9
PT 141.0 133.1 109.8 107.9 81.4 85.0 65.2 71.9
FI 98.9 99.2 87.5 90.0 73.4 78.7 65.6 72.5
SE 133.5 125.2 108.9 106.7 84.9 88.7 72.0 78.9
UK 78.4 79.7 70.4 72.5 57.7 61.2 49.1 53.8
CZ 97.4 98.1 79.6 84.9 62.3 72.1 51.5 64.1
HU 84.2 88.2 74.9 81.3 63.6 72.8 61.1 71.0
PL 92.1 93.5 77.4 81.2 63.1 69.4 53.5 61.4
Unemployment trap indicators calculated on gross wage (GW) and labour cost (LC)
METR ut (Previous work 100%)
 % of APW
GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC
BE 91.3 92.7 82.3 86.4 74.0 80.2 68.0 75.8
DK 104.1 104.1 96.5 96.6 82.5 82.6 75.9 76.0
DE 114.7 112.2 104.1 103.4 86.7 88.9 74.9 78.9
GR 125.7 120.1 97.9 98.3 70.8 77.2 57.1 66.5
ES 137.9 129.1 110.1 107.7 81.1 85.5 63.7 72.2
FR 100.6 100.5 100.0 100.0 81.7 87.0 63.3 73.9
IE 50.5 54.4 54.3 57.9 60.0 64.3 52.5 57.6
IT 99.9 99.9 73.0 79.8 67.1 75.4 60.7 70.7
LU 153.7 147.2 126.1 122.9 89.1 90.4 73.4 76.6
NL 104.1 103.6 96.6 97.0 81.2 83.8 65.8 68.9
AT 106.3 105.2 88.7 90.7 72.9 77.7 63.1 69.7
PT 106.8 105.5 93.8 95.0 77.6 81.9 61.8 69.1
FI 103.5 102.8 94.5 95.6 84.0 87.2 72.7 78.1
SE 123.1 117.4 106.1 104.6 89.6 92.2 76.0 81.9
UK 45.0 48.2 56.2 59.3 65.3 68.2 56.7 60.7
CZ 94.4 95.9 79.5 84.8 67.5 75.9 56.7 67.9
HU 88.6 91.5 71.2 78.5 61.0 70.9 59.3 69.7
PL 86.1 88.4 84.4 87.1 67.8 73.3 56.6 64.0
Unemployment trap indicators calculated on gross wage (GW) and labour cost (LC)
METR ut (Previous work 100%)
 % of APW
GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC
BE 92.2 93.5 80.0 84.6 70.5 77.5 65.4 73.9
DK 72.6 72.9 82.9 83.0 77.1 77.2 71.1 71.2
DE 100.0 100.0 88.3 90.3 73.9 78.3 65.0 70.6
GR 120.0 115.6 93.6 95.0 69.7 76.3 56.4 65.9
ES 135.1 126.8 103.4 102.6 78.2 83.3 61.8 70.8
FR 100.0 100.0 98.6 98.9 74.1 81.7 59.6 71.3
IE 100.0 100.0 86.9 88.0 67.7 71.1 53.8 58.7
IT 92.8 94.6 76.1 82.2 66.6 75.0 57.7 68.4
LU 118.4 116.2 119.2 116.9 87.0 88.6 68.6 72.4
NL 102.4 102.1 96.4 96.9 80.7 83.4 65.2 68.3
AT 100.0 100.0 85.5 88.1 70.8 76.0 61.7 68.6
PT 106.8 105.5 93.8 95.0 79.5 83.4 60.8 68.4
FI 98.9 99.2 92.2 93.7 79.1 83.2 69.3 75.5
SE 114.1 110.6 108.9 106.7 84.9 88.7 72.0 78.9
UK 84.2 85.1 82.2 83.5 66.0 68.8 54.7 58.8
CZ 95.3 96.5 81.1 86.0 65.9 74.8 53.9 65.9
HU 84.2 88.2 74.9 81.3 63.6 72.8 61.1 71.0
PL 93.8 94.8 77.7 81.5 63.4 69.6 53.6 61.5
Single person (2001)
50 67 100 150
Single parent with 2 children (2001)
50 67 100 150
One-earner couple, without children (2001)
50 67 100 150
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Unemployment trap indicators calculated on gross wage (GW) and labour cost (LC)
METR ut (Previous work 100%)
 % of APW
GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC
BE 86.8 89.0 75.9 81.5 67.7 75.4 63.6 72.5
DK 75.5 75.8 87.1 87.2 82.3 82.4 74.6 74.7
DE 114.6 112.1 95.5 96.2 81.8 84.9 70.3 75.1
GR 125.7 120.1 97.9 98.3 70.8 77.2 57.1 66.5
ES 138.9 129.8 110.8 108.3 80.0 84.7 62.8 71.5
FR 89.0 91.0 92.1 93.9 81.3 86.8 62.3 73.2
IE 95.3 95.7 87.3 88.3 71.8 74.8 56.5 61.2
IT 103.7 102.7 73.5 80.2 66.3 74.8 62.1 71.7
LU 112.6 111.1 112.1 110.6 89.1 90.4 67.6 71.5
NL 102.4 102.1 96.4 96.9 82.3 84.8 66.2 69.3
AT 100.0 100.0 96.6 97.2 78.2 82.1 66.7 72.6
PT 67.4 73.7 64.4 71.2 63.2 70.3 59.7 67.4
FI 100.0 100.0 98.8 99.0 88.8 91.1 75.9 80.7
SE 104.1 103.1 103.1 102.3 85.9 89.4 72.6 79.4
UK 65.8 67.8 71.8 73.8 73.6 75.8 62.3 65.7
CZ 100.0 100.0 95.9 97.0 76.8 82.8 62.8 72.4
HU 88.6 91.5 71.2 78.5 61.0 70.9 59.3 69.7
PL 100.0 100.0 91.0 92.5 80.0 83.4 64.7 70.7
Unemployment trap indicators calculated on gross wage (GW) and labour cost (LC)
METR ut (Previous work 100%)
 % of APW
GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC
BE 99.0 53.9 88.8 57.1 77.8 59.1 70.4 61.0
DK 106.8 46.2 91.2 46.1 77.8 47.0 72.8 50.6
DE 118.0 58.9 100.7 58.8 84.6 59.1 73.7 59.0
GR 112.0 59.2 87.6 56.1 65.7 52.6 53.7 50.9
ES 129.3 65.7 103.1 62.9 79.2 59.8 63.1 56.8
FR 119.8 61.4 100.0 61.2 78.3 61.1 63.1 58.9
IE 53.7 29.0 47.5 29.7 41.8 32.2 37.0 32.9
IT 91.9 54.6 76.6 53.9 64.6 54.2 56.4 54.4
LU 139.0 64.3 111.0 60.9 84.8 56.8 69.1 54.1
NL 114.7 55.9 97.0 55.6 80.0 55.1 65.0 50.7
AT 100.8 53.2 84.6 52.6 70.1 52.4 61.3 52.7
PT 143.6 68.8 112.8 64.8 83.2 59.4 63.7 54.8
FI 98.5 53.7 83.5 53.4 70.7 53.9 63.8 55.3
SE 133.5 67.7 108.9 65.7 84.9 63.0 72.0 62.2
UK 43.4 23.9 40.5 25.9 37.7 28.6 35.8 31.1
CZ 99.9 57.5 81.0 55.9 63.3 54.0 52.2 52.7
HU 84.2 52.2 73.1 52.6 62.3 53.2 60.2 56.4
PL 76.6 44.2 65.9 44.3 55.4 44.5 48.3 44.7
Unemployment trap indicators calculated on gross wage (GW) and labour cost (LC)
METR ut (Previous work 100%)
 % of APW
GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC
BE 99.0 53.9 88.8 57.1 77.8 59.1 70.4 61.0
DK 106.8 46.2 91.2 46.1 77.8 47.0 72.8 50.6
DE 138.2 66.0 116.1 65.2 94.9 64.2 80.1 62.7
GR 125.7 63.8 97.9 60.1 70.8 55.0 57.1 52.7
ES 140.4 69.4 110.7 65.8 83.9 61.9 65.9 58.3
FR 121.5 62.0 99.9 61.2 76.5 60.2 60.5 57.6
IE 71.9 36.1 61.1 36.0 50.8 37.1 43.0 36.7
IT 95.4 55.7 81.2 55.6 69.5 56.4 59.8 56.2
LU 154.9 70.3 119.1 64.5 88.2 58.6 71.3 55.5
NL 114.5 55.8 97.0 55.6 80.0 55.1 65.0 50.7
AT 106.8 55.3 89.1 54.4 73.1 53.8 63.3 53.8
PT 141.0 67.9 108.0 62.8 79.8 57.8 61.5 53.5
FI 106.3 56.3 89.3 55.7 74.6 55.7 66.4 56.7
SE 133.5 67.7 108.9 65.7 84.9 63.0 72.0 62.2
UK 54.3 28.3 48.6 29.7 43.2 31.6 39.4 33.4
CZ 97.4 56.8 80.2 55.6 65.3 54.9 53.1 53.1
HU 84.2 52.2 73.1 52.6 62.3 53.2 60.2 56.4
PL 76.6 44.2 65.9 44.3 55.4 44.5 50.8 46.1
One-earner couple, with 2 children (2001)
50 67 100 150
Two-earner couple without children. Principal earner with 67% of APW. 
Secondary earner earnings from 0 to 200% of APW. (2001)
50 67 100 150
Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal earner with 67% of APW. 
Secondary earner earnings from 0 to 200% of APW. (2001)
50 67 100 150
 
Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models. - 89 - 
Table B5                  Inactivity trap indicator for jobless persons 
 
Inactivity trap indicator for jobless persons calculated on gross wage (GW) and labour cost (LC)
 METRit when moving from social assistance to work,  at a wage level equivalent to:
% of APW
GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC
BE 85.4 88.3 70.7 75.4 66.9 74.5 63.7 72.4 61.1 70.7
DK 96.2 96.3 96.1 96.1 83.1 83.3 72.4 72.6 69.2 69.3
DE 84.2 86.9 89.6 91.4 80.1 83.5 71.3 76.2 66.6 72.0
GR 15.9 34.3 15.9 34.3 15.9 34.3 17.7 35.7 21.7 38.8
ES 68.9 76.2 50.1 61.8 43.9 57.1 39.6 53.7 36.7 51.5
FR 81.2 84.7 82.9 86.1 71.5 77.9 60.0 71.7 52.3 66.1
IE 100.0 100.0 87.3 88.3 72.6 74.7 58.5 63.0 54.0 58.9
IT 10.0 32.8 16.1 37.3 20.0 40.2 26.6 45.2 31.1 48.5
LU 89.0 90.3 92.2 93.2 76.3 79.2 63.2 67.6 57.9 63.0
NL 96.6 97.1 92.2 93.2 84.4 86.6 71.5 75.5 59.4 63.1
AT 100.0 100.0 87.7 89.9 74.8 79.3 63.6 70.1 57.0 64.6
PT 55.5 64.0 50.4 59.9 42.1 53.2 36.1 48.4 35.0 47.4
FI 100.0 100.0 86.2 88.9 78.0 82.4 67.1 73.6 61.3 69.1
SE 100.0 100.0 98.1 98.6 82.5 86.8 67.2 75.3 60.2 70.0
UK 79.7 80.3 78.4 79.7 70.4 72.5 57.7 61.2 49.1 53.8
CZ 83.2 87.5 70.5 78.1 59.4 69.9 48.8 62.1 42.5 57.4
HU 69.2 77.0 55.1 66.5 53.3 65.1 49.1 62.0 51.4 63.7
PL 92.4 93.7 72.4 77.0 62.7 69.0 53.3 61.2 46.9 55.9
Inactivity trap indicator for jobless persons calculated on gross wage (GW) and labour cost (LC)
 METRit when moving from social assistance to work,  at a wage level equivalent to:
% of APW
GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC
BE 96.9 97.5 76.6 80.4 71.4 77.9 66.6 74.6 63.1 72.1
DK 84.5 84.8 91.6 91.7 87.2 87.3 76.3 76.4 71.8 71.9
DE 84.2 86.9 89.6 91.4 85.3 87.8 74.1 78.5 66.5 71.9
GR 15.9 34.3 15.9 34.3 15.9 34.3 15.9 34.3 20.5 37.8
ES 100.2 100.2 68.3 75.7 58.1 67.9 46.3 58.9 40.5 54.4
FR 68.9 74.7 75.4 80.0 81.2 85.4 69.1 78.1 54.9 68.0
IE 50.9 54.8 50.5 54.4 54.3 57.9 60.0 64.3 52.5 57.6
IT -0.7 24.8 -0.6 24.9 -2.1 23.8 16.9 37.9 27.2 45.6
LU 85.8 87.5 94.2 94.9 81.7 83.9 59.3 64.3 53.5 59.1
NL 93.3 94.2 82.2 84.6 80.2 82.9 70.2 74.4 58.5 62.3
AT 100.0 100.0 99.5 99.5 83.6 86.5 69.5 74.9 60.9 67.8
PT 55.5 64.0 55.5 64.0 55.5 64.0 51.9 61.2 44.7 55.3
FI 70.3 76.2 64.7 71.7 65.5 72.4 64.6 71.7 59.7 67.8
SE 81.9 86.4 63.3 72.4 61.4 71.0 59.7 69.7 56.1 66.9
UK 80.6 81.2 45.0 48.2 56.2 59.3 65.3 68.2 56.7 60.7
CZ 100.0 100.0 94.4 95.9 79.5 84.8 67.5 75.9 56.7 67.9
HU 61.2 71.1 44.7 58.7 38.4 54.0 39.0 54.5 44.7 58.7
PL 100.0 100.0 86.1 88.4 84.4 87.1 67.8 73.3 56.6 64.0
Inactivity trap indicator for jobless persons calculated on gross wage (GW) and labour cost (LC)
 METRit when moving from social assistance to work,  at a wage level equivalent to:
% of APW
GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC
BE 97.5 98.0 77.6 81.2 69.0 76.1 63.1 71.9 60.5 70.2
DK 34.3 35.5 59.4 59.9 73.0 73.2 70.4 70.6 66.7 66.8
DE 84.2 86.9 89.6 91.4 80.5 83.9 68.7 74.0 61.5 67.7
GR 15.9 34.3 15.9 34.3 15.9 34.3 17.7 35.7 21.7 38.8
ES 87.7 90.6 60.0 69.4 47.4 59.7 40.7 54.6 36.8 51.6
FR 75.6 80.1 82.6 85.9 85.7 88.9 65.4 75.5 53.8 67.2
IE 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 86.9 88.0 67.7 71.1 53.8 58.7
IT 7.3 30.8 8.2 31.4 13.0 35.0 24.3 43.4 29.5 47.4
LU 79.2 81.8 89.8 91.0 97.9 98.2 72.7 76.0 59.0 64.0
NL 95.7 96.2 96.4 96.8 91.9 93.0 77.7 80.8 63.2 66.5
AT 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 85.5 88.1 70.8 76.0 61.7 68.6
PT 55.5 64.0 55.5 64.0 55.5 64.0 53.8 62.7 43.7 54.5
FI 100.0 100.0 97.4 97.9 91.0 92.8 78.3 82.6 68.8 75.1
SE 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.4 98.8 77.9 83.3 67.3 75.4
UK 88.5 88.8 84.2 85.1 82.2 83.5 66.0 68.8 54.7 58.8
CZ 100.0 100.0 92.4 94.4 78.9 84.4 64.5 73.7 53.0 65.1
HU 69.2 77.0 55.1 66.5 53.3 65.1 49.1 62.0 51.4 63.7
PL 100.0 100.0 93.8 94.8 77.7 81.5 63.4 69.6 53.6 61.5
One-earner couple, without children (2001)
33 50 67 100 150
Single parent with 2 children (2001)
33 50 67 100 150
Single person (2001)
33 50 67 100 150
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Inactivity trap indicator for jobless persons calculated on gross wage (GW) and labour cost (LC)
 METRit when moving from social assistance to work,  at a wage level equivalent to:
% of APW
GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC
BE 96.9 97.5 72.2 76.6 65.0 73.0 60.4 69.8 58.7 68.8
DK 36.7 37.8 58.2 58.7 74.2 74.4 73.6 73.8 68.8 68.9
DE 84.2 86.9 89.6 91.4 76.8 80.8 69.3 74.6 62.0 68.1
GR 15.9 34.3 15.9 34.3 15.9 34.3 15.9 34.3 20.5 37.8
ES 106.3 104.9 76.6 82.1 64.3 72.6 48.8 60.8 42.0 55.6
FR 68.2 74.2 74.9 79.6 81.6 85.7 74.3 81.8 57.7 69.9
IE 100.0 100.0 95.3 95.7 87.3 88.3 71.8 74.8 56.5 61.2
IT -4.5 21.9 -4.4 22.0 -7.1 20.0 12.3 34.5 26.1 44.8
LU 75.5 78.4 87.3 88.9 93.2 94.0 76.4 79.3 59.2 64.1
NL 95.7 96.2 93.9 94.7 90.0 91.4 78.0 81.1 63.4 66.7
AT 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 96.6 97.2 78.2 82.1 66.7 72.6
PT 55.5 64.0 55.5 64.0 55.5 64.0 57.2 65.4 55.7 64.2
FI 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.8 99.0 88.8 91.1 75.9 80.7
SE 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 83.8 87.8 71.2 78.3
UK 93.1 93.3 65.8 67.8 71.8 73.8 73.6 75.8 62.3 65.7
CZ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 95.9 97.0 76.8 82.8 62.8 72.4
HU 61.2 71.1 44.7 58.7 38.4 54.0 39.0 54.5 44.7 58.7
PL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 91.0 92.5 80.0 83.4 64.7 70.7
Inactivity trap indicator for jobless persons calculated on gross wage (GW) and labour cost (LC)
 METRit when moving from social assistance to work,  at a wage level equivalent to:
% of APW
GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC
BE 45.8 33.7 45.1 35.5 48.6 41.6 50.9 46.8 52.4 51.5
DK 55.6 19.3 52.1 23.1 50.4 25.9 50.4 30.7 54.5 38.0
DE 41.9 28.5 45.5 33.2 46.6 36.4 48.3 41.0 49.5 45.0
GR 15.9 26.0 15.9 27.2 15.9 28.1 17.7 30.1 21.7 33.6
ES 18.1 28.0 16.5 28.8 18.9 30.7 22.8 33.9 25.5 36.9
FR 21.4 26.8 22.5 28.5 27.4 33.1 29.7 39.7 30.7 42.5
IE 12.0 11.5 14.7 13.6 18.4 16.3 22.3 21.6 24.0 24.8
IT 28.4 32.3 32.6 35.7 32.3 37.4 34.9 40.9 36.6 44.2
LU 13.6 16.1 16.7 18.4 19.7 20.8 23.7 24.6 28.3 29.3
NL 35.1 23.5 32.7 25.6 35.8 29.2 39.0 34.0 37.7 33.8
AT 21.4 23.6 20.2 25.0 24.5 27.9 29.8 32.5 34.5 37.4
PT 42.0 30.4 32.7 30.5 30.0 31.3 27.7 32.6 26.7 34.1
FI 25.4 26.7 26.8 29.2 30.0 32.0 34.9 36.7 39.9 42.1
SE 26.7 31.4 26.9 33.4 29.4 35.8 31.7 39.0 36.5 43.7
UK 6.7 7.9 15.1 12.6 19.4 16.1 23.5 20.8 26.4 25.2
CZ 31.3 33.6 29.4 35.2 28.4 36.4 28.0 38.4 28.7 40.6
HU 20.5 30.4 23.0 32.7 27.4 35.6 31.7 39.5 39.8 45.9
PL 30.8 25.4 32.0 28.3 32.5 30.5 33.1 33.4 33.4 36.2
Inactivity trap indicator for jobless persons calculated on gross wage (GW) and labour cost (LC)
 METRit when moving from social assistance to work,  at a wage level equivalent to:
% of APW
GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC GW LC
BE 45.7 33.7 45.0 35.5 48.5 41.6 50.8 46.7 52.4 51.5
DK 82.7 28.2 70.0 30.6 63.7 32.5 59.4 36.0 60.5 42.1
DE 51.7 31.2 51.3 35.2 51.3 38.3 51.4 42.6 51.2 46.0
GR 15.9 26.0 15.9 27.2 15.9 28.1 15.9 29.3 20.5 32.9
ES 15.1 27.3 12.2 27.4 15.0 29.2 19.8 32.5 23.2 35.7
FR 56.4 35.9 43.2 35.5 41.5 38.5 37.3 43.0 34.4 44.4
IE 33.5 18.0 28.9 19.2 29.0 21.2 29.3 25.5 28.7 27.7
IT 36.8 34.4 44.4 39.5 43.2 41.4 44.0 45.0 42.8 47.4
LU 13.6 16.1 13.7 17.3 13.8 18.2 17.6 21.4 24.3 26.9
NL 38.4 24.4 34.9 26.4 37.6 30.0 40.2 34.6 38.5 34.3
AT 21.4 23.6 20.2 25.0 24.5 27.9 29.8 32.5 34.5 37.4
PT 87.0 42.4 72.6 44.3 57.0 42.2 45.6 41.3 38.7 40.8
FI 41.6 31.0 37.5 32.8 38.0 35.2 40.3 39.3 43.5 44.0
SE 37.4 34.0 36.6 36.5 36.6 38.5 36.5 41.2 39.7 45.4
UK 62.9 25.4 48.5 26.0 44.3 27.7 40.3 30.1 37.5 32.2
CZ 31.3 33.6 29.7 35.3 29.6 36.9 31.5 39.9 30.5 41.5
HU 20.5 30.4 23.0 32.7 27.4 35.6 31.7 39.5 39.8 45.9
PL 54.3 31.8 47.4 33.8 44.1 35.3 40.8 37.2 41.0 40.5
Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal earner with 67% of APW. 
Secondary earner earnings from 0 to 200% of APW. (2001)
33 50 67 100 150
Two-earner couple without children. Principal earner with 67% of APW. 
Secondary earner earnings from 0 to 200% of APW. (2001)
33 50 67 100 150
One-earner couple, with 2 children (2001)
33 50 67 100 150
 
Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models. - 91 - 
Figure B1 
 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































METR-GW (2001) METR-LC (2001)


































































































































































































































































METR-GW (2001) METR-LC (2001)































































METR-GW (2001) METR-LC (2001)































































































































































































METR-GW (2001) METR-LC (2001)
 
Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models. - 93 - 
Figure B2 
 
Comparing  METRlw on Gross Wage (GW) and Labour Cost (LC) (2001) 
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Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models. - 95 - 
Figure B3 
 
Comparing  METRlw on Gross Wage (GW) and Labour Cost (LC) (2001) 
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Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models. - 97 - 
Figure B4 
 
Comparing  METRlw on Gross Wage (GW) and Labour Cost (LC) (2001) 
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Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models. - 99 - 
Figure B5 
 
Comparing  METRlw on Gross Wage (GW) and Labour Cost (LC) (2001) 
Belgium: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Denmark: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 































































METR-GW (2001) METR-LC (2001)
Germany: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Greece: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Spain: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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France: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Ireland: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Italy: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Luxembourg: Two-earner couple without children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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Netherlands: Two-earner couple without children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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Austria: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Portugal: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Finland: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Sweden: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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United Kingdom: Two-earner couple without children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 































































METR-GW (2001) METR-LC (2001)
Czech Republic: Two-earner couple without children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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Hungary: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Poland: Two-earner couple without children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models. - 101 - 
Figure B6 
 
Comparing  METRlw on Gross Wage (GW) and Labour Cost (LC) (2001) 
Belgium: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Denmark: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Germany: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Greece: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Spain: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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France: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Ireland: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 































































METR-GW (2001) METR-LC (2001)
Italy: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal earner 
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Luxembourg: Two-earner couple with 2 children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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Netherlands: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Austria: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Portugal: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Finland: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Sweden: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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United Kingdom: Two-earner couple with 2 children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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Czech Republic: Two-earner couple with 2 children. 
Principal earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner 
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Hungary: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Poland: Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal 
earner with 67% of APW. Secondary earner earnings 
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Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models. 